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Abstract
This study analyses the Oslo Accords, the interim self-government 
agreements signed between the government of Israel and the Palestine 
Liberation' Organisation (PLO), during the period 1993-1995. It suggests that 
the Israeli recognition of the PLO as the official representative of the 
Palestinian people did not translate into an acceptance that the Palestinians 
possessed an equal national right to the territories that both peoples claimed. 
The acceptance of the PLO as a strategic partner ironically served to 
consolidate Israel’s post-1967 settlement presence in the West Bank and Gaza 
strip. It provided Israel with the means to achieve a separation of peoples 
without a withdrawal from the occupied territories, to keep the land but not its 
indigenous population. Through the structure of the Palestinian interim self- 
governing agreements, the Rabin government sought to ‘persuade’ the PLO to 
abandon its goal of Palestinian statehood through a complex co-optation 
process. In this situation, Israel would control the terms and momentum of the 
interim period, bringing the PLO into a position of substantial authority under 
its aegis while simultaneously creating an irreversible fait accompli that would 
impel the Palestinian leadership to forego its demands for sovereignty and 
settle for an alternative, permanently sub-sovereign final status arrangement 
instead. But in contrast to preceding analyses of Oslo, this study argues that 
these circumstances cannot be wholly interpreted in Realist terms, as an 
instance of traditional power politics or an act of shrewd statecraft. It is 
undeniably true that the key Israeli leaders at the time, Yitzhak Rabin and 
Shimon Peres, were manipulating the Oslo Accords to their own ends, but this 
deliberative process cannot be fully explained at the level of agency. It must 
instead be understood as reflecting a new logic of rule that has been explicated 
in the works of the theorists Gilles Deleuze and Michael Hardt.
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Introduction 
Unstated Continuities of Political Outlook
It is unedifying to besmirch the reputation of a slain leader. The shock 
of political killings frequently creates an aura of inviolability and tends to 
stifle critical assessments of the legacy of the statesman in question. The 
assassination of Yitzhak Rabin on 4 November 1995, for example, is often 
viewed as the first of a series of calamitous downturns to the achievement of 
the 1993 Oslo Accords. Rabin was undoubtedly murdered because of 
opposition to the sweeping political changes that his administration had begun 
to implement as part of the Israeli-Palestinian conciliation process. In stark 
contrast to his ultra-nationalist predecessor Yitzhak Shamir, Rabin both 
recognised the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) as the legitimate 
representative of the Palestinian people and assented to its incorporation as the 
seat of an interim self-governing authority. However, both Rabin’s detractors 
during his time of office and his later eulogisers failed to understand the 
entirety of his intentions regarding the Palestinians. A noted scholar of Israeli- 
Palestinian relations remarked in 1994, for instance, that ‘[b]y starting the 
withdrawal from occupied territory, Rabin is not leading Israel to commit 
suicide, as his critics on the right claim, but laying the only secure foundation 
for peaceful coexistence between Israel and the Palestinians’.1 It is thus 
believed that Rabin had come to accept the inevitability of a Palestinian state, 
that it was the logical outcome of a process of compromise in which Israel was 
to receive security guarantees in exchange. From such a standpoint, Rabin’s 
positive legacy was undermined by a number of spoiler events that followed
'Avi Shlaim, ‘Prelude to the Accord: Likud, Labor, and the Palestinians’ Journal of 
Palestine Studies 23 no. 2 (Winter 1994), 19.
5
his assassination, namely sensational acts of terrorism commitment by
Palestinian Islamic militants and the dubious commitment to peace of the
Likud government that came to power in June 1996. But instead of
emphasising how markedly different the Rabin government was from its
predecessor and successor, it is worthwhile to examine its innate similarities to
them, how its recognition of the PLO was only seemingly transformative and
in fact represented unstated continuities of Israeli political outlook.
Rabin: Ambiguous Intentions
Yitzhak Rabin’s approach toward the Oslo Accords was puzzling.
According to his advisers and members of cabinet, he never discussed the
long-term implications of the interim agreements that he reached with the
PLO. He kept all his deliberations on this monumental matter to himself. This
almost unbelievable development has been explained as a function of Rabin’s
personality and style of leadership. It was noted in 1995 in this regard that:
Rabin, who never viewed himself as a politician, disparages, distrusts, 
and tends to ignore party functionaries. He holds the reins of power 
tightly in his grip and is considered to be a “lone wolf’ because he 
rarely takes his colleagues into his confidence.3
If Rabin had any additional strategic goals or any clear vision where the Oslo
process should go, he simply did not share these thoughts with others. The
cabinet member Shimon Shitreet prodded Rabin several times to discuss the
impending plans of the government, particularly Israel’s future borders, but to
2Efraim Inbar, Rabin and Israel’s National Security (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1999): 152.
3Myron J. Aronoff, ‘Labor in the Second Rabin Era: The First Year o f Leadership’ in 
Robert O. Freedman, ed., Israel Under Rabin (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995): 137.
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no avail.4 Yossi Beilin, one of the key Israeli architects of the Oslo
Agreements, commented in this respect that:
For Rabin, the absence of a discussion on the permanent arrangement 
was a political preference. After his death, I sat with Leah Rabin and 
said to her, “If anyone could know what Rabin was thinking of as a 
permanent settlement you are the one.” She said to me, “Look, I can’t 
tell you. He was very pragmatic, he hated to deal with what would be 
many years down the road. He thought about what would be now and 
the immediate future. As far as I know, he didn’t have a very clear 
picture of the permanent settlement.”5
Others argued that Rabin believed this ambiguity to be useful in reducing the
opposition to the concessions he had in mind for the future. For example,
Yehuda Ben-Meir, a former Israeli deputy Foreign Minister and Eitan Haber,
an adviser to Rabin and head of the Prime Minister’s Bureau, both speculate
that this process of deferral may have been Rabin’s way of dealing with the
inevitability of a Palestinian state.6
Adherents to the view that Rabin had quietly come to accept the idea
of a Palestinian state point to the late leader’s frequent talk of the need for
‘separation’ between Israelis and Palestinians. But a closer examination of the
idea is no more revealing of Rabin’s intentions. After a suicide bombing in Tel
Aviv on 19 October 1994, for example, Rabin stated the ‘necessity of
separation’ and that Israel would continue to face security problems of this
kind ‘as long as we continue to occupy another nation of two million people’.7
Yet it is not clear if ‘ending the occupation’ translated into eventual
Palestinian statehood or was meant to lead to a different arrangement.
Following a similar attack in Beit Lid on 22 January 1995, Rabin raised the
4Inbar, 152.
5‘Interview with Yossi Beilin on the Permanent Status Arrangement’, H a’aretz, 7 
March 1997.
6Inbar, 152.
1 Jerusalem Post, 20 October 1994.
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slogan of ‘total separation* and began cabinet discussions about building a 
‘security fence’ to create a physical division between Israelis and
o
Palestinians. Again, Rabin never expressly equated these proposals with
sovereign borders. The leading Israeli analyst of Rabin’s strategic thought
depicts this concept of separation in an equally problematic way: ‘Separation
[was] a new term in Israeli political parlance that denoted the partition of the
Land of Israel between Arabs and Jews, as well as a reduction in the contact
and the friction between the two populations...’.9 It must be noted, however,
that the terms ‘separation’ and ‘partition’ cannot be used interchangeably:
[F]our different operative terms -  “territorial compromise”, 
“separation”, “partition”, “land-for-peace” -  are assumed, mistakenly, 
to be synonymous with each other, and as a result are employed 
entirely too indiscriminately. Whereas, most emphatically, in point of 
practice they are anything but interchangeable. In fact, it would be fair 
to say they are words -  and worlds -  apart.10
Whereas ‘partition’, the division of a country into two or more sovereign
nations, implies the creation of a Palestinian state, ‘separation’ or ‘reduction in
contact and friction’ does not connote political division per se and thus
suggests that any number of non-sovereign formulas could be used to address
the status of the Palestinians.
Peres’s Role and the Beilin-Abu Mazen Agreement
Rabin’s Foreign Minister Shimon Peres played an equally significant
role in shaping the Oslo Accords. Indeed, it was Peres who convinced Rabin
of the need to recognise and negotiate with the PLO. So even if Rabin’s
8 Jerusalem Post, 31 January 1995.
9Inbar, 152.
,0Aharon Klieman, Constructive Ambiguity in Middle East Peace-Making, Research 
Report Series no. 10 (Tel Aviv, Israel: The Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research, Tel 
Aviv University, 1999): 96.
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position can never clearly be known, it might be argued that Peres’s ability to 
sell Rabin on the idea of a partnership with the PLO, coupled with a rational 
understanding of the kinds of compromises that would be required to achieve a 
lasting and stable peace, meant that a Palestinian state would have been the 
foregone conclusion of Oslo -  if Rabin had not been assassinated, or, if Peres, 
as Rabin’s successor, had not fallen from power in June 1996. But before 
dismissing concerns with inconsistencies in Rabin’s actions and statements as 
being mean-spirited or somewhat foolhardy, it is fruitful to relay some equally 
curious behaviour on the part of Peres, particularly in relation to a highly 
relevant document known as the Beilin-Abu Mazen agreement.
Between October 1993 and November 1995 a series of secret and 
unofficial meetings took place between teams led by the Israeli Deputy 
Foreign Minister Yossi Beilin and the PLO Executive Committee member 
Mahmoud Abbas (who is also known as Abu Mazen) to explore practical 
solutions for the final status agreement that would eventually be negotiated by 
the Israelis and the Palestinians. The draft agreement that was finally reached 
was only a tentative understanding in principle -  and only on some but not all 
outstanding issues, but its central tenet was that Israel would agree to the 
establishment of a Palestinian state.11 Rabin was never shown the document,
"See Aharon Klieman, Compromising Palestine: A Guide to Final Status
Negotiations (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000): 227-229. The gist of the draft of 
the agreement is as follows:
Israeli concessions:
• agreement to the establishment of a Palestinian state;
• consent for an extraterritorial corridor linking the Gaza Strip with the West Bank;
• a pledge of financial assistance for the absorption and rehabilitation of Palestinian
refugees outside Israel’s final borders;
• the Palestinians could continue to claim the moral right of return;
• the Palestinians would have functional control over Muslim and Christian holy sites in 
Jerusalem;
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which was completed just three days before his assassination. But is it is just
as significant to note that when Peres became privy to the content of the
Beilin-Abu Mazen agreement on 11 November 1995, he refused to endorse it.
Peres’s objections were not merely formulaic. He was fundamentally opposed
to the gist of the understanding that his deputy had reached with the
Palestinian team. Beilin, who was in a unique position to gauge Peres’s
personal positions, later commented on the nature of this disagreement:
[Peres] believes that a Palestinian state is not necessary. He doesn’t see 
that territorial compromise is an appropriate vision....He believes in a 
functional compromise. If I were to compare the readiness for 
concessions..., I cannot say that between Rabin and Peres that Peres is 
the dove. I can’t say that.12
Peres was the driving force behind the Rabin government’s recognition of the
PLO, but at the same time was opposed to the creation of a Palestinian state.
Complex Co-optation
This study addresses the seeming anomalies reflected in Rabin and
Peres’s actions and statements. It argues that at a deeper level the Oslo
Accords represent a continuation of past Israeli positions toward the
Palestinians. The Israeli recognition of the PLO as the official representative
• the Palestinians’ capital would be located on the outskirts of Jerusalem, in the Arab 
villages o f Abu Dis and al-Azariyya.
Palestinian concessions:
• the pre-1967 borders would be open to modification;
• Israel would not be held to return to those 1967 lines, nor held to full withdrawal;
• Israel could annex the largest settlement areas of the West Bank and the Palestinian state
would receive lands formerly inside Israel in exchange;
• military areas of the Jordan Rift Valley would temporarily remain under Israeli control 
but would be scheduled for transfer to Palestinian rule by 2007, at the time of full 
normalization;
• the Palestinian state would be demilitarised;
• the Palestinian national leadership would declare and end to the conflict and pledge to
make no further demands upon Israel.
I2‘lnterview with Yossi Beilin on the Permanent Status Arrangement’, H a’aretz, 1 
March 1997.
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of the Palestinian people did not translate into an acceptance that the 
Palestinians possessed an equal national right to the territories that both 
peoples claimed. The acceptance of the PLO as a strategic partner ironically 
served to consolidate Israel’s post-1967 settlement presence in the West Bank 
and Gaza strip. It provided Israel with the means to achieve a separation of 
peoples without a withdrawal from the occupied territories, to keep the land 
but not its indigenous population. Through the structure of the Palestinian 
interim self-governing agreements, the Rabin government sought to ‘persuade’ 
the PLO to abandon its goal of Palestinian statehood through a complex co­
optation process. In this situation, Israel would control the terms and 
momentum of the interim period, bringing the PLO into a position of 
substantial authority under its aegis while simultaneously creating an 
irreversible fait accompli that would impel the Palestinian leadership to forego 
its demands for sovereignty and settle for an alternative, permanently sub­
sovereign final status arrangement instead. But in contrast to preceding 
analyses o f Oslo, this study argues that these circumstances cannot be wholly 
interpreted in Realist terms, as an instance o f traditional power politics or an 
act o f shrewd statecraft. It is undeniably true that Rabin and Peres were 
manipulating the Oslo Accords to their own ends, but this deliberative process 
cannot be fully explained at the level o f agency and must be understood as 
reflecting a new logic o f rule.
The theoretical basis of this study is found in the works of Gilles 
Deleuze and Michael Hardt. It is possible to raise immediate concerns of bias
11
because Gilles Deleuze was a vocal supporter of the Palestinian cause.13 But 
such concerns should be downplayed. Deleuze was, above all, a philosopher 
and his writings are utilised for their broad critical perspective. Indeed, 
Deleuze’s support for the Palestinians can be understood in the general context 
of his works, as the endorsing of views that challenged hegemonic 
perspectives or what he derided as the ‘master’s or colonist’s discourse’.14 For 
Deleuze, the Palestinians represented the quintessential ‘Other’. He admired 
how, in the face of great opposition, they were able to craft a unique identity -  
and largely on their own terms: ‘people don’t take enough account, for 
instance, of how the PLO has had to invent a space-time in the Arab world’.15 
While this study can rightly be said to resonate with the underlying ideas that 
shaped Deleuze’s pro-Palestinian views, it should not be viewed as a direct 
outgrowth of those political beliefs.
For Deleuze, an important aspect of challenging hegemonic 
perspectives was to conceptually map how forms of power re-manifested 
through changing relationships and modes of interaction. This study is based 
upon an essay Deleuze wrote near the end of his life that attempted to detail a 
new template of ordering in the hope that it might assist in the formulation of 
future strategies of emancipation. It is relevant to note that Deleuze was 
gravely ill during the first years of the Oslo Accords and committed suicide in 
1995. But had these tragic circumstances not occurred and given his manifest
l3See, for example, Gilles Deleuze, ‘The Troublemakers’, Discourse, vol. 20, no.3, 
23-4 (1998). Originally published in Le Monde, 7 April 1978; ‘The Grandeur of Yasser 
Arafat’, Discourse, vol. 20, no. 3, 25-9 (1998). Originally published in Review d ‘etudes 
palestiniennes, September 1973; and ‘Wherever They Can See It’, Discourse, vol. 20 no. 3, 
34-35 (1998). Originally published in al-Karmel 29, 1988, 27-8.
,4Gilles Deleuze, ‘Mediators’ in Gilles Deleuze, Negotiations 1972-1990 (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1995): 172. 126.
,5Gilles Deleuze, ‘Control and Becoming’ in Gilles Deleuze, Negotiations 1972-1990 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1995): 172.
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interest in Palestinian affairs, it is possible that Deleuze would have produced 
an analysis of the Oslo Accords that mirrored this investigation. Deleuze’s 
insights, which are very much supplemented in this analysis with the work of 
Michael Hardt, are crucial in understanding the new power dynamic that 
began to take hold during the ‘breakthrough’ Israeli-Palestinian agreements. 
Without this particular theoretical template, the notion of complex co-optation 
is likely to be misunderstood as a crafty act of diplomacy, or worse, a grand 
conspiracy.
Structure o f Chapters
Chapter one is a literature review. It gauges inconsistencies and 
unexplored possibilities that are reflected in the asymmetrical power structure 
of the Oslo Accords. It suggests that the achievement and dynamic of the 
agreements can not be fully explained by 1) foreign policy analysis and 
‘rational choice’ models of decision-making; 2) trends in diplomacy rooted in 
‘constructive ambiguity’; or 3) the ‘overly-neutral’ character of the Norwegian 
facilitation/mediation of the Accords. It posits that there is an Israeli strategic 
element at the heart of the Accords, but that this phenomenon can only be 
understood at a deeper level and as a complex and diffuse end goal.
Chapter two presents the work of Gilles Deleuze and Michael Hardt. It 
introduces key concepts: 1) the ‘control society’, a term developed by Deleuze 
to convey that traditional ends were increasingly being achieved by new 
means of devolution, forms of ‘empowerment’ that seemed to be an 
improvement from past types of ordering but that were ultimately 
disenfranchising; 2) ‘modulation’, a concept that Deleuze used to further 
describe this new occurrence, which connotes an environment wherein there is
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a constant ‘changing of the rules’ and; 3) the ‘extra-dialectical’ condition, 
Hardt’s theoretical elaboration of this type of relative acceptance and 
empowerment. These ideas provide the conceptual basis for the argument that 
the 1993 Rabin government essentially structured the Oslo Accords to co-opt 
the PLO as a permanently sub-sovereign authority under Israeli rule.
Chapter three examines Rabin’s past experiences in promoting Israeli 
security needs and the tactics that Shimon Peres long contemplated in relation 
to the Palestinian question. It suggests that the principal Israeli decision­
makers during the Oslo Accords were predisposed toward complex co­
optation. It conveys that these ‘predispositions’ were not simply the sum of 
these two leaders’ political personalities, or their interpretation of foreign 
policy and security issues, but rather were the result of a somewhat unplanned 
combination of these factors in a manner that reflected the operative logic of 
‘control society’ forms of governance.
Chapter four maps the process in which complex co-optation unfolded. 
It maintains that the independent Norwegian initiative that created a line of 
contact with the PLO provided a divergent opportunity to achieve Israeli 
political goals. It reconstructs the history and substance of the negotiations, 
using Deleuze’s insights to further elucidate the nature of the Accords’ power 
asymmetries and Israel’s related ‘concessions’ to the Palestinians. It suggests 
that between 1993 and 1995, the co-optation element came to be structured as 
a kind of ‘phased diminishment of expectations’.
Chapter five examines the on-the-ground relationship between Yasser 
Arafat’s Palestinian Authority (PA) and the Rabin government in 1994 and 
1995. It is the principal application of Michael Hardt’s insights to the case
14
study. It suggests that the failure of the Rabin government to wholly embrace 
Arafat’s modus operandi to its advantage, and its seemingly contradictory 
practice of disempowering its partner in peace instead, can best be understood 
as traits of an ‘extra-dialectical’ condition that had come to define the 
relationship between Israel and the PLO after Oslo.
Chapter six addresses conflict resolution strategies. It suggests that the 
theoretical insights gleaned from the study substantially affect 
recommendations that seek to address the shortcomings of the Oslo Accords. 
It examines possible means that might have enhanced the efficacy of Rabin 
and Peres’s ‘complex co-optation* programme. It also explores if the 
principles of the ‘control society’ affect proposals for new forms of mediation 
specifically intended to protect the rights of sub-nationals, such as the 
Palestinians.
The Conclusion utilises the insights gleaned from the 1993-1995 
period of investigation to address Israeli-Palestinians relations at the present 
time. It suggests that the Rabin government’s complex co-optation attempt 
essentially consigned the Oslo Accords to failure, made armed confrontation 
between Israelis and Palestinians inevitable. Concerned with the immediate 
safety needs of the Palestinians, it endorses multilateral intervention in the 
conflict. It then examines Deleuze’s ideas on possible ways out from the 
‘control society’ in tandem with the related thought of the philosopher Martin 
Buber -  who long contemplated similar themes in the Israeli-Palestinian 
context, so as to intimate the first steps needed to permanently end the enmity 
between the two peoples.
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Chapter One 
Assessing the Oslo Accords
This chapter reviews analyses of the Oslo Accords. It explores the 
issues pertaining to the interests and motives of the Rabin government in Israel 
and the PLO at the onset of the landmark agreement, why both parties decided 
to recognise each other under the auspices of the Norwegian government and 
officially began a peace process in September 1993. It focuses on the 
diplomatic substance of the breakthrough as well as the nature of the 
Norwegian mediation of the Accords. It examines the link between the 
Accords and the vision of peace in the Israeli national narrative. Most 
importantly, it gauges inconsistencies and unexplored possibilities relating to 
the dynamic underlying the Israeli-Palestinian process of mutual recognition 
that are reflected in the asymmetrical power structure of the Accords.
Contradictory Intentions 
Andrew S. Buchanan, an International Relations scholar, has written 
the most comprehensive account of the Oslo Accords to date.1 He examines 
the background and the framework of the Accords, surveying the dynamics of 
this attempt to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Buchanan maintains that 
the Accords, and particularly their chief innovation -  the Israeli-PLO act of 
mutual recognition, emerged because of a broad convergence of interests of
'Andrew S. Buchanan, Peace with Justice: A History o f the Israeli-Palestinian 
Declaration o f Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (London: Macmillan, 
2000). There are of course other chronicles of the Accords, but these works lack the 
sophistication of Buchanan’s analysis and tend to focus on the intrigue of the negotiations at 
the expense of the actual substance of the agreements. The two most well known accounts of 
Oslo are journalistic, rather than scholarly in orientation: Jane Corbin, Gaza First (London: 
Bloomsbury, 1994) and David Makovsky, Making Peace with the PLO (Boulder: Westview 
Press, 1996). Similar, non-scholarly texts have been written by Israeli and Palestinian policy 
makers and negotiators. See Mahmud Abbas, Through Secret Channels (Reading: Garnet, 
1995), Yossi Beilin, Touching Peace: From the Oslo Accord to a Final Agreement, trans. 
Philip Simpson (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1999) and Uri Savir, The Process: 1000 
days that changed the Middle East (New York: Random House, 1998).
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the Rabin government and the Arafat-led PLO in the early 1990s. He 
chronicles how the agreements were highly asymmetrical in structure, often 
grossly favouring Israel at the expense of the Palestinians, but his assessment 
of why this institutionalised imbalance occurred is problematic, rooted in 
contradictory assertions.
For Buchanan, ‘[t]he step towards mutual recognition depended on a 
number of factors which only when combined led to the Israeli-Palestinian 
breakthrough, factors which had the timings been different may never have 
influenced the willingness to negotiate’.2 First, there was a structural change 
of the international system from a bipolar to a unipolar one and, as a result, 
both Israel and the PLO had to re-examine past positions and strategic goals. 
Whereas the Israelis were uncertain if they would continue to receive US 
military and economic assistance in the new global climate, the PLO had 
completely lost the political and logistical support of its superpower patron, 
the USSR. Secondly, there was a realignment of the political relations within 
the Middle East after the 1991 Persian Gulf War. The conflict had severely 
weakened the conventional fighting capabilities and nuclear potential of Iraq, 
the only regional state that heretofore was capable of rivalling Israeli military 
strength. But before Israel could begin to consolidate its regional power in the 
wake of this occurrence, it was necessary to find a political solution to the 
ongoing Palestinian intifada or uprising as well as achieve peace treaties with 
neighbouring Arab states. Such a dynamic received momentum after the 
election of the Israeli Labour party in 1992, with its less ideologically rigid 
stance about trading lands occupied in war. The new Israeli Prime Minister,
2Ibid., 142.
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Yitzhak Rabin, believed that the loss of superpower conflict by proxy and the 
removal of Iraq from the regional balance of power created grounds for his 
primary goal -  a diplomatic compromise with the Arab states.
A resurgence of radical Islamist movements throughout the region 
brought about a re-evaluation of priorities by many Arab states. The leadership 
of these countries began to see the containment of such radicalism as a higher 
priority than continued opposition to Israel. At the same time, both Israel and 
the PLO grew increasingly wary of Islamic opponents. The Hamas movement, 
which provided the ideological and physical infrastructure of the continued 
Palestinian intifada, was unwilling to consider accommodation with Israel 
and, at the same time, was helping to diminish the position and power of the 
PLO as leader of the Palestinian national movement in the occupied territories.
Since 1991, the intifada had become increasingly radicalised. Israeli
leaders predicted that if the uprising were not confronted politically, it would
move from an outpouring of frustration and anger within the confines of civil
disobedience to a more extreme form involving armed confrontation and
suicide bombings. ‘For all the talk of rising Islamic fundamentalism sweeping
across the Middle East and North Africa and influencing Palestinian
*
fundamentalism in the occupied territories, the inescapable truth was that the 
appalling poverty, hopelessness, anger and discontent that was spreading like a 
malignant cancer through Gaza only highlighted that Israeli policy in Gaza 
provided sustenance to Islamist radicalism’.3
The support given by PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat to President 
Saddam Hussein of Iraq during the Persian Gulf War had caused him to lose
3Ibid., 156.
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crucial support payments from Saudi and Gulf state patrons. The loss of 
funding, coupled with the challenge from Hamas in the Gaza strip as well as 
an independent West Bank PLO leadership that had emerged in the intifada, 
increasing isolated Arafat and prompted him to seek lines of communication 
with Israel. Indeed, the financial and political weakness of the PLO made the 
Israelis begin to see the organisation as a potential negotiating partner who 
would be more flexible and willing to moderate past positions. This was 
especially so in regard to the PLO’s continuation of violent actions and its 
strength to negotiate over highly contentious issues such as Palestinian 
statehood, refugees, and Jerusalem. Moreover, in Israeli eyes, the Palestinian 
issue could not be left unresolved -  even though Palestinian violence was 
decidedly low-intensity and non-threatening in existential terms. It would be 
impossible to achieve peace treaties and construct a new, co-operative regional 
order without a remedy to the Palestinian question: hostile actors such as Iraq 
and Iran would continue to manipulate the issue as a way to counter the 
political integration of Israel into the region. Furthermore, an accord with the 
PLO would entail much less of a political risk than, say, an agreement with 
Syria which would involve major territorial concessions and severely 
antagonise Israeli public opinion. It was better for Israel to start by giving as 
little as possible, to begin peace negotiations with the party that would have 
little choice but to accept the bare minimum -  the PLO.
For Buchanan, the overlapping strategic assessments toward changing 
global and regional political dynamics of the Labour government in Israel and 
the PLO produced the impetus so that, when contacts of the Norwegian 
Foreign Ministry offered a channel for secret negotiations between the two
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foes, an accord was reached. He believes that pragmatic and rational decision-
making on the part of the Israeli and Palestinian leaderships signalled a dual
intention for a benign resolution to their conflict. But while Buchanan lauds
the breakthrough of Israeli-PLO mutual recognition, he relays, at the same
time, how its institutionalisation through the Oslo Accords did not create an
equal status for Israel and the Palestinians:
The DoP [the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government 
Arrangements, the document signed between the State of Israel and the 
PLO, in Washington DC on 13 September 1993] is not a symmetrical 
agreement outlining mutual obligations on a quid pro quo basis, rather 
it is an agreement to further the basic interests of both sides. For the 
Israelis, the DoP provides a reliable, legitimate interlocutor and the 
ability to transfer responsibility for a large proportion of the Palestinian 
population, if not the territory they inhabit. For the Palestinians, the 
DoP provides for the establishment of a legitimate political and moral 
authority with the mandate to negotiate on behalf of the Palestinian 
people to pursue Palestinian national interests.4
The structure of the Accords aims to give basic satisfiers for the Palestinians,
but it provides no institutional mechanisms, such as third party mediation, by
which they can advance their positions on an equal footing with Israel. As a
consequence, the Accords will ultimately favour, or prioritise the interests of,
Israel:
[T]he inherent structural asymmetrical power imbalance robs the 
agreement of balance, and the nature of the state-non-state bilateral 
agreement ensures that the DoP’s international and legal foundations 
remain dubious, or at least open to wide interpretation. The DoP does 
not provide sufficiently for an enforceable conflict prevention regime 
in that such a regime is not defined and enforcement of what 
constitutes a conflict prevention regime is left open to the 
interpretation of the parties, which, in an asymmetrical structure, in 
practical terms means the higher party. The DoP as a bilateral 
agreement does not incorporate third party mediation to offset the 
inherent structural asymmetrical power imbalance, nor does it allow 
for international assistance which enables peaceful change, including 
procedural mechanisms which allow for the review of settlement 
terms, the raising of grievances, and adjustment to the settlement as
4Emphasis added, Ibid., 160.
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new realities are created, and which anticipate and monitor potential 
areas of future conflict ,5
Buchanan locates the source of the asymmetrical power structure of the 
Accords in Israeli security considerations. But he does not explicitly say if the 
security-based explanation for the inherent structural power imbalance is 
epiphenomenal in nature, if there are deeper, endgame intentions behind its 
design.6 Indeed, there is a tension in his account. Buchanan argues that the 
Israeli security considerations within the Accords act to undermine Palestinian 
political and national rights. Similarly, he recounts views that maintain that the 
mutual recognition between Israel and vthe PLO was essentially hollow in 
nature. But at the same time he suggests that, despite the asymmetrical 
structure of Oslo, the Israeli recognition of the PLO meant that Palestinian 
statehood was inevitable.
Israeli security considerations overrode Palestinian political rights. ‘It 
must be noted that the entire peace process was not geared specifically to 
enshrining the fundamental rights and freedoms of the Palestinian people, 
rather the primary consideration of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process was to 
end the bloodshed between the two parties and to establish a mutually agreed
5Ibid., 219.
‘’Based on the text o f the Israeli-Palestinian DoP of 13 September 1993, Buchanan 
infers two guiding assumptions:
1. The principal objective of the DoP is to achieve a ‘just, lasting and comprehensive 
peace settlement’ leading to the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict via 
‘historic reconciliation through the agreed political process’.
2. The foundation of the agreed political process, the DoP, rests on basing the 
permanent settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on UN Security Council 
Resolutions 242 and 338 [which embody the principle of trading land for peace] and 
on the premise that negotiations on the permanent status will lead to the 
‘implementation of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338’ (Buchanan, 2).
Thus, Buchanan seeks only to evaluate the efficacy of the framework of the DoP in terms o f 
the above assumptionsy by its capacity for: a) resolution; b) institutionalisation; c) confidence- 
building; d) empowerment; e) mediation; f) administration; and g) negotiation (Buchanan, 2).
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nmodus vivendi'. Focusing on the asymmetrical quality of this new operative 
relationship, Buchanan comments that, ‘[t]he importance of [Israeli] security 
considerations greatly constrains independent Palestinian political 
development, particularly the freedoms of assembly, association, and 
Palestinian independent control within the spheres transferred’.8 Buchanan 
systematically details how Israel was unyielding in this regard, even to a point 
of ‘diminishing returns’. He notes disapprovingly that ‘[w]hen Israeli security 
considerations subordinate all the transferred competencies without exception, 
the letter of the agreements becomes more important than the spirit, in fact the 
importance stressed by Israeli security considerations gives the transfer of 
power and responsibilities a hollow ring’.9
Buchanan leaves the impression that the mutual recognition-based co­
operative relationships bom of Oslo have allowed Israel to manipulate 
consensus with its own, non-normative end in mind. In this regard, he devotes 
considerable attention to the objections of Palestinians such as Haider ‘Abd 
Al-Shafi, Hanan Ashrawi and Edward Said who saw the act of recognition as 
being distorted and deceptive.10
‘Abd Al-Shafi discusses that the Oslo Accords fail to address Israel’s 
illegal claim to the occupied territories, in effect validating Israel’s claim that 
it was not an ‘occupier’ but that it was in the West Bank and Gaza strip by 
right. There are also no provisions in the Accords where, for example, Israel 
renounces any of it claims that the West Bank and Gaza strip are Israeli 
territory or that state that Jewish settlement activity will stop at the onset
7Ibid., 235.
8Ibid., 265.
9Ibid., 268.
,0Ibid„ 124-125, 213-215,217.
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Palestinian autonomy. By not challenging or objecting to such claims and 
activities, the Palestinians had essentially condoned what was illegally 
established and allowed Israel to spuriously claim that this acquiescence is an 
abandonment of their right to an independent state over the entirety of the 
occupied territories. ‘Abd Al-Shafi further objects that, through the Accords, 
the status of the West Bank and Gaza strip was being blurred from being 
recognizably ‘occupied’ to only being ‘disputed’. In his view the Accords’ 
institution of two separate entities in the West Bank and Gaza strip -  two 
separate administrations and judicial systems -  indirectly created a kind of 
apartheid. He notes that even though the Accords enumerate a number of 
contentious issues to be deferred to a later date, and make reference to UN 
Security Council Resolution 242 -  which relates to withdrawal of territories, 
there could be no reliance on ideas merely implied but not clearly stated, 
especially since there were no provisions for a complete Israeli withdrawal 
from the occupied territories, even as a final status issue.
Ashrawi and Said very much concur with ‘Abd Al-Shafi’s admonition 
against the reliance of implied ideas versus realities on the ground. Ashrawi 
was certain that the Israelis would exploit their powers as occupiers ‘to the 
hilt’, so that by the time final status negotiations discussing Palestinian 
statehood began, Israel would be ‘left’ with great sections of Palestinian 
territory.11 Said was even harsher in his criticisms, lambasting the Accords as 
a Palestinian Versailles treaty -  with the Palestinians given the role as the 
Germans. He was not only certain that final status talks would be grossly 
prejudiced by the conditions created by Israel during the Oslo interim period,
llHanan Ashrawi, This Side o f Peace (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995): 261, 
cited in Buchanan, 125.
but he also feared that by agreeing to prioritise Israeli security concerns, the 
PLO-led autonomy regime would become a mere stooge to enforce Israeli 
dictates.
Buchanan takes a somewhat contradictory position in other sections of 
his analysis. In spite of his great emphasis on the structural asymmetries of the 
Accords and his citing of views dubious of Israeli end-game intentions, he 
takes a far less plausible position that suggests that the Rabin government 
would have acceded to a contrasting final outcome. An example can be seen 
when Buchanan explains that the PLO made the sweeping concessions to 
Israel that were decried by its critics because of a belief that a Palestinian state 
would be the implicit and inevitable outcome of the process of mutual 
recognition:
Mutual recognition was ‘something that Arafat...longed for. By 
accepting the PLO’s right to represent the Palestinian people, [Arafat 
and his advisors reasoned that] Israel would also be implicitly 
accepting the PLO’s political agenda -  the Palestinians’ right to self- 
determination and their own state.’12
In contrast to the evidence of his own account, Buchanan seems to concur with
the logic that guided the PLO leadership.13 In this vein, Buchanan argues that
Yitzhak Rabin, the Israeli Prime Minister who had made the ultimate decision
to implement the Accords, was a pragmatic and practical man who, despite
declaring that Palestinian autonomy would not necessarily translate into
statehood, ‘knew otherwise’:
The ceremony at the White House lawn was made possible, according 
to former [US] Secretary of State Kissinger, by exhaustion, material 
exhaustion on the part of the PLO and psychological exhaustion on the 
part of Israel. Kissinger argued this was why all truly contentious 
issues were set aside -  borders, settlements, refugees and Jerusalem,
l2Ibid., 200.
13Ibid., 127.
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and that even the mutual recognition on which the agreement was 
based was ambiguous. This gave rise to the illusion that Israel had 
recognised the PLO but believed it had not recognized [the certainty 
of] a Palestinian state and that it could continue to choose the 
representatives with whom it was prepared to deal.14
For Buchanan, the Israeli recognition of the PLO made Palestinian statehood
inevitable. He further notes that
Whilst Israel remains the occupying power, the DoP’s enshrinement in 
Article I of UNSCRs 242 and 338, which explicitly preclude the 
inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and serves as the 
basis of the permanent status settlement, means that the entire process 
could be construed as being about the detail of establishing a sovereign 
[Palestinian] entity which can serve mutually inclusive Palestinian 
interests, and not whether or not there will be an independent Palestine 
as this is already implied. In this sense, the signing of the DoP does not 
imply a Palestinian acceptance of the Israeli occupation but an Israeli 
acceptance of Palestinian sovereignty.15
Thus a sovereign Palestinian state will emerge regardless of the fact ‘[f]or the
Israelis, the DoP represented a Palestinian practical policy that allowed them
to publicly embrace the PLO without having to accept the PLO’s agenda’.16
Buchanan’s analysis is Janus-faced. While his study does convincingly
illustrate how the broad strategic calculations of the Rabin government and the
PLO led to the decision to begin secret negotiations with each other in Oslo,
his contradictory stances on the presence of structural asymmetries and the
issue of mutual recognition suggests that two separate possibilities could have
motivated Israeli intentions and shaped the dynamic of the Accords. The first
possibility would posit that the Oslo Accords were a genuine breakthrough
between Israel and the Palestinians -  a territorial compromise-based construct
rooted in the idea of mutual recognition, and since the structure of the Accords
were built on established traditions of diplomacy, any destabilising
l4Ibid., 205.
15Ibid., 347.
16Ibid., 349.
25
asymmetries that occurred were likely due to the oversight, or lack of 
innovation, of the parties or the international sponsors of the agreements. The 
second likelihood would maintain that the Oslo Accords were not the basis of 
a normatively oriented Israeli-Palestinian conflict resolution effort, and were 
instead a roundabout strategic endeavour on the part of Israel. The utility of 
these two explanations will now be addressed.
Sloppy Diplomacy?
Aharon Klieman, a professor of International Relations, offers a 
sophisticated understanding of the Oslo Accords. Although he accepts the 
1993 Israel-PLO act of mutual recognition as a positive breakthrough, 
Klieman also argues that the Oslo Accords are inherently flawed because the 
principles of territorial compromise embodied within them cannot, in the long 
run, be given an effective means of implementation. He does believe that the 
Accords represent the prospects of a genuine Israeli-Palestinian peace:
By solemnly signing the Oslo declaration of principles, these two 
historic protagonists turned interlocutors, Israelis and Palestinians, 
have undertaken a profound change in the basic pattern of their 
relationship. In one fell swoop, they have gone from delegitimizing 
each other to extending mutual recognition. Opting for peace over 
enmity, they have shifted from uncompromising, all-or-nothing 
positions to political and territorial compromise. And, in choosing to 
move forward instead of temporizing and remaining locked in place, 
they have forced us to look beyond making peace to peace building.17
But at the same time, he maintains that the framework of the agreements is not
innovative enough and has backfired because of an over-reliance on cheap and
,7Idem Aharon Klieman, Compromising Palestine: A Guide to Final Status 
Negotiations (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000): 2.
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imperfect diplomacy.18 For Klieman, it is the very the structure of the Oslo 
Accords that counters crucial prerequisites to peace from taking hold.
Klieman is at odds with the interim nature and deliberately vague 
structure of the Accords. It should be noted that recent peace processes have 
been generated by focusing on interim agreements that aim to build 
confidence measures for a settlement to be reached at a later date. In order to 
bring diametrically opposed, deeply reluctant parties to the negotiating table, it 
is believed to be necessary to situate agreements on nebulous ground, in which 
multiple outcomes to a final accord seem available. To account for differences 
in interpretation that begin inevitably to emerge, it is often possible to sustain 
momentum in the negotiations through what has been labelled ‘constructive 
ambiguity’.19 Such an approach to peace building operates in a two-fold 
manner. First, it enshrines the principle of mutual recognition between parties 
who had hitherto not recognised each other’s legitimacy. Secondly, it 
establishes objectives of a peace process as a whole, to work toward 
stabilising mutual recognition in an ongoing, new political relationship. But 
constructive ambiguity does not circumscribe a concrete plan of 
implementation. It is an anchored in an approach that combines self-interest 
with voluntary commitments to a peace process. Even in a legal sense, it does 
not actually require parties, through guarantees or threat of sanctions, to
18Idem Aharon Klieman, Constructive Ambiguity in Middle East Peace-Making, 
Research Report Series no. 10 (Tel Aviv, Israel: The Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace 
Research, Tel Aviv University, 1999). Klieman’s account is unequalled. For other analyses 
that address the destabilising role played by constructive ambiguity in the Oslo Accords, see 
PLO Negotiation Affairs Department, ‘An Assessment o f US Involvement in the Palestinian- 
Israeli Peace Process Over the Last Seven Years’, 20 January 2001, at internet site 
http://www.nad-plo.org/eye/newsl9.html and Badil Resource Center for Palestinian 
Residency and Refugee Rights, ‘Ending the Ongoing Nakba, A Real Alternative to Oslo’ al 
Majdal Newsletter, Issue no. 11 September 2001, 3-5.
,9Jonathan Stevenson, ‘Irreversible Peace in Northern Ireland?’ Survival, Volume 42, 
No. 3, Autumn 2000, 9.
27
undertake actions related to the objectives of the peace process that they have 
made.
Constructive ambiguity approaches to peace building are encouraged 
for many reasons. Absolutely clarity of goals may not be possible early on in 
an accord as it can easily produce a political stalemate and hinder 
implementation of an agreement altogether. Ambiguity provides enough of an 
incentive for parties to an agreement to try an alternative to a situation of 
conflict. More importantly, constructive ambiguity can bring about relative
9 0peace. In this situation, ‘the maintenance of peace does not depend on any 
written agreement or visions of permanence (for these diverge), but on the
91political process engendered by...[a] peace process itself. By extending 
peace processes, constructive ambiguity can allow forbearance from violence 
to become habitual among parties to a conflict. So even if an original 
agreement does not achieve its full objectives, a peace process still may have 
positive, long-term effects. A new improved agreement may likely emerge out 
of the ruins of a failed predecessor that nonetheless had a beneficial impact. 
By conditioning former combatants to behave non-violently, and by 
diminishing old enmities by creating new, cooperative institutions based on 
‘win-win’ principles, an overall national mood favouring, and conductive 
toward, a continuing peace process may take hold. Thus it is argued that 
constituents of the parties to the original, unsuccessful agreement, enjoying the 
stability and environment that it had nonetheless brought about, will tend not 
to favour a return to the old status quo and support new efforts to construct a 
more viable agreement instead.
20Ibid., 19.
2‘ibid.
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Klieman sees constructive ambiguity as having major limitations -
even great destructive potential -  when misapplied to international negotiation
or peace making. He argues that the post-Oslo DoP deadlock occurred
precisely because of the Accords’ inordinately strong component of
constructive ambiguity. While constructive ambiguity can help to catalyse
initial agreements, it is not satisfactory to properly resolve the major, complex
issues making up the Israeli-Palestinian final status peace agenda. Klieman
looks more favourably on traditional forms of diplomacy:
This insistence upon the proper construction of agreements and the 
careful, precise wording of declarations, protocols, or binding treaty 
accords has its own cogency. First, in assuring one’s own interests. 
Second, minimizing the likelihood of misinterpretation. Third, 
avoiding charges of bad faith. Fourth, to minimize contravention and 
protect against unilateral infractions.22
Contemporary statecraft increasingly eschews these traits, in favour of 
situations of vagueness where images of accord -  ‘artful compromise’ -  are 
prioritised over long-term guarantees. Klieman states disapprovingly, ‘When 
international negotiation sacrifices substance to appearance, puts non­
confrontation above tough yet exhaustive bargaining, and often times prizes 
soft commitments over hard ones, then you know something is either 
fundamentally wrong, or else significantly different about contemporary 
statecraft’. He decries how regional and international conflict resolution has 
become less of a specialized diplomatic field and more like half-finished 
commercial transactions. Peacemaking efforts are geared more toward ‘getting 
to the table’ than sustaining momentum and looking toward long-term aims. 
‘Just as the potential contracting parties themselves are encouraged to move
^Klieman, Constructive Ambiguity in Middle East Peace-Making, 12.
23Ibid., 12.
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beyond merely forming, or, transmitting images and perceptions, we, too need
to go beyond (a) prenegotiation and (b) pre-contractual negotiations to the
later final stages of peace talks and to the product rather than the environment
or procedures of diplomatic bargaining’.24
Ambiguity can be a valid, constructive force in initial diplomatic
exchanges, but it is dangerously unstable in formal agreements. Durable
agreements should aim precisely to eliminate grey areas that can imperil future
peace prospects. The utility of ‘loose ends’ is exhausted once initial exchanges
have commenced:
Unless ambiguities are identified as such, documents do not 
necessarily mean what they say, mean much more (or much less) than 
they say, or can mean anything one wishes them to say. All these 
influences render the document non-binding, whereas the entire aim of 
ending conflict and institutionalizing peace is assumed to be reaching 
higher plateaus of commitment.25
In circumstances where ambiguities continue to persist, each party will revert
to self-maximising, autonomous behaviour, seeking gains by insisting on its
reading of nebulous aspects of an agreement and by exploiting weaknesses of
its interlocutor’s interpretation. Thus, antagonism and distrust will actually
grow the closer the negotiation and the negotiating parties come to endgame
conflict termination and contractual peace. Ambiguity helps to generate
dialogues, but it soon becomes counterproductive. It neither retains its
effectiveness nor helps to secure permanent peace structures. ‘Constructive
ambiguity offers the pretence of peace-making and peace, without the
substance’.26
24Ibid., 15.
25Ibid, 18.
26Ibid., 20.
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Constructive ambiguity has dominated diplomacy in the media age. 
Under constant scrutiny and pressure to deliver results to constituencies, 
politicians and statesmen now tout initialled memoranda of understanding and 
declarations of principles as ‘peace accords’. Klieman asserts that this use of 
constructive ambiguity as a guiding diplomatic compass, especially in efforts 
to resolve conflicts in the Middle East, is due largely to the contribution of the 
US National Security Adviser and later Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger. In 
this school of thought, negotiation emphasises finessing, and not necessarily
77finalising, the structure of diplomatic relationships.
Klieman sees ambiguity as the servicing agent of four related themes 
of contemporary world politics that emerged from Kissinger’s influence. First 
among these themes is ‘constructive engagement’, which assigns highest 
priority toward easing international tensions between bitter opponents. Talking 
assumes an extremely high importance; ‘the value of dialogue becomes the 
dialogue itself, irrespective of any actual or final outcome’. Secondly, there 
is the phenomenon of ‘backchanneling’, in which ‘constructive engagement’ is 
pursued through lines of discreet, unofficial communication that offers parties
7 0plausible denial. Thirdly is ‘surprise diplomacy’, which ‘aims at nothing less 
than forcing an abrupt, radical change in well-established policies, entrenched 
positions and political power balances that otherwise might take decades to 
achieve-if ever’.30 Lastly, is a method of gradualism, an incremental approach 
to peacemaking where, after initial pressure has been applied, a gradual
27Ibid., 35.
28Ibid., 26.
29Ibid.
30Ibid., 27.
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• ^  Iprocess of conciliation, pacific settlement, and normalization can occur. 
‘Constructive relationships and constructive engagement represent the goals; 
backchanneling, the avenue; surprise diplomacy, the stunning effect; and 
gradualism the format for following up on the initial bold initiative’.32 
Constructive ambiguity is the bond linking this broad approach to 
peacemaking. But the approach is flawed. Taken as a whole, it propagates ‘the 
lulling belief that once warring sides cross their Rubicon and commit 
themselves to a process of reconciliation, negotiation, and compromise, given 
time and a modicum of goodwill all that remains is to work on, and work out 
final, technical details’.33
Klieman identifies a tradition of unarticulated, diplomatic episodes of 
constructive ambiguity with regard to the Palestine question predating the 
Oslo Accords. ‘Early practitioners were engaging in studied obfuscation long 
before the term was coined and the idea gained currency.’34 Constructive 
ambiguity finds its origins in the contradictory pledges of support made by 
Great Britain, the chief colonial power in the Middle East after the First World 
War, to both Jewish and Arab nationalist movements. Even the oft-cited 
United Nations Resolution 242, the basis for all Israel-Arab peace negotiations 
that was passed after the June 1967 war, is sufficiently vague and open to 
multiple interpretations. But the most successful and deliberate application of 
constructive ambiguity can be seen in the Camp David Accords, which 
finalised a peace treaty between Israel and Egypt.35 Camp David set some
3,Ibid.
32Ibid.
33Ibid.
34Ibid, 37.
35See Ibid., 49-54.
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important precedents that were to be reformulated, and reproduced, within the
structure of the Oslo Accords. As a result, constructive ambiguity became both
the ‘solution’ and ‘problem’ for peacemaking:
At any given moment in the process it can be instrumental at 
overcoming stalemate, and in reaching a consensus without having to 
give words full meaning. But by leaving core values, issues or interests 
vague and unsettled, it is guaranteed to be the source for later 
difficulties.36
Camp David did not assure peace; it only represented the possibility of peace 
between Israel and her Arab neighbours. But this agreement was achieved 
precisely because it left issues of Palestinian autonomy and national rights 
undeveloped, to be addressed at a later date!
The Oslo agreements build on the discussions of Palestinian autonomy 
discussed first at Camp David. Since Oslo attempts to build on an already 
nebulous foundation, it provides an unstable framework for future peace. 
‘Owing to the accretion of layers of ambiguity, the deferred or unfinished 
business of previous episodes compounds each successive agenda, and 
therefore the work of the next peacemaker’.37 Rather than discarding the 
clouded phraseology of past agreements, the architects of Oslo relied on the 
diplomatic and legal frameworks of past treaties. Thus, Oslo follows a long­
standing pattern of deferred confrontation. The agreements are genuinely 
innovative in the sense that they clarify the national and political standing of 
the Palestinian people and make recognition of the Israel by the PLO explicit 
and unconditional. But it is an interim agreement that continues to defer the 
most contentious issues of Israeli-Palestinian confrontation, such as the status 
of Jerusalem, refugees, Jewish settlements, future borders and security
36Ibid., 55.
37Ibid., 56.
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arrangements. * While it is understood that the permanent status negotiations 
would cover the remaining issues, there is not even the slightest clue as to 
what was understood about the issues themselves, or about the answers to 
them, leaving plenty of room for interpretation -  and confrontation -  in the 
future’.38
Oslo adds ‘super ambiguities’ to Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking
efforts:
First, what are true Israeli and Palestinian intentions? To coexist 
peacefully or to continue the struggle by possibly other means. Second, 
just how high is the degree of their willingness to compromise on 
behalf of co-existence and to make meaningful, doubtless painful 
ideological and territorial concessions?
For example, Israel pledged only to ‘redeploy’ its military forces in the West
Bank and Gaza strip, but not from these territories. It is unclear whether this
action marks Israel’s permanent intention to retain control over these ‘areas of
redeployment’. Klieman also notes how the PLO’s renunciation of the ‘use of
terrorism and other acts of violence’ and its pledges to assure compliance to
these actions by ‘PLO elements and personnel’ allows the Palestinian
leadership to passively condone, or not curtail, the activities of the Islamic
Resistance Movement (Hamas) as a further bargaining tactic to pressure the
Israelis.
Ambiguities evolve easily into deadlock. Ambiguity may initially help 
moderate peace promoters, but ironically aids extremists opposed to 
compromise as well. Extremists can easily exploit these ambiguities, entrench 
their own side’s positions and then still place the blame for misrepresentation 
or misinterpretation squarely upon the other side. Klieman cites the Middle
38Ibid., 60.
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East analyst Ian Lustick, who sees the accords ‘as an array of legalistic and 
definitive limits for the opposing side versus an array of loopholes and
• I Qopportunities for the aggressive, adversarial exploitation for one’s own side’.
Klieman sees an element of Israeli-Palestinian mutual strategic manipulation
and abuse. In his opinion, the Palestinian Authority leader, Yasser Arafat, has
proved just as wily as his Israeli partners in using ambiguity for strategic
purposes. But Klieman also mentions the numerous Arab criticisms of Arafat
and the PLO for being out-witted and out-manoeuvred in the negotiations.40
Arab critiques fault Arafat for not
forcing Israeli official leaders at the outset to renounce their occupation 
of Palestinian land, and in effect allowing them to prejudice or possibly 
even predetermine the final outcome through unilateral action during 
the interim phase. This shortcoming is compounded in Arab eyes by 
Arafat’s not extracting ironclad assurances of: the right of national 
self-determination, the right to establish an independent state on 
Palestinian soil with Jerusalem as its capital or the right of return by 
the Palestinian refugees.41
Nonetheless Klieman adds his view that the PLO acceptance of the ambiguity
formula may not have been due solely to short sightedness, and in fact may
have represented their own uncertainty if they were ready to truly divide and
share land with the Israelis.
Klieman tends to stress gross oversight over pure strategy as a more
explanatory factor to explain the deep flaws of the Oslo agreement. He
therefore urges an end to what he sees as the sloppy diplomacy that invites
abuse and deadlock. Substantive differences lie at the heart of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, not simply secondary phenomena such as the procedural,
situational, or personality variables that have been assuaged by ‘constructive
39Ibid., 67.
40See Ibid., 70-71.
4lIbid., 73.
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ambiguity’ in traditional diplomacy. Klieman believes Oslo to be an 
unexpressed commitment to the principle of partition of geographic Palestine 
into Israeli and Palestinian sovereign states: ‘No matter how much .either side 
wishes to think otherwise, either the Oslo agreement is at heart a territorial 
compromise-based construct and, as such, makes redrawing borders 
obligatory, or it is one of the great diplomatic deceptions of all time’.42 The 
structure of Oslo has within it a fundamental, distorting flaw -  if the intent of 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict resolution is indeed a partition-based, territorial 
compromise.
In sum, what can possibly be gained by continuing to live on borrowed 
diplomatic time and by continuing to defer grappling with the core 
issues, however contentious? If Jerusalem or West Bank territorial 
compromise are truly non-starters, and non-negotiable, then why have 
we been deluding ourselves about overall peace prospects? But 
conversely, if we genuinely believe that peace and compromise are 
possible, and that Jerusalem can be negotiated successfully, then what 
have we been waiting for?43
Constructive ambiguity may have helped to bring about a new modus vivendi,
but this interim situation will not suffice to ensure long-term stability and
peace. The Oslo agreements have explosive, destabilising potential. It is
crucial to understand that merely separating two peoples residing on a land is
not the same as agreeing to divide the land between them.
Klieman’s observations indicate a pattern by which diplomacy and
negotiations in the Arab-Israeli conflict have taken place in the past. His
observation that the constructive ambiguity of past Middle East peacemaking
reached its apex in the Oslo accords is of great importance. But Klieman fails
to seriously address the possibility if the Israeli preference for constructive
' 42Ibid., 114.
43Ibid., 136.
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ambiguity was deliberate, and served a complex tactical objective. Moreover, 
Klieman does not even attempt to discern, at a deeper level, why Israel 
recognised the PLO in 1993. Mirroring Andrew Buchanan, he simply accepts 
that the Israel-Palestinian conflict, a fully ‘zero-sum’, existential conflict -  one 
of the most protracted in history -  was ‘ripe’ for resolution and so the national 
leadership of both peoples rationally decided to recognise their past foes. He 
notes that the agreements acknowledge the national and political standing of 
the Palestinian people and make recognition of the Israel by the PLO explicit 
and unconditional, but he does not delve into the nature of this process, if it 
served another purpose.
Klieman assumes uncritically that normative intentions underlay the 
Oslo Accords.44 Without recourse to other explanations, he is forced to decry 
Israeli leaders in particular for failing to tackle the most complex issues of the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict at the inception of the peace process in 1993, for 
not demonstrating their irrevocable resolve to achieve true peace.45 Indeed it is 
problematic to claim that the dominant actors in the Accords acted with 
extreme negligence by allowing a vague and open-ended agreement to serve 
as the basis of the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. If such an 
argument were true, than it would not only be necessary to accept that the 
primary architects of the Oslo Accords, Israeli academics and jurists, failed to 
understand that by prioritising Israeli security and nationalist claims to the 
occupied territories in their concessions to the PLO, they might act to
44See Klieman, Compromising Palestine: A Guide to Final Status Negotiations, 24: 
‘Let us assume two conditions. Agreement by nationalist adversaries to negotiate their conflict 
and bargain together over specific terms of settlement is one necessary given. The second is 
their willingness to do so on the basis of compromise’.
45Klieman, Constructive Ambiguity in Middle East Peace-Making, especially 132-
136.
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obfuscate full Palestinian sovereignty from ever taking hold, but also when 
their Palestinian interlocutors raised the possibility of this scenario in ongoing 
negotiations, these Israelis remained aloof, continuing with a framework that 
in principle they opposed.
Although Klieman identifies constructive ambiguity as the operative 
mechanism by which Israel sustained its domination over the Palestinians in 
the Accords, it is necessary to discount his explanation that the fundamental 
problem of the agreements lays in a kind of sloppy statecraft. Klieman 
downplayed the likelihood that Oslo was a great diplomatic deception, but a 
closer scrutiny of his arguments suggests otherwise. It is now necessary to 
address if, and how, the structural asymmetries of the Accords could be the 
manifestation of an Israeli strategic endeavour.
The Issue of Mediation
The political theorist Deiniol Jones addresses the possibility of a 
premeditated Israeli design to undercut Palestinian aspirations to statehood 
through the structure of the Oslo Accords.46 Jones critiques the political 
environment of what might be called the ‘flawed normative perspective* that 
shaped the Norwegian mediation of the Oslo Accords. While the Norwegian 
facilitators acted within the boundaries of facilitation theory, as it has come to 
evolve in the field of international conflict resolution, they helped unwittingly
d e in io l  Jones, Cosmopolitan Mediation? Conflict Resolution and the Oslo Accords 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999). Jones is by no means the only person to 
have speculated that Israel was undermining Palestinian aspirations to statehood through the 
structure of the Oslo Accords. His study is, however, more theoretically developed than the 
other, largely empirical and journalistic accounts that develop this theme. For examples of 
these other works, see Edward W. Said, The Politics o f Dispossession: The Struggle for 
Palestinian Self-Determination, 1969-1994 (London: Chatto, 1994), Edward W. Said, Peace 
and its Discontents: Gaza-Jericho, 1993-1995 (London: Vintage, 1995), Noam Chomsky, ‘A 
Painful Peace’ Z Mag January 1996, at internet site, 
http://www.zmag.org/chomsky/articles/z9601-painful-peace.html, and Nicholas Guyatt, The 
Absence o f Peace: Understanding the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (London: Zed Books,
1998).
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to legitimate an unjust, ‘neo-colonial’ arrangement. In essence, Jones claims, 
the Norwegian facilitators misconstrued recognition and dialogue, that is to 
say the onset of negotiations between two sides in a protracted international 
conflict, as constituting enough of a foundation to implement a viable peace 
agreement suited to the needs of both sides. But the huge imbalance of power 
in favour of Israel was not undone in the agreements; it was preserved and 
reproduced -  at the expense of the Palestinians. As a result, the very structure 
of the agreement is open to an interpretation/manipulation that gives legal 
justification to Israeli actions (such as continued construction of Jewish 
settlements in the West Bank and Gaza strip), which subsequently antagonise 
Palestinian sensibilities and can be used to deny their aspirations to statehood. 
In short, Jones believes that the accords use language and symbols of conflict 
resolution to disguise ‘naked strategic action’ by Israel, allowing the PLO to 
police a ‘hostile’ population on its behalf, while it continues to hold on to 
occupied territory for security reasons.
Jones favours a new form of mediation, one rooted in cosmopolitan 
political theory. In this proposed alternative, the mediating party moves 
beyond merely bringing disputing parties together and facilitating dialogue. 
He believes that mediators should instead act to ensure the genuine well-being 
and justice of all parties concerned: ‘enlarging the boundaries of political 
community, overcoming sectional and factional differences, expanding the 
domain of moral responsibility which ought to exist between international 
actors, and promoting relations which conform to certain ideals of 
international order -  in particular, respect for a democratically constituted
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international law’.47 For Jones, the Oslo Accords represent the farthest 
departure from the ideal that he is advocating. By critiquing the conceptual 
underpinning of the framework of the Oslo Accords and illustrating the fault­
laden environment that they have produced, he hopes to demonstrate the 
ultimate futility of such approaches and the need for remedies based on his 
suggestions.
Jones argues that mediation is a potential avenue to pursue new means 
to a virtuous end. ‘In the absence of any clear form of global government, 
mediations, sanctioned by the norms of an international order, could represent 
an informal, diplomatic tool capable of pursuing just and workable political 
settlements to contemporary international conflicts’ 48 In order to outline the 
broad contours of ‘cosmopolitan mediation’, Jones fleshes out what he sees as 
problematic aspects of mediation as it exists in two main subgroups: a power- 
political/geostrategic paradigm and a facilitative/problem-solving paradigm. 
When rooted in power politics, mediation is marked by an approach of 
strategic rationality. Competing parties are brought together to maximise self- 
interest, irrespective of social or value-oriented norms. Furthermore, the 
intermediaries in the conflict intervene and mediate because they expect a 
reward for doing so. Facilitative approaches function in a domain of 
contextual rationality, in which mediators deal within the realm of symbolic 
reality and meaning in order to make divergent perceptions understood and 
thus reconcilable.
Geostrategic mediation is linked intimately with the international 
activities of the United States in the world order since 1945.
47Ibid., 2.
48Ibid., 10.
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Mediation here is not necessarily an impartial attempt at resolving 
conflict, although it may have a variety of effects -  both negative and 
positive. Primarily geostrategic mediation pursues the perceived 
interest of a global structure of power.49
Bound to the notion that the global arena is wrought with a struggle for 
domination and power, the geostrategic view of mediation reflects an 
intellectual construction that deems normative theorising to be irrelevant, of 
no importance. All normative practice is relative and can only be significant if 
existing in the context of the world power structure. Associated especially 
with the neo-realist theory of Kenneth Waltz, such reasoning is at worst, a sort 
of apologetics for the status quo. Deiniol Jones thus believes that geostrategic 
thinking -  including mediation -  often lapses into an oversimplified typology 
of analysis that is not prone to genuinely factual knowledge about the 
particular conflicts under investigation. Such an instrumental approach to the 
social world, whose counterparts can be seen in utilitarian philosophy, micro- 
economic analysis, and game theory, reifies ‘the facts of existing international 
theory’50, providing too much emphasis on state actors and marginalizing 
other (non-state) elements who may be central to a conflict.
American mediation in the Middle East was shaped by commitments 
to Israel as a proxy ally against the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Thus, 
in US led conflict settlement efforts, the initial causes of conflict between 
Israel, the Palestinians and her other Arab neighbours were abstracted and 
viewed from the perspective of American national interest: strengthening 
regional allies at the expense of Soviet client regimes. After the June 1967 
Arab-Israeli war and especially following the October 1973 war, US
49Ibid., 34.
50Ibid., 43.
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mediation efforts set the broad pattern for the negotiated settlement of the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Like Aharon Klieman, Jones sees US Secretary of 
State Henry Kissinger as a pivotal influence on conflict settlement efforts in 
the Middle East: ‘By elevating Israel to the position of strategic asset, and by 
removing Egypt from the balance of power in the wider Arab-Israeli conflict, 
Kissinger’s geostrategic foreign policy encouraged those forces in the region 
that were opposed to national rights for the Palestinian people’.51 Autonomy, 
or secondary, non-state solutions to the ‘Palestinian question’ became the 
accepted ‘norm’ in this approach to mediation. Relatively weak regional actors 
such as the PLO were never perceived to be equal partners in the network of 
interests who supported American global security perspectives. There was no 
overriding need to hear their voice or designate a place for them in regional 
mediation efforts.
Third-party intervention or ‘problem-solving mediation’ is intended to 
have a more just and normative orientation than the geostrategic approach. 
Nonetheless, many unwitting flaws mark this approach as well. In this method, 
‘[facilitation rests upon a belief that international politics can be made to 
resemble the politics of normal democratic states, or the political relations 
between normal democratic states’. Its guidelines, rooted m social- 
psychological approaches to conflict resolution -  especially the idea of ‘needs’ 
fulfilment, provide an illusory panacea with distorting results. Jones argues 
that this broad style of mediation never quite bridges the gap between its 
theoretical, or hermeneutic, emancipatory strategies and its practical means of 
implementation.
51Ibid., 51.
52Ibid., 58.
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Contextual dynamics to conflict (which are ignored in geostrategic 
approaches) are central in facilitation and problem-solving forms of mediation. 
Such methods reflect an understanding that ‘conflict exists in the realm of 
intersubjective meaning and understanding, so conflict resolution must also
c'y
exist in this realm’. It is thus necessary to promote amiable relations and 
mutual understanding, so as to create new relationships amenable to conflict 
resolution. Jones’ central cause of concern is in the relatively detached role of 
the facilitator who is mediating this important process of reformulation of a 
conflict dynamic. Advocates of this method, such as Michael Banks and 
Christopher Mitchell, recommend that social scientists make more effective 
mediators than area or regional specialists. For them, social scientists are more 
dispassionate and work to encourage dialogue and compromise while area 
specialists may cause a dialogue to become overly mired in political issues. 
Jones fears that this de facto detachment -  avoiding making substantive 
critiques or moral judgements -  will undermine the normative value of the 
mediation effort. ‘Without normative political theory guiding and restructuring 
an intervention, how can the goal of substantial political reconstructions 
become a reality?’54
The work of the social theorist John Burton lies at the core of problem­
solving mediation efforts.
The belief is that human nature, needs and purposes are somehow 
thwarted by the international system and that the process of conflict 
resolution is merely, or mainly, one of adjusting the surface 
superstructure of the system to ease and facilitate into the system what 
is, basically an underlying harmony of human purposes and needs. We 
might call this the ‘volcano’ model of social change.55
53Ibid., 60.
54Ibid., 63.
55Ibid.
43
Through dialogue, facilitation acts as an instrument of social engineering, an 
attempt to bring about an international order that fulfils human needs for 
security -  in both a physical and existential sense.56 Larger structures or 
systems can be adjusted or modified to address the underlying needs of 
elements that constitute their cores. Interaction between the parties is intended 
to serve as a productive catharsis that will prompt the parties to generate 
egalitarian solutions amongst themselves. Jones sees several problems with the 
view that conflict is the expression of a frustrated dynamic of human need. 
Specifically, the association of needs with innate forces, such as biological 
drives, can cause expressions of political dissatisfaction to be interpreted as 
senseless outbursts of violence -  irrational ‘rioting* -  and not as acts with 
political motivations and end goals. ‘The socio-biological view of needs as 
drives underlying this aspect of facilitation theory is problematic in that it 
divorces the concept of need and any resulting political action from the 
concept of normative justification’.57 Indeed, human actors are not mindless 
drones bereft of moral agency. Jones notes that ‘[g]iven a strict identification 
of needs with drives, facilitation theory becomes just another form of social
• » c oscience oriented toward prediction and control*. In this circumstance, 
dialogue can be used to change the dynamic of a conflict for strategic reasons. 
The intensity of a conflict is transformed from a protracted, deep-rooted state 
to one that has manageable ends, but it does not take place in an environment 
in which it is possible to ‘discharge our moral responsibility to evaluate
56Ibid., 64.
57Ibid., 65.
58Ibid., 66.
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critically claims made by particular parties that a particular state of affairs is a 
normatively legitimate one’.59
Jones sees the problem-solving workshop as an endeavour that 
attempts, unsuccessfully, to apply ideas developed by the social theorist 
Jurgen Habermas. Habermas’s work in particular is a call for ‘communicative 
politics’. It is not a plea for a mere dialogue, but a theory of justice in which 
an ideal or open exchange can take place between individuals and peoples free 
from external constraints or an overriding, determining agenda. ‘It is a central 
component of the concept of ‘communicative action* that the claim or claims 
to ‘comprehensibility’, ‘truth’, ‘rightfulness’, or ‘truthfulness’ can be validated 
only on the basis of reason or argumentation*.60 In this ideal, politics assumes 
peaceful ideals in a practical, operational form: ‘Habermas insists on a number 
of points: communicative action should be free from deception, self-deception 
and the exercise of power and domination; all participants should be allowed 
to express their views, opinions, interests and needs, and any actor who wishes 
to introduce a political proposal defensible on the basis of universalisation 
may do so’.61 In theory, such an operation can find its avenue in the 
facilitation of the problem-solving workshop since it brings disputing parties 
into a position in which they engage in discourse. By overcoming the 
intransigence of parties to recognise each other as interlocutors, an attempt can 
be made to implement a Habermasean programme. Jones suggests that the 
ideal will never be able to leapfrog from the narrow environs of the problem­
solving workshop to wider society as a whole. This inability is due to inherent 
structural constraints of the facilitation process, specifically its focus on
59Ibid.
60Ibid., 86.
61Ibid.
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interim solutions, in which the reformulation of conflicting relationships on
the basis of dialogue predates the final status discussions of disputes. Leaving
core issues unresolved creates opportunity spaces for shrewd statecraft to
obfuscate conflict resolution efforts that are based on egalitarian ideals:
It is important to realise that facilitative and critical approaches may 
move in separate political directions. And that, from the point of view 
of the latter, there may be no moral distinction between facilitation and 
practice of power politics.62
Failing to negate power asymmetries in facilitation creates a ‘false dialogue’
that gives a misleading impression that a conflict is being resolved and thus
fosters a bogus conception of justice.
Jones seeks to debunk the conceptual underpinnings of the Oslo
Accords by offering an alternative model that is embedded in a cosmopolitan
theory of international relations. At the heart of this new approach to
mediation is a call for contextual specificity, or a comprehensive familiarity
with the history of the disputed conflict, and not a preference for a detached,
general means of facilitation. Secondly, Jones desires a commitment to a
‘democratic public law’ at the international level.63 His proposal entails an
innovative legal and political structure that differs from the Westphalian
model of state sovereignty that is the dominant norm in the current
international system: ‘[t]he state is only one form of legitimate institution
among many, where decision-making power is granted by a pragmatic
principle of appropriateness rather than a metaphysical neo-realism’.64 In other
words, Jones sees benefit in modifying international legal boundaries to make
them more permeable, to prevent overriding questions of human justice from
62Ibid., 69.
63Ibid., 81.
“ Ibid., 90.
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being submerged under the rubric of ‘state sovereignty’. He contends that only 
in such a system can sub-nationals, such as the Palestinians and other 
‘systemically excluded’ peoples, be included in a ‘higher level of universality 
and difference’.65 In harmony with these goals, Jones advocates forms of 
mediation that address the intransigence of a stronger party and intervenes 
actively and forcefully to strengthen weaker parties, to treat them 
democratically and equitably. Jones does not list an actual mechanism of 
diffusion to implement this ‘moral’ reconfiguration of the world order, but by 
offering forth the a-normative example of conflict resolution embodied in the 
Oslo accords, he hopes to demonstrate the inefficacy of mediation models that 
lack cosmopolitan ideals.
The Norwegian facilitation of the Oslo accords followed the core 
assumptions of facilitation and the problem-solving mediation. The 
Norwegians saw themselves as suitable agents to promote conflict resolution 
because of Norway’s international status as a small, impartial actor uninvolved 
in global power politics, and because of its strong links of support for both 
Israel and the PLO. But the resources of this ‘small state’ could not account 
for, or offset, the asymmetry of power that existed between the regional 
superpower Israel and the relatively weak Palestinians. ‘The Norwegian 
facilitators wre [sic] the right people to deliver the secure environment for 
negotiations, an environment that would place no international pressure on 
Israel’.66 However, Norway’s ‘detached’ facilitating status acted in a way to 
prevent the PLO from raising validity claims pertaining to Palestinian 
statehood demands during the entire Oslo process. The Norwegians believed
65Ibid. See 80-90, for a full discussion.
“ ibid., 123.
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very much in the need to bring about a breakthrough in Israeli-PLO mutual 
recognition. They endeavoured greatly to build connections between the 
representatives of the two sides on a human, everyday level, but they did not 
act to ensure equality of rights for the Palestinians.
The structure of the Oslo agreements left the Israeli military government 
as the dominant legal force in the West Bank and the Gaza strip, with the 
Palestinian autonomy regime assenting its subservience to Israel’s authority. 
Jones states bluntly, ‘it is hard to see the Oslo Accords as anything but abject 
Palestinian surrender to the core demand of Israeli nationalism -  security in an 
expanded state’.67 While it can be argued that it was not possible to move 
directly from the state of affairs in the occupied territories that existed in 1993 
directly to a final settlement creating a Palestinian state, the Oslo Accords 
nonetheless created an interim period which was too ill-defined, and rife with 
flaws. The interim status of Oslo allowed Israel to maximise its self-interest at 
the expense of the Palestinians, to implement what Jones describes as a ‘neo­
colonial arrangement’:
Historically, Palestinians are neither citizens of Israel, nor citizens of 
an independent Palestine. To institutionalise this state of affairs, Israel 
needed to sign an agreement with the PLO, but the agreement and the 
process of agreement had to exist in a space between the international 
and the domestic. Israel could not sign an international agreement, as 
this would grant an implied recognition of Palestinian claims to 
statehood. At the same time, Israel could not deal with the Palestinians 
as if they were citizens of Israel. This strategy confronts what is called, 
in Israeli political discourse, the demographic problem [i.e. Arabs 
would come to outnumber Jews in the ‘Jewish state’]. The small-state 
facilitative mediation offered the perfect solution to this dilemma. The 
Oslo process and the Accords are not part of Israeli domestic politics. 
But.. .neither are they part of a full-blooded international politics. The 
Oslo Accords and process offered the appearance of international 
politics, without creating any international politics.68
67Ibid., 138.
68Ibid., 143.
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Reflecting on the net effect of Oslo, Jones concludes that effective mediation 
should neither be left to the power-political role of the United States, whose 
arbitrary, strategic interests -  and not normative obligations -  shape its 
involvement in such efforts, but neither to small states like Norway that lack 
the power to reshape the dynamics of a conflict in a democratic way. He sees 
an ideal mediation likely to come to fruition in the form a coalition of states 
(or an international organisation representing a coalition of states) that is 
guided by a normative ideological -  cosmopolitan -  commitment. (Jones 
specifically proposes that the involvement of the European Union in the 
Middle East peace process be considered.) Only such a framework can ensure 
that interim status agreements move toward egalitarian resolution of conflicts 
and not be used by intransigent parties to backtrack on, or undermine, peace 
commitments that have previously been made.
Deiniol Jones’s investigation of the Oslo accords is a sophisticated 
appraisal of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. His critique of the 
Norwegian facilitation and mediation at Oslo offers a convincing account of 
why the international community and the sponsors of the Middle East peace 
process allowed such a flaw-laden peace process to take hold. He identifies 
how the Norwegian mediation gave Israel the initial means to impose its 
strategic goals onto an acquiescent PLO. But by emphasising that it was the 
flawed mediation process which generated the Israeli strategic endeavour 
lying at the heart of the Accords, and by overlooking how this power dynamic 
could have begun to develop independently beforehand -  and also how it 
might have assumed tangible substance only later in Oslo, Jones stops short of
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compellingly explaining Israel’s end goals with regard to its recognition of the 
PLO.
Jones’s claim that Israel undertook a ‘naked strategic action’ by 
recognising the PLO is an important insight, but his account of precisely why 
and to what end this situation came about is not entirely convincing. He rightly 
understands that the Israeli recognition of the PLO was a departure from past 
behaviour. Although his insights are more developed than Andrew Buchanan 
or Aharon Klieman, Jones too does not grasp the full scope of this reversal of 
past behaviour. He mentions that the Israelis were interested in the Accords 
because they wished to vacate Palestinian cities in the Gaza strip and because 
the bankrupt, weakened PLO posed no threat to them. But as Buchanan 
discussed, Israel’s desire to solve the ‘Palestinian question’ on its own terms 
was but one component, a bridgehead of a much larger agenda to consolidate 
regional power and reach peace treaties with neighbouring Arab states (pp. 17- 
19). The inconvenience caused by the occupation of the Gaza strip was an 
important factor, but not the only strategic consideration, for the Israeli 
decision to recognise the PLO in 1993. But since Jones does not address the 
entirety of intentions of the Rabin government, it is plausible that he fails to 
construe the sum of Israeli objectives in the Oslo Accords. For example, Jones 
describes Oslo as a ‘neo-colonial arrangement’. It is true that the Palestinian 
autonomy initiated in the Accords does bear some structural resemblances to 
what is understood as neo-colonialism, but in a political sense it does not fit 
such a characterisation. For such a classification to hold, there would have had 
to be nominal Palestinian independence and Israel, the occupying or ‘colonial’ 
power, would have had to completely withdrawn its armed forces from, and
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evacuated its settlements located in, the West Bank and Gaza strip. By not 
qualifying what he means by neo-colonialism, Jones’s explanation of Israeli 
end goals becomes at best over-generalised and at worst conceptually 
inaccurate and askance. Since he seeks to discern the ultimate aim of Oslo 
primarily from the mediation process and at the expense of other phenomena, 
Jones may have been unable to infer the equal possibility that the mediation at 
Oslo may have only been the avenue, and not the prime cause, of a more 
complex end goal on the part of Israel. Instead of extrapolating the primary 
dynamic of Oslo solely from the flawed mediation effort, it may prove more 
fruitful to locate it beforehand, to examine how deeply entrenched, non- 
normative beliefs could have specifically motivated the Israeli leadership to 
inaugurate the Accords in 1993.
Reliving Myths Through Oslo
The historian Amnon Raz-Krakotzkin explains the Oslo Accords 
through an understanding of Israeli national consciousness. Raz-Krakotzkin is 
influenced heavily by discussions of colonialism by the literature Professor 
Edward Said, the work of the cultural critic Walter Benjamin, as well as of the 
‘critical historians’ Michel Foucault and Hayden White.69 He does not accept 
the positivist premise that the past is fixed or shut and so is susceptible to an 
objective representation. He seeks instead to discover how images of the 
national past'remain anchored in the present (especially through discursive 
processes), how these images continue to shape a state’s current actions.70 In 
addition, he sees the role of the historian to recover and restore the voices of
69Amnon Raz-Krakotzkin, ‘Exile in the Midst of Sovereignty: A Critique o f  
‘Negation of the Diaspora’ in Israeli Culture’ (Hebrew) Theory and Criticism 4 (Autumn) 
1993: 49. For a similar, but less cogent effort, see Gabriel Piterberg, ‘Erasures’ New Left 
Review July-August 2001: 31-46.
70Ibid.
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oppressed minorities, and because he writes about Israel, he seeks to bring 
what he sees as the denied perspective of the Palestinians into a discussion of 
current political realities. He calls for critique of the discourse and of the 
related forms of Israeli political culture that allow Israelis to systematically 
deny and forget events of the past, such as how the history of modem Jewish 
settlement in Palestine and the establishment of the state of Israel relates to the 
dispossession of the Palestinians.
Raz-Krakotzkin examines traditional Israeli historiography as the basis 
of a critique of Israeli management strategies vis-a-vis the Palestinians. For 
him, the core concepts of this critique has its roots in the historical 
circumstances surrounding the emergence of European Jewish settlement in 
Palestine in the late nineteenth century, and the reformulation of Jewish
71identity m a form of territorial nationalism, as ‘new Hebrews’. In the 
discourse that was formulated in tandem with these events, the existential 
status of the world’s Jews was seen as an ‘exile’ to be ended through a return 
to their historical homeland in Palestine. As a result of this shaping 
perspective, the conflict between the indigenous population and the Jewish 
settlers became situated within a teleological reading of Jewish history. Since 
Israeli historical discourse framed the Jewish return to the land and the conflict 
that it precipitated with the Palestinians only in terms of European Jewish 
history, it de-contexualised the Israeli-Palestinian conflict from its Middle
7,This belief argued that the Jews had originally been a secular national people. It 
maintained that Jewish identity had formerly been independent from religious discourse, and 
the Jewish religion had evolved to preserve a national culture that was threatened with loss 
when the Romans exiled the Jews from Palestine in 35 CE. Since Palestine was the place 
where the Jews had emerged as a secular national people, it was argued that the country 
continued to be the focal point o f Jewish identity. As such, religious themes within Judaism 
were innovatively explained as constituting a 1) trans-historical, 2) inalienable, and 3) 
exclusive national claim to Palestine. By this logic of this thought, it was then natural for Jews 
to want to immigrate, or ‘return’, to Palestine.
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Eastern setting. This notion of ‘exile and return’ thus fails to consider the role 
of Jewish settlement as a major hastening role in the conflict and has the added 
effect of excluding Palestinians from Israeli public discourse.72
The Israeli notion of ‘the return of the nation to the homeland’ (shivat 
ha ’am):
prevented relating to the collective yearnings of the local Arab 
population and its perspective. It [also] undoubtedly made it 
impossible to turn the fact of this collective’s existence into an 
essential foundation for establishing a new Jewish identity. The 
historical conception of the ‘negation of the diaspora’, the emptiness of 
Jewish time that separates the loss of the sovereignty over the land and 
its renewed settlement, is completed in a direct way through the image 
of the land-the place for the realization and resolution of history-as an 
“empty land.”73
The idea of ‘empty land’ acts to erase the Palestinian perspective from Israeli 
interpretations of history. The Palestinians’ opposition to Jewish settlement, 
their dispossession and subsequent refugee problem are not seriously engaged 
in mainstream, Israeli historical narratives. This is a point that must be 
underscored. For Raz-Krakotzkin, the discourse of the ‘negation of the 
diaspora’ (shelilat ha’galut) and ‘the return of the nation to the homeland’ 
continues to define the consciousness of Israeli Jews, determining their 
conception of history, their collective memory, and the collective identity that
72The Jewish settlers who began to arrive in late 19th century and would lay the 
foundations of the Israeli state maintained that Palestine was the homeland of the Jews alone. 
They regarded the native Palestinians as mere inhabitants, people whose collective identity 
was not shaped by national attachment to the territory on which they lived, but only by a 
connection to the Arab nation of which they belonged. As such, Jewish settlement was marked 
by a desire for separation from, rather than integration with, the indigenous Palestinian 
population. Moreover, settlement came to be guided by a security doctrine that utilised armed 
force to safeguard exclusively Jewish, separate communities. The fearful response and 
resistance of the local Palestinians toward the settlers -  as foreigners who threatened local life 
and culture -  was not addressed in a holistic way. For the most part, the Jewish settlers were 
not willing to come to terms with the native Palestinians with the understanding that both 
peoples had an equal right to the same land. Security focused on protecting against or 
minimising violent responses to settlement and was not concerned with gauging and 
transforming the underlying causes of this opposition in an accommodating manner.
73Raz-Krakotzkin 1993, 44, English translation cited from Laurence J. Silberstein, 
The Postzionism Debates: Knowledge and Power in Israeli Culture (London: Routledge
1999): 179-180. This theme will be revisited in the Conclusion.
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finds its source within them.74 It is the prime matrix that forms the cultural and 
political boundaries of Israeli political consensus. By focusing the history of 
the ‘land’ around a notion of ‘Jewish time’, the discourse ‘naturally’ denies 
the existence of the Palestinian ‘Other’. It does not centre on all the people 
who have dwelled in Palestine throughout history, but only on the area’s 
association with Jews. The Israeli concept of Jewish identity is not based on 
recognition of the bi-nationality of the land. By extension, an Israeli 
conception of peace will be less apt for territorial compromise rooted in an 
acceptance of bi-national claims and will seek instead to consolidate the 
predominance of the Jewish association with the land.
Raz-Krakotzkin sees the 1993 Israeli decision to recognise the PLO as 
a new means to achieve its traditional ends.75 He believes that the Israeli 
national myth of ‘a new Jewish community in an empty land’ remains at the 
core of the Oslo agreement. The Accords do not at all reflect a change in how 
Israel perceived its interaction, or conflict, with the Palestinians. Although 
Israel’s shift in attitude toward the PLO was unexpected, it was neither a true 
compromise nor the result of a decision to recognise the Palestinians as equals, 
but merely a new method to safeguard Israel’s strategic interests. The Israeli 
Prime Minister who signed the Accords, Yitzhak Rabin, saw in Oslo the path 
to achieve a particular settlement that he had long believed in, one first 
articulated by the Israeli defence strategist Yigal Allon shortly after the June 
1967 war. In the plan, large portions of the occupied territories would be 
annexed to Israel while the remaining areas would become autonomous
74Raz-Krakotzkin 1993, 23.
75Amnon Raz-Krakotzkin, ‘A Peace Without Arabs: The Discourse of Peace and the 
Limits of Israeli Consciousness’ in George Giacaman and Dag Jorund Lonning ed., After 
Oslo: New Realities, Old Problems (London: Pluto Press, 1998): 59-76.
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Palestinian enclaves, with an administrative link to Jordan. The Oslo Accords 
merely substituted the PLO for the policing role originally designed for 
Jordan.
The vision of peace in the Israeli national consciousness is a peace
without Arabs. The Oslo initiative was an extension of this defining feature of
Israeli national consciousness:
The enthusiasm with which the peace process was received by liberal 
circles in Israel was not because of a belief that it signified a 
compromise between Israel and the Palestinians, but rather because it 
seemed to signify an opportunity to get rid of them and consequently to 
recreate the concept of ‘vacant land’.76
The Oslo Accords allowed Israelis to return to their self-image that had
prevailed until the June 1967 war and, to a certain extent, up to the Palestinian
uprising that began in 1987. The brutality that Israel had employed to quell the
uprising had undermined Israelis’ original notions of themselves, both as
brave pioneers who had revived a culture and built up a new country, and as
victims of the animus of the Arab world. The uprising forced Israelis to alter
their ‘habitual disregard’ for the Palestinians and to consider the direct link
between their nationalist practices and the issue of Palestinian rights. But
through the Oslo Accords, Israelis could return to their vision of innocence.
‘Peace was considered the end of a long nightmare, not for the Palestinians but
for Israeli Jews’.77 The Oslo peace process brought about an end to the
occupation, and although many Israelis believed genuinely that the agreement
would be of benefit to the Palestinians, it was favoured precisely because it
allowed them to skirt fundamental issues surrounding the Palestinian question.
76Ibid., 62.
77Ibid., 65.
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For Raz-Krakotzkin, the accords are a kind of management strategy par 
excellence. The vision of Palestinian autonomy that shaped the design of the 
Accords is rooted in a mutual, but unequal recognition between Israelis and 
Palestinians. ‘The growing increase in support of a Palestinian state was thus 
not the consequence of the realisation of the Palestinian right to self- 
determination, but of the will to ignore Palestinian existence’.78 The 
fundamental principle guiding the Israeli support for the Accords was the 
concept of separation. It was not a separation in the sense of disengagement as 
preparation for Palestinian independence. It was a separation to free Israel 
from policing Palestinian population centres, but that allowed it to maintain its 
settlements in the West Bank and Gaza strip, to consolidate its occupation in a 
different way.
Israeli strategic goals are achieved in the peace process through rhetoric
of peace and by the interim status nature of the accords. Raz-Krakotzkin
maintains that Israeli political approaches to the Palestinian question differ
only in semantics: two similar versions of non-sovereign autonomy exist, but
one approach refers misleadingly to its design as ‘statehood’:
[T]he acceptance of the concept of a Palestinian state involved, for 
Israeli society, removing from that concept any notion of Palestinian 
national rights. The idea of a state, which once expressed the desire for 
emancipation, became a repressive concept, which would now serve to 
fulfil Israeli political goals. The idea of a state became the end result of 
separation. The word ‘state’ in Israeli discourse has become a 
euphemism for the kind of autonomy whose function is to separate the 
Palestinians from the Jews. The only real disagreement is on the degree
*70of autonomy to be given to the Palestinians.
In Raz-Krakotzkin’s view, the strategic enterprise within Oslo is consolidated 
by the interim status of the Accords. Instead of concentrating on the
78Ibid.
79Ibid., 66.
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fundamental issues of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Oslo Accords 
concentrate on developing a subservient autonomy regime. The interim status 
arrangement nature serves to freeze Israel’s post 1967 status quo, its 
occupation and settlements -  to establish them as defining norms. The PLO 
assented to this position in 1993 because of a strategic gamble; it believed that 
by creating a new relationship with Israel, it could win later concessions and 
assure the complete dismantlement of the Israeli occupation. Raz-Krakotzkin 
intimates that such a possibility would be unlikely as the reason the Accords 
were acceptable to Israel in the first place was precisely because they did not 
gauge final status issues such as the status of Jerusalem, the right of return or 
compensation for Palestinian refugees, and the future of Jewish settlements. 
Indeed, the Accords are based entirely on the Israeli view of history and 
essentially oblige the Palestinians to abandon their former positions! For Raz- 
Krakotzkin, the underlying goal of the interim status of the Accords was to 
allow Israel to entrench its hegemony in the West Bank and Gaza strip, and 
not to create a prelude to a genuinely sovereign Palestinian independence.
Raz-Krakotzkin’s argument that the Oslo Accords serve as a kind of 
bizarre re-manifestation of past Israeli nationalist beliefs is an extremely 
valuable insight. It delves into the nature of the Israeli strategic endeavour that 
took hold at Oslo, conveying a phenomenon that has significant correlates at a 
deeper level and that cannot be wholly understood as a rational design of 
cunning statesmen. Unfortunately, Raz-Krakotzkin does not fully explore the 
consequences and implications of this understanding. Since he is primarily 
concerned with identifying how the Israeli government continues to deny the 
validity of Palestinian historical perspectives within current political realities,
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his analysis tends to focus only on generalities and, as a result, leaves many 
crucial issues undeveloped and unexplained. In this sense, Raz-Krakotzkin 
echoes Deiniol Jones and the Palestinian critics recounted by Buchanan, 
merely stressing that the interim nature of the Accords will allow Israel to 
entrench its hegemony in the West Bank and Gaza strip. He only roughly 
develops what the Israeli end-goals of Oslo were supposed to be and does not 
at all describe what might have been the operative logic that was used to 
achieve this objective. Although he asserts that there was a deep element 
underlying the Israeli decision-making process at Oslo, one which had strong 
continuities with past ideas despite a surface transformation of its identifiable 
attributes, Raz-Krakotzkin does not attempt to uncover if there were equally 
profound linkages between the transmuted Israeli notion of ‘empty land* and 
the interim nature of the Accords by which the non-normative end-goal of 
Oslo was supposed to take hold.
Further Questions 
It is problematic to maintain that Israeli attitudes and management 
strategies toward the Palestinians were being reinvented in a manner that did 
not follow logically from previously held patterns -  yet were somehow 
preserving their defining essence, and, that the means of this complex process, 
although undefined, can loosely be construed as having occurred through the 
interim structure of the Accords. It is therefore necessary to provide a 
supplementary theoretical account that can better explicate the principles of 
this unusual transformation. Such an account should not only resonate with 
Raz-Krakotzkin’s preference for critical history but also allow for a more
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precise reconstruction of the intentions and the practical assumptions of the 
Rabin government during this period of time.
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Chapter Two 
A Changing Economy of Power
This chapter addresses how a seemingly incontrovertible reversal of 
past behaviour can in actuality not be the case. In this regard, it presents ideas 
of theorists who described new techniques of ordering and philosophies of 
governance that were largely visible by the early 1990s (the period coinciding 
with the emergence of the Oslo Accords). It provides the theoretical 
framework of the study, the conceptual basis for the argument that the 1993 
Rabin government structured the Oslo Accords in order to co-opt the PLO as a 
proxy, autonomous authority that would permanently remain under Israeli 
overlordship.
New Forms of Order
In 1990 the philosopher Gilles Deleuze described a newly emerging 
system of order, one marked by the ‘breakdown’ of past institutions and 
dominant influences. He asserted, ‘We’re in the midst of a general breakdown 
of all sites of confinement -  prisons, hospitals, factories, schools, the family’.1 
Deleuze did not mean to convey that this ‘breakdown’ was an abandonment of 
the social functions that these institutions had formerly embodied. He was 
certain that their social functions would be preserved, but he also believed that 
they were assuming new forms. Deleuze saw the ‘breakdown’ as evidence that 
a transformation process was taking place -  that forms of order were becoming 
fundamentally altered. Deleuze could not pinpoint what the end result of all
^ ee ‘Postscript on Control Societies’ in Gilles Deleuze, Negotiations 1972-1990 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1995): 178.
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these transformations would be, but he did see in them ‘the widespread 
progressive introduction of a new system of domination’.2
Deleuze entitled his discussion of the new form of domination, 
‘Postscript on Control Societies’. The postscript, the afterthought or additional 
matter that Deleuze is referring to, is the work of the ‘historian of ideas’ 
Michel Foucault:
A thinker such as Michel Foucault has analyzed two types of 
societies that are rather close to us. He calls the former sovereign and 
the latter disciplinary societies. He locates the typical passage of a 
sovereign society to a disciplinary society with Napoleon. Disciplinary 
society is defined-and here Foucault’s analysis is rightly famous- by 
the accumulation of structures of confinement: prisons, schools, 
workshops, hospitals. Disciplinary societies require this. This analysis 
engendered ambiguities in certain of Foucault’s readers because it was 
believed that this was his last thought. This was certainly not the case. 
Foucault never believed and indeed said very precisely that disciplinary 
societies were not eternal. Moreover, he clearly thought we were 
entering a new type of society.3
The disciplinary society is not characterised solely by structures of
confinement; it is a kind of philosophy of rule. ‘ ‘Discipline’ may be identified
neither with an institution nor with an apparatus; it is a type of power, a
modality for its exercise, comprising a whole set of instruments, techniques,
procedures, levels of application, targets; it is a ‘physics’ or an ‘anatomy’ of
power, a technology’.4 This type of power occurred over time as part of a
changing economy, or management, of power by ruling groups. It was shaped
by the kinds of ordering of its predecessor, the sovereign society, feudal type
2Ibid., 182.
3Gilles Deleuze, ‘Having an Idea in Cinema (On the Cinema of Straub-Huillet)’ in 
Eleanor Kaufman and Kevin Jon Heller ed., Deleuze and Guattari: New Mappings in Politics, 
Philosophy and Culture (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998): 17.
4Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth o f the Prison, trans. Alan 
Sheridan. (New York: Vintage Books, 1977): 215.
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states that existed in Europe from the Middle Ages to the sixteenth century. In 
the sovereign type of power, the monarch and nobility exercised absolute 
forms of rule. Indeed, the public displays of torture and gruesome forms of 
execution that were carried out on transgressors of the law during this period 
served as a pedagogical spectacle to demonstrate the absolute power over life 
that the sovereign exercised. This exercise of authority was seen by Foucault 
as a kind of social coding to instil that the sovereign occupied a position of 
externality and transcendence with respect to his subjects.5 The ability to 
torture demonstrated publicly that the king was the state, its ultimate 
embodiment, and that his overarching rule was direct and immediate. Over 
time, these types of authority and forms of punishment diminished.
Foucault argues that the diminishment of sovereign forms of power was 
not due to the enlightened nature of later rulers or revolutions. Rather, these 
rulers sought more efficient ways of ordering, of social control. For example, 
the public spectacle of torture frequently created a grey area, or potential space 
.to defy the will of the sovereign, because criminals who displayed defiance in 
the face of torture served as roundabout symbols of resistance to onlookers and 
the population at large. Later rulers instituted punishment reform, including 
the present norms of isolation and imprisonment, precisely to better order 
populations as a whole, to prevent the kind of symbolic empowerment that 
emerged in past, public displays of torture from undermining the authority of 
the state. This ‘changing economy of power’ was an indirect occurrence, not
5Michel Foucault, ‘Govemmentality’ in Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter 
Miller ed., The Foucault Effect: Studies in Govemmentality (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1991): 91.
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planned per se, and came about around the time that populations under state 
jurisdiction grew and required greater intervention for their management and 
control.
The philosophy of government changed simply because past notions of
rule were ineffective and inefficient. In the eighteenth century, there was a
massive increase in population in Western Europe:
All of a sudden schools and hospitals, to take two of Foucault’s 
examples, were flooded with unprecedented numbers of people seeking 
education and health care and there were no established procedures for 
handling them. At the same time, some of the newer creations of the 
period, such as the modem army and the factories, required the 
efficient management of large numbers of soldiers and workers. New 
economies of scale and quite different uses for the human body created 
the condition in which a new type of power could come into being.6
Foucault introduced a term, ‘govemmentality’, to describe the changing nature
of the administrative state that emerged alongside the disciplinary society.
Govemmentality is linked with, and reinforces, disciplinary-type power. The
term relates to the management of populations, where power is devolved to
administrators through corporate mechanisms. The administrators manage the
population at large to ensure the welfare of the state. With the move away
from the total power of the sovereign, an art of government began to emerge.
The view of the sovereign, exemplified in Nicolo Machiavelli’s The Prince,
saw the state as an object; the territory and the subjects within it belonged
simply to the sovereign. But the art of government was not about establishing
distance, as in the old relationship between the sovereign and his subjects, but
about establishing direct and immediate linkages between rulers and mled.
6John S. Ransom, Foucault’s Discipline: The Politics o f Subjectivity (Durham, North 
Carolina: Duke University Press, 1997): 41.
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‘Thus we find at once a plurality of forms of government and their immanence 
to the state: the multiplicity and immanence of these activities distinguishes 
them radically from the transcendent singularity of Machiavelli’s Prince’.7 
Government is marked by active involvement. ‘The art of government...is 
essentially concerned with answering the question of how to introduce 
economy -  that is to say, the correct manner of managing individuals, goods 
and wealth within the family (which a good father is expected to do in relation 
to his wife, children, and servants) and of making the family fortunes prosper -  
how to introduce this meticulous attention of the father towards his family into 
the management of the state’.8
Government is not only about the imposition of laws, but involves the 
use of tactics to achieve a certain number of ends. Taken as a simple collective 
mass, the ‘people’ were unpredictable and dangerous, but with the 
development of statistics and demography, it became possible to view rising 
populations as a singular object, in a quantified and abstract way. ‘The 
population now represents more the end of government than the power of the 
sovereign; the population is the subject of needs, of aspirations, but it is also 
the object in the hands of the government, aware, vis-a-vis the government, of 
what it wants, but ignorant of what is being done to it’.9 In a sense, the new art 
of governance has not eclipsed the old sovereignty, but has instead perfected it, 
filling in the grey areas within the sovereign’s raw power with its sophisticated
7Foucault, ‘Govemmentality’, 91.
8Ibid., 92.
9Ibid., 100.
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techniques of managing populations.10 For Foucault, the term 
‘govemmentality’ encapsulates the evolution and spread of this understanding 
of government as population management, as well as its traits and 
characteristics, both within apparatuses and forms of knowledge. It is 
important to note that that he sees the state as a ‘composite reality and 
mythicized abstraction’.11 It is govemmentality that defines the state and not 
vice versa. It is the tactics, the operational component that defines a certain 
philosophy of governance over the population within the territory of a state, 
that is more important than the existence of the state itself.
Foucault noted govemmentality had corollaries or ‘disciplines’, tactics 
that operated in parallel fashion in different areas of society. Disciplines 
describe the programmes of action that were used for population management: 
‘Generally speaking, it might be said that the disciplines are techniques for 
assuring the ordering of human multiplicities’.12 The techniques of discipline 
were initially ideas that emerged from numerous thinkers, administrators, and 
practitioners in various fields that were designed to manage the ‘problems and 
opportunities associated with a demographic, industrial, and military 
environment in a state of flux’.13 For example, many of the originators of 
disciplines saw societal benefit if the newly organised population was 
integrated into ‘a complex production apparatus as part of the industrial 
revolution’.14 Foucault does not suggest that the emergence of disciplines was
10Ibid, 102.
11 Ibid., 103.
12Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth o f the Prison, 219.
13Ransom, 41.
14Ibid„ 39.
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part of a capitalist ‘master plan’. He only implies that as population 
management techniques proliferated and as people were increasingly placed 
into environments of supervision, the process of capitalist production was 
aided: ‘the techniques that made the cumulative multiplicity of men useful 
accelerated the accumulation of capital’.15 Training people to be labourers (and 
the material means of production in general) were utilised as part of a greater 
strategy of organisation and management in the disciplinary society as a whole. 
Indeed, Foucault does not consider all forms of discipline bad. Disciplines 
provide necessary order in growing societies and do not shape individuals into 
mindless drones. Foucault does suggest, however, that disciplines came over 
time to proliferate in excess, developing into a kind of informal hyper­
management of daily life that can be viewed as limiting and objectionable.
Disciplines can be understood as influential cognitive templates that 
mould individuals to serve the needs of power. In a figurative sense, 
disciplines ‘produce’ individuals, training them without the use of violence. (It 
is by no means a complete or finalised production; both disciplines and the 
individuals they shape vary in dimension.) But, it is important to understand 
that the individual identities ‘shaped’ by disciplines do not emerge in neutral 
or power-free environments. ‘By organising masses of individuals in particular 
ways, new truths emerge: truths that were not there before that disposition of 
forces’.16 Disciplines determine the social constructions of a society. As the 
corollaries of govemmentality, disciplines establish what is ‘natural’ and
15Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth o f the Prison, 221.
16Ransom,50.
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measure individuals to see if they fit these criteria, if they are ‘normal’. ‘The 
development of the disciplines marks the appearance of elementary techniques 
belonging to a quite different economy: mechanisms of power which instead 
of proceeding by deduction, are integrated into the productive efficiency of 
apparatuses from within, into the growth of this efficiency and into the use of 
what it produces’.17
Michel Foucault saw the metaphorical mark of disciplinary power as 
best exemplified in the panopticon, a prison designed by the utilitarian 
philosopher Jeremy Bentham. The prison design allowed observation and 
surveillance techniques to replace pure force in the management of the prison 
population. A prisoner ‘watched’ himself and was normalised to the rules of 
imprisonment; he would became socialised to rules of order and would thus be 
prepared to ‘rejoin’ society at large. Bentham had believed that the self­
regulating principles that were imbued by the architectural design of the 
panopticon could be pertinent for many other institutions of society, such as 
schools, the work place, etc. Foucault saw this applicability of panopticon 
principles to the broader social world as a new strategy of governance, a 
general model in which ‘obedient subjects’18 were shaped in enclosures such 
as prisons, schools and universities, the military, the factory, asylums and 
hospitals.
For Foucault, prisons have both a practical as well as a symbolic- 
representative function. (He ‘is not attempting to show that all society is a
17Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth o f the Prison, 219.
18Ibid., 129.
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prison.. .thoroughly penetrated by bureaucratic surveillance’.19) As part of a 
changing economy of power, imprisonment was used to replace the potentially 
destabilising spectacle of public execution as a common punishment for 
crimes. But prisons also reflect a new type of power relations, that a calculated 
management of daily life could best be undertaken in institutional forms. In 
other words, disciplines came to determine societal norms within sites o f  
confinement. It must be noted, however, that these institutions or sites of 
confinement are not the locus of a centralised power structure. They are only 
the terminal forms, the most visible manifestations of an understanding of 
‘power’ that has no centre and functions instead as a kind of strategic ordering 
of life itself: ‘power is not an institution, and not a structure; neither is it a 
certain strength we are endowed with; it is the name that one attributes to a 
complex strategical situation in a particular society’.20 Foucault means to draw 
attention away from a conventional notion that conceives of power as being 
centred solely within government or political organisation: ‘The panoptic 
modality of power -  at the elementary, technical, merely physical level at 
which it is sustained -  is not under the immediate dependence or a direct 
extension of the great juridico-political structures of society; it is nonetheless 
not absolutely independent’.21 For Foucault, power operates as a deployment, 
‘a mechanism or apparatus which has both material and immaterial elements
19Ransom, 45.
20Michael Foucault, The Will to Knowledge: The History o f Sexuality Volume 1, 
trans. Robert Hurley (London: Penguin Books, 1976): 93.
21Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth o f the Prison, 221-2.
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working in concert’.22 This is not to say that the sovereignty of the state and 
the form of law are not important. The institutional crystallisation of force 
relations of power is embodied in the state apparatus and its laws, but this is 
only one link in a chain of power that is ‘everywhere’, or has a directly 
productive role in everyday life.23 (Foucault uses the term ‘bio-power’ to 
encapsulate this notion of a strategic ordering of life.24)
Foucault’s discussion of the disciplinary society and govemmentality 
provides a perspective of how to view the nation-state, and its corollary, 
statecraft, the art of conducting state affairs or state management. The 
immediate decision-making capabilities of the leadership of a state are 
important areas of analysis, but provide an incomplete tool to assess the entire 
power dynamic at play within political relationships. It is also necessary to 
gauge the immaterial elements of power, its embodiment in ‘disciplines’ and 
forms of knowledge. This means that past ideas and guiding beliefs that 
shaped govemmentality or population management practices, and that were 
once deployed as discipline-type ordering techniques, cannot be discounted as 
active influential phenomena in an analysis of the state. However, such an 
understanding can be fruitful only by positing, as Foucault did, that ordering is 
not a static phenomenon, that a changing economy of power should be 
accounted for in ongoing political relationships. It is in this light that it is
22Michael Hardt, The Art o f Organization: Foundations o f Political Ontology in 
Gilles Deleuze and Antonio Negri PhD Thesis, (Seattle: University o f Washington, 1991): 
217.
23See Foucault, The Will to Knowledge: The History o f Sexuality Volume 1, 92-102, 
for a comprehensive discussion.
24Ibid., 140-1, 143-4.
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necessary to return to Gilles Deleuze’s discussion, ‘Postscript on Control 
Societies’.
Control Societies: Breakdown and Transformation
Deleuze believed that ordering should no longer be emblematised with 
disciplinary-type structures of confinement in highly advanced or developed 
states. Building on the observations of the political theorist Paul Virilio, 
Deleuze saw ultra-rapid forms of technology, and the cybernetic principles 
underlying them -  immediate, instantaneous control, as the shape of new 
forms of social order.25 Technology, the practice of any or all of the applied 
sciences that have practical value, represents a way of acting into the world. It 
is not only the widespread application of advanced technology that marks the 
transformation, or ‘breakdown’ of past forms of disciplinary sites of 
confinement. The onset of a new system of ordering is also characterised by 
the application of cybernetic principles that figure within advanced technology 
to forms of govemmentality or population management.
.  Deleuze speculated about the logic and programme of this new system
of order, which he called a ‘control society’ (la societe de controle). Deleuze 
called this type of power ‘control’, based on the fiction of the writer William 
S. Burroughs. In his work, Burroughs discusses nightmarish scenarios of social
25Cybemetics is the science of communication and control theory that is concerned 
with organisation, communication and control in complex systems. It studies organisation by 
focusing on circular mechanisms that allow complex systems to maintain, adapt and self- 
organise. Self-organisation is a process where the organisation of a system increases 
spontaneously, without this increase being controlled by the environment or an encompassing 
or otherwise external system.
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ordering, where forms of control are elusive and always changing.26 Deleuze’s 
deliberate use of the term ‘control societies’ is meant to have a negative 
connotation. Read within the historical classifications established by Michel 
Foucault, it implies that a form of servitude with some conceptual parallels to 
the role of subjects within the old sovereign societies characterises the new 
condition of rule. Hence the use of the name ‘control’. It is not a control 
similar in methods to the authority that was used to dominate the peasants and 
serfs of the past, but a form of power that is analogous by its absolute nature.
‘Control’ is not a marked departure from disciplinary-type power. Like 
the deep historical link that disciplines had to their sovereign predecessor, 
control is part of a changing economy of power rooted in the past. Deleuze 
sees the identifiable move toward the control society in the ‘breakdown’ of the 
old institutions of the disciplinary society, a gradual process that began to pick 
up momentum after the Second World War.27 Since the passage to control 
societies is a gradual one, disciplinary deployments or even traits of 
sovereignty do not disappear altogether. Elements common to the preceding 
systems continue to function, alongside emerging, more complex forms of 
order that transform and enhance them.
‘Control’ represents a kind of perfection of the techniques of ordering 
that were seen in disciplines:
The various placements or sites of confinement through which 
individuals pass are independent variables: we’re supposed to start all 
over again each time, and although these sites have a common
26For a discussion of the works of William Burroughs, see Timothy S. Murphy, 
Wising Up the Marks: The Amodem William Burroughs (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1997).
27Deleuze, ‘Postscript on Control Societies’, 178-9.
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language, it’s analogical. The various forms of control, on the other 
hand, are inseparable variations, forming a system of varying geometry 
whose language is digital (though not necessarily binary). 
Confinements are molds, different moldings, while controls are a 
modulation, like a self-transmuting molding continually changing from 
one moment to the next, or like a sieve whose mesh varies from one 
point to another.28
The terms analogical and digital logic can be understood by their usage in the
technology of clocks. A mechanical clock functions analogically. The rotation
of its hands is a physically measurable quantity of duration that precisely
relates to the movement of its inner gears. However, a digital clock operates on
the basis of discrete elements; the surface display of time does not correspond
to its inner structure in a direct or straightforward way. The same kind of
movement away from fixity toward fluid forms of organisation can be seen in
Deleuze’s other examples. A mould is set pattern by which something is
shaped. On the other hand, a modulation is not really bounded and can be seen
in music, for example, in the act of attuning (voice, sounds, etc.) to a certain
pitch or key. A modulation adjusts or adapts to many different patterns or
forms. The mould of discipline was a specific, singular conception of
population ensconced in govemmentality that homogenised the individual. But
the modulations of control accommodate heterogeneity, reformulating
populations as both singular and multiple:
We’re no longer dealing with a duality of mass and individual. 
Individuals become “dividuals,” and masses become samples, data, 
markets or “banks”29
28Ibid., 178-9.
29Ibid., 180. The notion of the ‘singular-multiple’ reflects Deleuze’s understanding of 
ontology. A discussion in this regard is far beyond the scope of this investigation. For a full 
account, see both Gilles Deleuze, The Logic o f Sense, trans. Mark Lester with Charles Stivale, 
edited by Constantin V. Boundas (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990) and Gilles 
Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1995). Excellent analyses of the themes developed in these two works are found in James
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This newfound acceptance of dissimilar or diverse elements is best seen in a 
‘digital’ sense, as a ‘display’ that does not directly reflect or find immediate 
cognates in its structure of ordering.
The ‘control society’ is characterised by a flexible normalcy. Its 
perfected forms of ordering are well illustrated in Deleuze’s note of the usage 
of electronic tagging devices as alternatives to imprisonment.30 It is possible to 
be a ‘prisoner’ and yet live at home and go to the workplace. “ Normal’ is now 
free-standing, no longer the opposite and necessary complement of 
‘abnormal’, ‘deviant’, or ‘dysfunctional’ as it was under disciplinary power, 
except in limited cases’.31 Deleuze also sees this aspect of ‘multiple-
Brusseau, Isolated Experiences: Gilles Deleuze and the Solitudes o f Reversed Platonism 
(Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1998) and Dorothea Olkowski, Gilles 
Deleuze and the Ruin o f Representation (Berkeley, CA: The University o f California Press, 
1999). There are differing interpretations of these ideas, perhaps best exemplified in Alain 
Badiou, Deleuze: The Clamor o f Being, trans. Louise Burchill (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1999). For a specific counter to this alternative perspective, see Nathan 
Widder, ‘The rights of simulacra: Deleuze and the univocity of being’ Continental Philosophy 
Review 34: 437-453, 2001.
30Deleuze, ‘Postscript on Control Societies’, 182. The electronic tagging device has 
several components: a transmitter, that is worn on a strap around the ankle; a receiver, that is 
attached to the telephone in the home of the criminal offender; and an automated monitoring 
system run by a computer. The ankle transmitter emits a constant signal to the receiver on the 
telephone. At various times during the day, the monitoring system dials the telephone of the 
person tagged (who does not hear a ring) to monitor if a signal is being sent to the transmitter -  
that is, to ensure that the person is in the house. The computer is programmed to know when 
the offender is scheduled to be at work or some other location outside the house. Offenders 
give their schedules to probation officers, who enter the information into the monitoring 
system. If no signal is being received when the system dials the offender’s house, the system 
notes first if a person is permitted to be outside his home. In addition, probation officers can 
use a portable version of the home receiver to keep track of offenders when they are outside 
the house. For example, using the portable receiver, a probation officer can park outside an 
offender’s workplace and receive a signal to certify if he has indeed gone to work. If an 
offender is supposed to be at home and the system gets no signal at the home phone, an alert is 
sent to probation officers, who begin a search. If an offender cuts the strap that holds the 
transmitter to the ankle, an alert is sent out immediately. See Roger Knights, ‘Electronic 
tagging in practice’, at Internet site http://www.globalideasbank.org/BI/BI-88.html.
31Brian Massumi, ‘Requiem for Our Prospective Dead (Toward a Participatory 
Critique of Capitalist Power)’, in Eleanor Kaufman and Kevin Jon Heller ed., Deleuze and 
Guattari: New Mappings in Politics, Philosophy and Culture (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1998): 57.
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singularity’ as a new trend in capitalism, within a changing production
process:
[Nineteenth century capitalism was concentrative, directed toward 
production, and proprietorial. Thus it made the factory into a site of 
confinement, with the capitalist owning the means of production and 
perhaps owning similarly organized sites (worker’s homes, schools). 
As for markets, they were won either through specialization, through 
colonization, or through reducing the costs of production. But 
capitalism in its present form is no longer directed toward production, 
which is often transferred to remote parts of the Third World, even in 
the case of complex operations like textile plants, steelworks, and oil 
refineries. It’s directed toward metaproduction. It no longer buys raw 
materials and no longer sells finished products: it buys finished 
products or assembles them from parts. What it seeks to sell is 
services, and what it seeks to buy, activities. It’s a capitalism no longer 
directed toward production but toward products, that is toward sales 
and markets. Thus it’s essentially dispersive, with factories giving way 
to businesses.32
‘Metaproduction’ suggests that the circulation and exchange of products has 
become more important than their production. Capital, once encapsulated in 
the disciplinary site of the factory, no longer intervenes directly in the 
production process. As is the case with electronic tagging devices, traditional 
ends are increasingly achieved by new means of devolution.
The modulations of the ‘control society’, its principles of ‘multiple- 
singularity’ or ‘metaproduction’, allow for far more power to configure 
populations than is possible under the purview of the disciplinary society. The 
disciplinary society is highly orthoprax. It shapes actions, daily practice to try
32Emphasis added, Deleuze, ‘Postscript on Control Societies’, 180-1. The critical 
theorist Frederic Jameson has discussed Deleuze’s understanding of capitalist metaproduction 
in a similar analysis. Jameson sees within late capitalism a near-total commodification of 
culture. An act of displacement has occurred, from production to circulation, and the market 
appears to be an autonomous force. Commodities seem to emerge and relate to each other 
autonomously so that the labour processes that went into their production appear as 
insignificant, or tertiary, factors. See Frederic Jameson, ‘Postmodernism and the Market’ in 
Postmodernism or The cultural logic o f late capitalism (Durham, North Carolina: Duke 
University Press, 1991): 72.
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to synchronise individual subjectivity with modes of behaviour conveyed 
through its institutions. It is not always successful. While ‘confinement* is the 
norm, there remains a space for self-reflexivity and auto-critique remains 
possible. For example, the activist Malcolm X, despite being imprisoned in 
early life, was not socialised to the role of convict and was able to use his 
incarceration to assess radically the structure of power relations in the United 
States.33 On the other hand, the ‘control society’ is orthodox in nature. Control 
is more successful in imbuing its intellectual template because it contrasts its 
flexible norms to the restricting, binary norms of disciplinary order. Control 
greatly enhances discipline because it no longer requires actual sites of 
confinement; it accommodates the techniques for the ordering of human 
multiplicities to a greater individual perception of emancipation. There is a 
transfiguration of past norms, a move toward new types of acceptance and co­
operation, but these changes do constitute genuine social improvements. The 
‘control society’ thus acknowledges difference, but its recognition is relative 
and asymmetrical.
Deleuze gave several noteworthy examples of the flexible and 
‘perfected’ traits of ‘control societies’. His observation of subcontracting and 
work at homes34 as well as the use of ‘open hospitals’ -  teams providing home 
health care35 is meant to illustrate that as past sites of containment (such as 
factories and hospitals) ‘break down’ and are reconstituted, subjection to
33See Malcolm X and Alex Haley, The Autobiography o f Malcolm X  (New York: 
Random House, 1965).
34Deleuze, ‘Having an Idea in Cinema (On the Cinema of Straub-Huillet)’, 18.
35Deleuze, ‘Postscript on Control Societies’, 182.
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dominant political and market forces increases. People have not achieved 
greater freedom because they are working or recuperating in the privacy of 
their own homes. It is no longer possible to leave the sites of confinement -  
they are everywhere. Such a phenomenon can be seen in another example, 
where Deleuze notes how the ‘control society’ requires special courses and 
‘continuing education’ to serve as substitutes for fixed training and 
qualifications.36 Education no longer empowers an individual, helping to 
guarantee a fixed position in society. ‘Control’ denies an individual’s certitude 
of having enough ‘knowledge’, or steady professional skills, and thus 
permanent gainful employment. The ability to continually foment uncertainty 
thus brings individual pliability to its greatest level. ‘[I]n control societies you 
never finish anything-business, training, and military service being coexisting 
metastable states of a single modulation, a sort of universal transmutation’.37 
Whereas discipline was long-term and discontinuous, control is short-term and 
rapidly-shifting, continuous yet unbounded. In advanced capitalist states, this 
situation is exemplified in the occurrence of chronic consumer debt, facilitated 
by readily issued credit with high interest rates.38 Gradually diminishing forms 
of empowerment are therefore characteristic o f ‘control societies’.
The ‘control society’ operates in a circuitous fashion. It functions 
specifically by not shaping identities in a definite manner, but by situating 
them in an infinitely manipulable, free floating condition. In another helpful 
comparison Deleuze says:
36Ibid., 179.
37Ibid.
38Ibid., 181.
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In making highways, for example, you don’t enclose people but instead 
multiply the means of control. I am not saying this is the highway’s 
exclusive purpose, but people can drive infinitely and “freely” without 
being at all confined yet while still being perfectly controlled.39
The control society appears to be marked by free movement, but in fact it has
selective boundaries that ‘phase’ between fixed and open states. Passage is
never guaranteed and is determined by a criterion of inclusion, which is also
liable to change.40 For example, the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985,
which led to the ‘removal’ of internal border controls within the European
Community/Union, gave rise to a complex alteration of the physical barriers of
the countries within the federation. The agreement was never implemented
fully as it was designed and the total abolition of internal border controls has
not come about because of concerns of member states about illegal
immigration, drug trafficking, and terrorism.41 A new arrangement is
perceived to be in place, but past borders remain, or rematerialise selectively,
in order to monitor profiled groups within the system. The terrain of control is
thus inherently infused by ambiguity.
Deleuze concludes by proposing a continuing investigation of the
‘control society’:
We ought to establish the basic sociotechnological principles of control 
mechanisms, and describe in these terms what is already taking the 
place of the disciplinary sites of containment that everyone says are 
breaking down. It may be that older means of control, borrowed from 
the old sovereign societies, will come back into play, adapted as 
necessary.42
39Deleuze, ‘Having an Idea in Cinema (On the Cinema of Straub-Huillet)’, 18.
40Deleuze, ‘Postscript on Control Societies’, 180.
41 Clive H. Church and David Phinnemore comp., European Union and European 
Community: A Handbook and Commentary on the post-Maastricht Treaties (Hertfordshire: 
Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1994), 125-6.
42Deleuze, ‘Postscript on Control Societies’, 182.
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Deleuze calls for an expanded conceptual ‘map’, an illustration of the newest 
and most salient traits of the ‘sociotechnological’ power that was first 
discerned by Foucault.43
Additional Principles of Control 
The first person to undertake Deleuze’s proposed investigation was the 
literary theorist Michael Hardt. Hardt maps the ‘control society* through a 
reading of Foucault as an extension of Hegelian theory.44
Central in Hardt’s analysis is the concept of ‘labour*. It is used 
differently than in its basic semantic sense, as a specific service rendered to 
production by a worker or artisan. It encompasses this meaning, but it is also 
understood as a value-creating practice 45 Labour is understood as any activity
43The ‘sociotechnological map’ of power has been described elsewhere by Gilles 
Deleuze as an ‘abstract machine’. In his analysis of Foucault’s Discipline and Punish, and 
later in his own work, Deleuze argued that there are basic ‘diagrams’ of power, informal 
representations of the types of social ordering that exist in a society, which can be extrapolated 
through genealogical investigation. In this vein, Foucault’s understanding of panopticism can 
be seen as the ‘diagram’ of the disciplinary society. ‘Deleuze points out that what Foucault 
calls a ‘diagram’ of panoptic power is the name of a pure function applied to an unspecified 
matter’ (Paul Patton, Deleuze and the Political (London: Routledge, 2000): 7). This ‘pure 
function’, or abstract machine, is given to surface transformation of its identifiable attributes, 
but its defining essence always remains: ‘We define the abstract machine as the aspect of or 
moment at which nothing but functions and matters remain’ (Gilles Deleuze and Felix 
Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Brian Massumi 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987): 141). Hence an abstract machine is both 
a broad vision of how the social world should be, as well as the basis for an ever-adapting 
logic and techniques that seek to bring this view to fruition. ‘Abstract machines are therefore 
endowed with a directive power which Deleuze...[is] careful to distinguish from other forms 
of causality’ (Patton, 45). An abstract machine ‘is neither an infrastructure that is determining 
to the last instance nor a transcendental Idea that is determining in the supreme instance. 
Rather it plays a piloting role’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 142). Thus an abstract machine should 
not be understood as a detailed ‘master plan’, but rather as a kind of general compass 
underpinning the social construction of reality. ‘It is both a condition of the effects realised in 
a given assemblage and an abstraction that exists only in those affects’ (Patton, 57).
44See Michael Hardt, ‘The Withering of Civil Society’ in Eleanor Kaufman and 
Kevin Jon Heller ed., Deleuze and Guattari: New Mappings in Politics, Philosophy and 
Culture (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998): 23-39.
45Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Labor o f  Dionysus: A Critique o f the State- 
Form (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994): 7.
78
that is recognised socially as being productive of value.46 Hardt’s analysis is 
rooted in the work of the philosopher Georg W.F. Hegel. Hegel formulated a 
complete philosophy that undertook to explain the universe and being, in the 
largest abstract concepts and in the minutest details. Within this grand theory 
are important ideas about the sovereign state. Hegel believes that the 
autonomous nation-state has objective reality -  it exists apart from its citizens. 
The state’s highest duty lies in its own preservation. For Hegel, the state serves 
as the concretisation of the absolute in history; the state has moral standards 
different from, and superior to, those of the individual. (It is thus denoted as 
the ‘State’, with the capital letter meant to convey its higher, transcendent 
status.)
Hardt concentrates primarily on Hegel’s discussion of the relationship 
between civil society and the state. Civil society relates to an actual or 
potential harmony between individual interests and the political sphere, in 
which the sustenance of a healthy or ‘civil’ public life is derived from private 
efforts. He notes how, for Hegel, civil society has a decisive economic 
character, related to the development of capitalism:
Hegel developed his conception of civil society on the basis of 
English economists of the time and the standard German translation of 
the English “civil society,” which Hegel used, was burgerliche 
Gesellschaft or “bourgeois society.” This fact alone should lead us to 
focus on the relationship between Hegel’s conception of civil society 
and the conceptions, which were widespread at the time, of the 
civilizing process contained in market exchange and capitalist relations 
of production 47
46Ibid., 9.
47Hardt, ‘The Withering of Civil Society’, 24.
79
Hardt relays how Hegel built on the work of the political philosophers Thomas 
Hobbes and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. The works of Hobbes contrasts the 
unorganised ‘state of nature’ with the civil state, and argues for the need of the 
rational authority of the civil state to control the chaos, or irrational disorder, 
of natural society. Similarly, Rousseau stresses the occasional necessity to 
curtail the rights of private interests in order to promote a common consensus, 
a greater public good. In this vein, Hegel saw civil society as an extension, a 
kind of evolutionary development or reconstitution, of natural society -  a force 
to be contrasted with, and that needs to be guided by, the rational order of the 
political realm, the state.
Hegel built on this innovation. As an evolutionary development, civil 
society is thus more advanced than the state of nature. Hardt tells how for 
Hegel, this development encompasses a specific educative aspect:
[C]ivil society takes the natural human systems of needs and 
particular self-interests, puts them in relation with each other through 
the capitalist social institutions of production and exchange, and thus, 
on the basis of the mediation and subsumption of the particular, poses a 
terrain on which the State can realize the universal interest of society in 
‘the actuality of the ethical Idea.48
The educative role of civil society ‘guides’ or redirects unorganised self-
interests into an arrangement that is beneficial to the political state.
Contradictions are seen to merge themselves in a higher truth that
comprehends them. This constitutes a dialectic, a process of the continuous
unification of opposites, where particular differences are negated and
integrated.
48Ibid., 25.
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It is within this dialectical process where Hardt introduces his theme of 
labour. ‘Hegel combines and highlights these economic and educative aspects 
in his conception that civil society is primarily a society of labor’.49 Civil 
society is the site of the organisation of labour power, an area for the formation 
of labouring corporations. Before the onset of this organisation, labour exists 
in a pure or a ‘concrete’ form. This concrete form is the direct, tangible 
contribution that individuals make toward self-advancement. It is a self- 
determined, value-creating practice. Hegel, for example, locates this pure form 
in the labour of peasants, but he views concrete labour, which he sees as the 
human activity closest to nature, disparagingly. Like the state of nature, this 
concrete labour is ‘uneducated in the universal interest’50 and must be negated 
and integrated into the universal -  through the medium of civil society. The 
process of negation and integration can also be understood as a process of 
abstraction. Hardt notes how:
The process of abstraction, then, from concrete labor to abstract 
labor, is the educative process whereby the singular is transformed into 
the universal, by abandoning itself... [CJivil society is not simply the 
society of labor but specifically the society of abstract labor.51
Through civil society, new identity constructs are imposed onto subaltern
groups, transforming pre-existing systems of understanding. For Hardt,
Hegel’s final conception of civil society can be understood as an ‘organisation
of abstract labour’52, a dialectical mechanism consisting of all the institutions
49Ibid.
50Ibid.
51 Ibid.
52Ibid.
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of capitalist society that ‘align’ the particular interest of the individual with the 
‘universal* interest of the state.
The Site o f  Economy
Hardt sees Hegel’s civil society as most prominently applied in the 
work of two thinkers, Michel Foucault and the political activist Antonio 
Gramsci. Gramsci’s writings address the likelihood of usurping the dialectic to 
try to use civil society for democratic empowerment:
[Gramsci] insists repeatedly in his notebooks on the importance of 
the Hegelian distinction between civil society and political society for 
any liberal or progressive political theory, but in effect he inverts the 
relationship between these two concepts, standing the relationship, he 
might say, on its feet.53
Gramsci’s programme was marked by a unique voluntarism, a ‘war of
position’ to unseat forces of the dominant hegemony in a society. He accepted
Karl Marx’s base-superstructure argument, that the class that has the material
means of production at its disposal has concurrent control over the means of
‘mental production’. But Gramsci did not view the dominant hegemony as
impenetrable:
Undoubtedly the fact of hegemony presupposes that account be taken 
of the interests and the tendencies of the groups over which hegemony 
is to be exercised, and that a certain compromise equilibrium should be 
formed-in other words, that the leading group should make sacrifices 
of an economic-corporate kind.54
Gramsci believed that this compromise equilibrium could not ‘touch the 
essential’,55 or would continue to support a dominant elite, but he suggests that
53Ibid., 26.
54Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the prison notebooks o f Antonio Gramsci edited 
and translated by Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 
1971): 161.
55Ibid.
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a small pocket of resistance might form within it in which it may be possible 
to assert an alternative worldview.
Gramsci sees hegemony as being exercised through the capitalist 
state’s institutions of civil society. As Hegel had noted, these institutions 
imbue the worldview of those elements that control the state apparatus. 
Gramsci sees this view as a kind of artificial consciousness -  an understanding 
that is absorbed uncritically as ‘common sense’. This position is a uniform 
view of the state and the extant social order in keeping with the wishes of the 
economically advantaged over the needs of the working class. It is a rule by 
consent, rather than by coercion. But groups in the proletariat who are able to 
transcend the artificial, ‘common sense’ element of their consciousness in 
favour of ‘practical activity’ or ‘good sense’ can enact a counter-hegemony.56 
Gramsci sees workers as embodying an alternative hegemony in their 
quotidian, practical activity. The proletariat demonstrates both ‘good sense’ 
and ‘common sense’ in their relations with the dominant elite and the state 
apparatus. Revolutionary groups must therefore participate actively in civil 
society, wage a persuasive ‘war of position’, until sizeable elements of the 
working class can transcend their artificial consciousness in order to initiate a 
‘war of movement’ or counter-hegemonic process.
Hardt interprets Gramsci’s perspective as a ‘withering of the state’ of 
sorts.57 The Hegelian process of subsumption that flowed from society to state 
is reversed (from state to civil society) so that the state exists only secondarily
56Ibid., 323.
57Hardt, ‘The Withering of Civil Society’, 26.
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-  not as Hegel’s ‘higher truth*. The state, forces embodying political power 
and legitimacy, ‘descend* figuratively to ‘fill a structural void left by a civil 
society that is not fully developed’.58 Since the state has withered, or has 
‘descended’ into civil society from its old, untouchable, transcendent position, 
it is now open to mediation within this imminent realm by constructive forces 
in civil society.
But Foucault’s writings do not support Gramsci’s conclusions:
Michel Foucault’s work has made clear that that the institutions and 
enfermements (enclosures) of civil society -  the church, the school, the 
prison, the family, the union, the party, and so on -  constitute the 
paradigmatic terrain for the disciplinary deployments in modem 
society, producing normalized subjects and thus exerting hegemony 
through consent in a way that is perhaps more subtle but no less 
authoritarian than the exertion of dictatorship through coercion.59
Hardt notes how Foucault’s observations about the role played by the
institutions of civil society seem to confirm the initial vision that Hegel had
wanted for them -  ‘[t]he social dialectic thus functions in order that
antagonistic social forces be subsumed within the prior and unitary synthesis
of the State’.60 Using Foucault’s notion of govemmentality, Hardt maps how
Hegel’s civil society in fact emerged. Sovereign societies were far less ordered
than current-day states. In terms of power relationships, the state exercised
absolute, direct authority over its subjects, but it was a transcendent entity and
was removed entirely from the everyday. This relationship changed, however,
with the passage to the modem state. The modem state, marked by
govemmentality, is characterised by its immanence to the population through a
58Ibid.
59Ibid., 27.
60Ibid., 27-8.
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multiplicity of forms. These forms, the sites of confinement of the disciplinary 
society, are characterised by an active engagement of the population under 
their jurisdiction. The active engagement occurs within those elements 
understood traditionally as constituting civil society. ‘The same educative 
social processes that Hegel casts in terms of abstraction, Foucault recognizes 
in terms of training, discipline, and management’.61 Thus for Hardt, Hegel’s 
civil society serves as the site o f discipline or the operational domain o f 
govemmentality, ‘the productive site of modem economy (economy now 
understood in a large sense)’.62
Foucault’s work does not support Gramsci’s suggestion that the state 
has withered, or has ‘descended’ to an operative level that can be engaged and 
appropriated by forces in civil society. Gramsci had argued that workers 
embody an alternative hegemony in their everyday, practical activity, but this 
does not account for the fact that power has a directly productive role in the 
quotidian realm. For Hardt, the state has not at all withered: ‘When Foucault 
argues that power cannot be isolated but is everywhere, that it comes from 
everywhere, that there is no outside to power, he is also denying the analytical 
separation of political society from civil society.’63 Civil society is rooted in 
the disciplinary sites of confinement that embody govemmentality. It must be 
understood as part and parcel of them. While power is not absolutely 
embodied in the state, it still cannot be ‘seized’ through civil society, as
61 Ibid., 28.
62Ibid.
63Ibid.
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Gramsci has suggested. In this understanding, both civil society and the state 
can be seen as a kind of gestalt:
While this denies all the moral and teleological elements to Hegel’s 
social theory, Foucault’s understanding...does in certain respects takes 
the Hegelian notion of civil society to its logical conclusion. Foucault 
reformulates the educational processes of civil society in terms of 
production: power acts not only by training or ordering the elements of 
social terrain but actually by producing them—producing desires, 
needs, individuals, identities, et cetera. I see this not so much a 
contradiction but as an extension of Hegelian theory. The State, Hegel 
claims, is not the result but the cause; Foucault adds, not a transcendent 
but an immanent cause, statization, immanent to the various channels, 
institutions, or enclosures of social production.64
As disciplinary components of govemmentality, both civil society and the state
must be understood as the end result of forces of power that are multiple and
imminent in the social realm.
Beyond the Dialectic
Hardt interprets Gilles Deleuze’s discussion about the move toward the
control society through the above understanding. As the transition to the
‘control society’ ensues, and the enclosures of disciplinary societies break
down and transform (as part of a changing economy of power), civil society -
which Hardt has shown to be intimately linked with disciplinary sites of
confinement, will, by extension, ‘wither away’. Seeking to discern what kind
of successor to civil society, or operational domain of govemmentality, will
emerge in the control society, Hardt turns to an unorthodox reading of Karl
Marx by the political theorist Antonio Negri. Negri’s work is a hermeneutic
reading of Marx, an interpretation and extrapolation of principles discussed by
64Ibid., 29.
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Marx in the Grundrisse.65 Negri argues that it is no longer possible to posit a 
rigid differentiation between the ‘political* and the ‘economic’ in an era of 
post-industrial capitalism. Based on this understanding of Marx, it is possible 
for Hardt to suggest: ‘Straining their periodizations a bit, we could say that 
Foucault’s societies of sovereignty correspond to feudal relations of 
production; disciplinary regimes rely on what Marx calls the formal 
subsumption of labor under capital; and societies of control point to the real 
subsumption under capital’.66
The subsumption of labour is Karl Marx’s concept to explain how 
labour processes become subordinated and assuaged under capital.67 A 
‘formal’ and a ‘real’ stage mark Marx’s subsumption process. The first, or 
‘formal’, stage occurs when labour is explicitly taken over by capital. Capital 
needs the valued abilities that individuals have developed externally to its 
production process, so it willingly incorporates them as wage labourers in 
order to function. In the formal subsumption phase, capital ‘knows’ that it is 
the productive value of labour that sustains it, despite having full control over 
the workers it has taken on. More importantly, people who work as labourers 
in the formal subsumption are conscious of the crucial role they play and thus 
have leverage in determining the rates of production. The situation undergoes 
a massive transformation within the second, or ‘real’, stage, when labour 
becomes unaware of its subsumption within capital. Innovation in production,
65See Antonio Negri, Marx Beyond Marx, trans. Harry Cleaver, Michael Ryan, and 
Maurizio Viano (South Hadley, Massachusetts: Bergin and Garvey, 1984).
66Hardt, ‘The Withering of Civil Society’, 33.
67Hardt and Negri, Labor o f Dionysus: A Critique o f the State-Form, 257-61.
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such as by technological advancement, creates alienation processes that invert 
the relationship between capital and labour. In the real subsumption, labour, as 
a concept, becomes newly understood as a process that is generated within 
capital. It is no longer viewed as something of value that exists independently 
from, and externally to, the forces of production. Conditioning processes 
enmeshed in the workday cause labour to be seen as resulting from , and only 
having value in, capital. Marx thus saw the norms of capital and the subjective 
beliefs of the individual labourer as becoming one in the same.
As Deleuze had noted earlier, production has given way to 
metaproduction, or alternatively, ordering processes marked by circulation and 
exchange. Such is also the case in the real subsumption of labour, where a 
blurring of the boundary between circulation and production occurs. The 
primary ordering processes of the real subsumption must be understood as 
existing beyond the dialectic. Hegel’s dialectic was marked by a thesis, 
antithesis, and synthesis: an original tendency, an opposing tendency of which 
it inevitably gives rise, and the unification of the two tendencies in a new 
movement. For Hardt, the dialectic characterises the disciplinary society. But 
the traits of the real subsumption, which are analogous to forms of ordering in 
the control society, are not marked by a unification of opposites. ‘What is 
subsumed, what is accepted into the process, is no longer a potentially 
conflictive force but a product of the system itself.68 The real subsumption 
undoes any sort o f dialectic between labour and capital. It is domination in its 
purest form, an absolute determinant that is abstract from labour itself. From
68Hardt, ‘The Withering of Civil Society’, 35.
88
their initial encounter, there are no opposing tendencies between labour and
capital. This view of the control society as the ‘State of the real subsumption’69
can be seen in Antonio Negri’s suggestion that ‘capital has subjugated all lived
time’70, that the antagonism of class struggle no longer operates on an
immediate stage and has become displaced to an abstract level. An analogy to
the extra-dialectical ordering of control might be seen the process of genetic
cloning. In natural reproduction, genetic material from two parental organisms
is combined in an offspring. But in cloning, a donor cell is fused with an egg
stripped of its DNA, or genetic information. As a result, the genes of the
organism that develops from this union come only from the donor, so the
organism is its genetic twin or clone.
Complex Co-optation
Hardt suggests that the ‘control society’ is marked by a kind of
complex co-optation. Such a notion is implicit in his final description of this
new system of order:
Instead of disciplining the citizen as a fixed social identity, the new 
social regime seeks to control the citizen as a whatever identity, or 
rather as an infinitely flexible placeholder for identity. It tends to 
establish an autonomous plane of rule, a simulacrum of the social- 
separate from the terrain of conflictive social forces.71
In the context above, ‘whatever’ refers to a concept developed by the
philosopher Giorgio Agamben.72 For Agamben, a whatever identity or
whatever being has two forms: a future ideal and a present distortion of this
69Ibid.
70Negri, author’s preface, xvi.
71 Hardt, ‘The Withering of Civil Society’, 36.
72See Giorgio Agamben, The Coming Community, trans. Michael Hardt 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993): 8.
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ideal. The ideal is a ‘form of belonging without relation and being [and] 
without identity’, a concept of identity and community that is not linked to the 
state.73 Agamben calls his ideal ‘whatever singularities*.74 This is a self­
created, self-determined identity that is not ‘produced’ a la Foucault, by 
disciplines.75 (Agamben believes that past identities were not truly individual, 
but forms of ‘individuation’, moulds of sorts, an illusion of individuality.) 
Agamben sees a distortion in the use of the ideal of the ‘whatever singularity’ 
as a management tool within govemmentality. Within the current economy of 
power, a plurality of subjective identities is no longer a hindrance, an 
unacceptable or potentially destabilising force. It is not necessary to punish or 
contain ‘deviant’ identities, but merely to separate them from their 
autonomous creative potential. ‘What we are left with is a form of hyper- 
possessive individualism...that works on entire populations of collectively 
identified bodies, extracting their affective potential (and, therefore their 
potential for thought and forms of belonging) for reactive ends’.76
Hardt’s ‘whatever identity’ is a whatever singularity whose potential 
for emancipation has been contained. In the ‘control society’, identities that 
were formed outside of, and in opposition to, disciplinary power are 
incorporated into the ambit o f govemmentality. This process of incorporation
73Robert C. Thomas, ‘Whatever Intellectuals: The Politics of Thought in Post- 
disciplinary Societies’, paper delivered in lecture form at the Fifth Annual Humanities 
Symposium, San Francisco State University, 15 April 1998, on internet site, 
http://online.sfsu.edu/~theory/mrt/lecture.html, 5.
74Agamben, 1.
75For Agamben, this ideal is exemplified in the events of May 1968 in France, when 
combined student and labour protests rejected traditional identities and temporarily paralysed 
the French state. For a view that echoes Agamben’s interpretation of the protests, see Daniel 
Singer, Prelude to Revolution: France in May 1968 (London: Jonathan Cape, 1970).
76Thomas, 7.
90
is Hardt’s ‘autonomous plane of rule’, a new kind of co-optation that 
substitutes an acknowledgement of identities hitherto ignored or repressed for 
normative change. It is not simply marked by, for example, the taking of 
differing movements or cultures into a larger group. Nor can it merely be 
equated with the related concepts of absorption, appropriation, or assimilation. 
This new type of co-optation must be understood instead as constituting a 
‘simulacrum of the social’, an empty process of recognition and empowerment 
that is equivalent to Deleuze’s notion of ‘control’.
Hardt does not explicitly say if the agents who are primarily 
responsible for initiating these complex processes wholly conceive of their 
actions as constituting a ‘co-optation effort’, but such initiatives can be viewed 
as a kind of co-optation nonetheless. As will be recalled, Deleuze described 
the various forms of control as a modulation, a ‘self-transmuting’ moulding 
continually changing from one moment to the next. He saw ‘normal’ 
mouldings as those processes of power that were emblematised by Foucault in 
disciplines. These disciplinary enclosures were shown by Hardt to be 
tantamount to Hegel’s civil society, the dialectic-led organisation of abstract 
labour. Complex co-optation can thus be seen as an extra-dialectical 
organisation of abstract labour, or alternatively, a self-transmuting form of past 
disciplines. Within this ‘extra-dialectical organisation of abstract labour’, the 
techniques for assuring the ordering of human multiplicities are no longer 
marked by rigid shaping processes whose end goal is a synthesis of old forms 
of identity with the ‘higher’ norms of the state. The techniques for assuring 
order now function through the surface expression of multiple forms of
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difference.77 Ordering techniques change or transmute to accommodate all 
forms of subjectivity that have formerly been excluded from disciplinary 
‘moulds’. Yet through the use of ‘modulation’, the tactical interplay of the 
traits of ‘control’ suggested above -  ambiguity, asymmetrical recognition, and 
gradually diminishing forms of empowerment, these oppositional identities 
can be contained. Indeed the notion of a self-transmuting form of past 
disciplines would mean that an identity that was unacceptable or externally 
different from forms of identity embodied in past disciplines would become 
acceptable or intrinsically similar to them in the ‘control society’.78
Relevance of Deleuze and Hardt to the Oslo Accords 
Why are the theoretically diverse works of Deleuze and Hardt needed 
to elucidate and reconstruct the Oslo Accords? The use of these two thinkers 
as an explanatory template is in many ways predetermined by their conceptual 
linkages with the perspective of Amnon Raz-Krakotzkin that was relayed in
77Deleuze and Guattari, 482-83.
78The concept of self-transmutation offered here can be viewed as a kind of self- 
organising system, but should not be confused with the idea of self-reference, or autopoiesis, 
that was developed by the systems theorist Niklas Luhmann. See Niklas Luhmann, Essays in 
Self-Reference (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990). The term autopoiesis means 
literally, self-production. It is the process whereby an organisation produces itself, as well as 
maintains and constitutes itself in a space. A biological cell, a living organism, and to some 
extent a corporation are examples of autopoietic systems. Luhmann sees autopoiesis as 
applying to all forms of social organisation. But this particular elucidation of autopoiesis does 
not cover the understanding of self-transmutation offered here and the use of term, which is so 
intimately linked with Luhmann’s work, can be misleading because it may limit the scope of 
change that is perceived to have occurred. Deleuze’s observations stress that the organisation 
and maintenance that occur in self-transmutation is quite unusual (it may not even appear to be 
similar to its predecessor in its new form) and does not follow logically from previously held 
patterns. See Deleuze, ‘Postscript on Control Societies’, 178-9. In a basic sense, self­
transmutation may be viewed as a self-organising system since it is marked by an alteration 
that is not controlled by an external system. But the change is of an unbounded nature. While 
change occurs in autopoietic systems, such as growth or ageing in a living organism or 
restructuring in a corporation, it is still a relatively fixed and predictable process. For a 
detailed contrast of Deleuze’s self-transmuting ‘modulations’ to Luhmann’s autopoiesis see, 
Massumi, ‘Requiem for Our Prospective Dead (Toward a Participatory Critique of Capitalist 
Power)’.
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chapter one (pp. 51-7). Deleuze and Hardt’s understandings of the changing 
nature of power relations alone can be drawn upon to answer what Raz- 
Krakotzkin hinted at, but failed to develop: 1) how Israeli attitudes and 
management strategies toward the Palestinians could have been reinvented in a 
manner that did not follow logically from previously held patterns, yet still 
have retained their defining essence; and 2) how this process could have 
occurred through the interim structure of the Oslo Accords.
Application and Hypothesis
Michael Hardt noted how his expansion of the general principles of 
‘control’ that were first identified by Deleuze could be used to analyse other 
cases. The key to such an endeavour would be to identify the ‘multiplicity of 
forms’ that actively engaged and managed the populations that were under the 
jurisdiction of a particular state. Hardt located this ‘operational domain’ of 
govemmentality within civil society, but his analysis was specific to social 
conditions in Western Europe and North America. Indeed Hardt noted that the 
social and political environment of developed states that lay outside of these 
particular geographic regions would likely be shaped by a different operative 
dynamic. He remarked that if endgame similarities to the ‘withering of civil 
society’ in Western Europe and North America were to be gleaned in such 
cases, it would first be necessary to identify the principles of ‘population 
management’ that were employed in accordance with the particular guiding 
national or social vision of these other states.79 Once discovered, the transition 
to ‘control society’ forms of order could then be speculated.
79See Hardt, ‘The Withering of Civil Society’, footnote no. 29, 39.
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This study will build on Raz-Krakotzkin’s claim from chapter one that 
the guiding impetus of the Israeli national consciousness remained the notion 
of ‘empty land’, even after the recognition of the PLO as the official 
representative of the Palestinian people (p. 54). Raz-Krakotzkin’s analysis of 
Israeli nationalist and security discourse reflected Michel Foucault’s 
conception of power as a complex strategic ordering of life, but as was shown, 
failed to grasp the entirety of change that occurred when Israel recognised the 
PLO in 1993 (pp. 51-8). But since Deleuze and Hardt advance and update 
Foucault’s understanding of power relations, it is possible to use their insights 
to complete Raz-Krakotzkin’s observations, to suggest that Israeli forms of 
‘population management’ underwent transition to ‘control society’ types of 
governance in the Oslo Accords.
Before the Oslo Accords, the Israeli government had refused to 
recognise the PLO and its claim to represent of the Palestinian people. But if 
the recognition of the PLO by the Israeli government in 1993 is viewed as 
being tantamount to what Michael Hardt labelled a ‘whatever identity’, as 
being hollow in nature, than it is possible to speculate that Israel recognised 
the PLO for essentially the same reasons that it had previously challenged the 
organisation and disavowed its claims for Palestinian statehood. In the Oslo 
Accords, the government of Israel did not recognise the PLO as its equal, nor 
did it acknowledge that the Palestinians had an equal national right to the 
territory that both peoples claimed. The recognition process inherent in Oslo 
was not a prelude toward a fundamental resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict, but rather an innovative, and multifaceted attempt to consolidate 
Israeli control.
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A perspective informed by Gilles Deleuze and Michael Hardt would 
suggest that the 1993 government of Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres 
recognised the PLO so as to induce the organisation to abandon its goal of 
Palestinian statehood through a complex co-optation process, to bring its 
leadership into a position of lesser, but substantial power that it nonetheless 
would wish to maintain. But it would not see this desired end-goal as having 
resulted from clear-cut intentions. It would argue instead that the strategic 
endeavour at the heart of the Oslo Accords was a changing economy of power 
along Foucauldian lines -  i.e. not planned per se, but rather a series of 
evolving and not-immediately connected tactics that nonetheless served to 
preserve Israel’s guiding nationalist vision in changing form. Reflecting the 
principle of modulation identified by Deleuze, the Rabin government would 
have continually modified the ‘rules of the game’, in the general hope that, 
after being installed as the head of an interim-self governing authority, the 
PLO would in time abandon its original stance and settle for less than 
statehood in a final-status agreement. Recalling from the Introduction that 
Yitzhak Rabin’s motives with regard to Oslo were not clearly known -  
apparently even to himself (pp. 6-8), it can be surmised that complex co­
optation was a broad goal, an outgrowth of guiding national beliefs and 
security perspectives, but a phenomenon that did not operate on a fully 
articulated level. If this complex process was not wholly deliberative, it can be 
further presumed that Israel would have taken actions, which, from a rational 
perspective of policy analysis, would appear to be counter-intuitive in nature. 
The following chapters will plot the mechanics of these occurrences.
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Chapter Three 
‘Modulatory’ Predispositions
It will be recalled from chapter two that ‘complex co-optation’ is the 
utilisation of ‘modulation,’ the tactical interplay of asymmetrical recognition, 
ambiguity, and a gradual diminishment of concessions, to control those 
subaltern elements who had evaded or resisted the ‘deployments’ of power of 
the past ‘govemmentalised’ state (p. 92). In this vein, this chapter will show 
how Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres, the principal Israeli decision-makers 
during the Oslo Accords, were predisposed toward a ‘modulatory’ approach to 
peacemaking with the Palestinians, one oriented toward eventual complex co­
optation. The chapter examines Rabin’s past experiences in promoting Israeli 
security needs and the tactics that Shimon Peres long contemplated in relation 
to the Palestinian question. It suggests that this broad social vision became 
reconstituted, akin to a changing economy of power, in the later structure of 
the Oslo Accords.
In order to understand why Rabin and Peres were predisposed toward 
modulation or complex co-optation, it is first necessary to address their views 
on three key but interrelated concerns that can be viewed as being tantamount 
to a form of ‘govemmentality’ or population management:
(1) the interplay between Israeli security, the prism of the Jewish historical 
experience, and the nature of Israeli nationalism, especially after June 
1967;
(2) the status and political rights of the Palestinians; and
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(3) the assessment of the Israeli public’s commitment to nationalist goals, 
particularly in relation to the changing strategic climate in the Middle 
East.
Prone Toward Ambiguity
The categories of Israeli security, the prism of the Jewish historical 
experience, and Israeli nationalism have been grouped together for two 
reasons. First of all, because every Israeli leader, and not just Rabin and Peres, 
have had to grapple with these concerns that have tended to coalesce -  despite 
their being arguably separate phenomena. The discussion therefore helps to 
better understand the mindset of the Israeli leadership. It is also the case that 
these factors of consideration that have been associated together in Israeli 
political discourse are not easily reconcilable in terms of a future political 
compromise. Thus they are discussed secondarily to convey that, in 
contemplating conflict resolution strategies, Rabin and Peres were prone 
toward ambiguity, a central ‘tier’ of modulation.
Security
The state of Israel emerged in war and has lived for most of its 
existence in a technical state of war with the majority of its neighbours. The 
issue of security has thus been of paramount importance within the Israeli 
national agenda, in a manner unparalleled in most other states. The Israeli 
Minister of Defence, unlike counterparts in other democratic regimes, has 
tended to exercise a greater role in politics and policy making than any other 
individual apart from the Prime Minster. It is even common for Israeli leaders 
to hold both portfolios. ‘Security so dominated the Israeli decision-making 
process that it influenced, and often overwhelmed, almost all other dimensions
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of foreign policy, and even major elements of domestic and economic 
policy’.1 Indeed, Henry Kissinger once remarked that Israel had no foreign 
policy, only domestic politics.2 The Israeli civilian and military leadership 
shaped the defining feature of national security doctrine during the first few 
years of the state. The concept was based on a particular strategic perception, 
one requiring a posture of military deterrence that was meant to serve a 
defensive role, but whose operational content was actually offensive in nature. 
Israeli policy makers have adhered to this central notion ever since; it not only 
has produced the structure and doctrine of the Israeli armed forces, but has 
shaped the nature of civil-military relations as well.
Israeli leaders believed that their state would long exist in a hostile 
environment. The Arab states had accepted General Armistice Agreements in 
1949, but these military understandings did not signify their intentions for 
peaceful coexistence or diplomatic relations with Israel. The decision of the 
Arab states to attack Israel was for the most part undertaken in order safeguard 
the national existence of the Palestinian Arabs.4 Their subsequent refusal to 
accept Israel as a legitimate Middle Eastern state stemmed from a perception 
that its establishment had been an injustice. Israeli leaders understood this 
argument, but naturally believed otherwise. The Israelis perceived an
'Mark Heller, Continuity and Change in Israeli Security Policy (London: 
International Institute of Strategic Studies, 2000): 9.
2Avi Shlaim, ‘Israeli Politics and Middle East Peacemaking’ Journal o f Palestine 
Studies 25, no. 4 (Summer 1995), 20.
3Dan Horowitz, ‘The Israeli Concept of National Security’ in Avner Yaniv ed., 
National Security and Democracy in Israel (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 1993): 
13.
4It must be noted that critical historiography challenges this assumption in the case of 
.Jordan. Shlaim (1988) documents that before die 1948 war had begun, the Jewish settler 
leadership in Palestine had reached an tacit agreement with Abdullah, the king of 
neighbouring Transjordan (later Jordan), to allow his forces to take over the West Bank, the 
area set to be a Palestinian Arab state, in return for his assurances not to enter territory that 
had been earmarked for the Jewish state by the 1947 United Nations partition plan. See Avi 
Shlaim, Collusion Across the Jordan: King Abdullah, The Zionist Movement and the Partition 
o f Palestine (Oxford: Clarendon, 1988).
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irreconcilable Arab hostility toward their existence, which necessitated a high 
and ongoing state of military readiness in order to confront the continual threat 
of wars with one or more Arab armies.5
Israel had human and material resources that were quantitatively 
inferior to those of its adversaries, as well as limited territorial depth. It was 
thus vulnerable to protracted war, because of its limited staying power, and to 
surprise attack, because of the lack of space to trade for time. Israeli policy 
makers adopted broad strategies to cope with this situation. In addition to the 
promotion of immigration and the seeking foreign economic assistance, Israel 
would have to mobilise its existing resources a great deal more intensively 
than did its foes. In such a situation, the mobilisation effort would actually 
allow Israel to achieve quantitative parity, even local superiority, in terms of 
manpower and firepower. Israel also had to rely on the application of 
offensive force at the tactical and operational levels. The remaining material 
gaps could be overcome by cultivating qualitatively superior military 
technology, organisation and combat doctrines.6 In particular, it was crucial 
for Israel to achieve a decisive victory on the battlefield. This scenario did not 
necessarily require the wholesale destruction of enemy forces, but did entail 
the elimination of their capacity to sustain combat before outside intervention 
could impose a cease-fire. Israel would be greatly disadvantaged if the fighting 
arena was not controlled under these terms, and would likely face a quick 
renewal of hostilities or a static war of attrition along border areas.
5Some Israeli historians contend otherwise. Pappe (1992) suggests that Israeli leaders 
were unwilling to give up recent territorial gains in exchange for diplomatic relations and so 
did not exploit early opportunities for peace with Arab states. See, for example, Ilan Pappe, 
The Making o f the Middle East Conflict, 1947-1951 (London: I.B.Tauris, 1992).
‘‘Heller, 11.
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Israel was to rely on strategies designed to deter war. But it could 
never hope to achieve its political objectives vis-a-vis the Arab states solely 
through military means. ‘[Hjowever decisive the victory on the battlefield, 
Israel would never have either the resources or the international freedom of 
action to achieve a strategic victory, in the sense of being able to impose its 
peace on a defeated adversary’.7 For the most part, Israeli security policy was
o
defensive with regard to neighbouring Arab states. Military and civilian 
leaders agreed that security policy could serve the political objective of peace 
only if Israeli military superiority could deter Arab opponents from initiating 
war and, ultimately, compel them to forego military confrontation altogether.
Not all security concerns were perceived as existential threats. In 
particular, insurgency and terrorism were only viewed as ‘current security’ 
considerations, meaning a military nuisance that disrupted routine and affected 
the quality of life, but that posed no grave threat to Israel. Since its 
establishment, Israel has been susceptible to cross-border infiltration and 
guerrilla attacks, mostly from Palestinian militants based in neighbouring 
states. The traditional, tactical Israeli response to these activities was ‘based 
on a combination of passive defences and active measures to harass and 
disrupt terrorist organisations, and deter or compel governments of states in 
which those organisations operated’.9
7Ibid, 12.
8Unpublished interviews of former Israeli General Moshe Dayan in 1976 and 1977 
suggest that there were noteworthy exceptions to this rule. Dayan, who was Minister of 
Defence during the June 1967 war, said that during the fourth day of the conflict, Israeli 
kibbutz residents along the border with Syria pressured the government of Levi Eshkol to 
seize the adjacent Golan Heights. He says the government was swayed by the political 
arguments of the kibbutz residents (who coveted the fertile Golan lands) and that the decision 
to seize the Syrian territory was not in fact motivated by security reasons. See ‘Moshe Dayan, 
Interview on the Golan Heights and on Jewish Settlement in Hebron’, 22 November 1976 and 
1 January 1977’, Journal of Palestine Studies Vol. 28, No. 1 (Autumn 1997), 144-150.
9Heller, 24.
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Israeli security policies as a whole constituted a sizable burden on the 
time and resources of the Israeli Jewish population. For the most part, this 
burden was sustained by a strong domestic consensus based on confidence in 
the political leadership. ‘But the security consensus also rested on the 
legitimacy of the military establishment and the esteem in which it was held, 
and on the social mobility and acceptance that attached to participation in the 
security effort and in the hegemonic beliefs and norms that lay behind it’.10 
Indeed the widespread conviction amongst the Israeli populace was that the 
threats facing the state were genuine, there was no viable alternative, and so 
the demands and policies implicit in the primacy of security were not only 
necessary, but also completely justified. The national-security concept was 
sustained throughout the first two decades of Israel’s existence and its guiding 
logic appeared to be given credence after the Israeli victory in the June 1967 
war. (The Israeli military achievements notwithstanding, it can also be argued 
that the very need to fight a war at all stemmed from the failure of the 
deterrent that was supposed to be the core the Israeli security concept.) But it 
must also be noted that the pyrrhic victories in the October 1973 war and the 
war in Lebanon in 1982 created much unease and resistance within the Israeli 
populace. As a consequence, public scrutiny of matters of security became 
increasingly widespread and the Israeli leadership began to show greater 
reluctance toward the blanket use of force.
The prism o f the Jewish historical experience
Security policy was affected by other factors unique to the Israeli 
experience, in particular perceptions and behaviour that were a product of
10Ibid., 17.
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Jewish communal life in the Diaspora. It is true that the founders of Israel
believed that the establishment of the state had metahistoric and metaphysical
dimensions.11 For them, the state was the ‘negation of the exile’. They were
especially proud of the Israeli army, seeing it as the antithesis of centuries of
Jewish passivity and weakness. Yet at a deeper level, there was a tendency to
preserve the Diaspora distinction between Jews and non-Jews, a distrust of
foreigners and outsiders. The political circumstances of the Israeli state were
often seen to be a continuation of the Jewish historical experiences of isolation
and persecution that had culminated in the Holocaust. This perception has
often been widespread. For example, Yitzhak Rabin, during his 1974-1977
term as Prime Minister, echoed such thinking in his response to the November
1975 UN resolution equating Zionism with racism: ‘The whole world is
against us-when was this not so?’12
Israeli nationalism
As was conveyed by the perspective of Raz-Krakotzkin in chapter one,
the exclusivist nature of Zionism, Israeli nationalism, was that it remained
open-ended -  easily liable to expansionism, even after the de facto partition of
Palestine in the 1948 war. In this vein,
Zionist discourse takes it as a given that the land of Israel, also known 
as Palestine, is the legitimate home of the group represented by the 
Jewish people. ... For those who are positioned by Zionist discourse, 
this knowledge legitimates the Jewish claim to the land while 
delegitimating the claim of others. ... Insofar as Zionist discourse takes 
for granted the legitimacy of the Jewish people’s claim to the land, it 
denies the Palestinian Arab claim.13
"See, for example, Yechiam Weitz, ‘The Debate Concerning the Role of Culture in 
the State’s First Years’, The Journal o f Israeli History, vol. 12, no. 2 (1996).
,2Idem Effaim Inbar, Rabin and Israel’s National Security (Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1999): 12.
,3Idem Laurence J. Silberstein, The Postzionism Debates: Knowledge and Power in 
Israeli Culture (New York: Routledge, 1999: 22-23.
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Some, like Benvenisti, (1986) believe that Israeli nationalism was a
honourable and noble endeavour that went awry only after 1967:
Our Zionist, liberal socialist philosophy did not escape the fate of other 
great liberating ideologies. Its failure to adjust to changing realities 
enabled dark forces to usurp its revered symbols, now fossilized and 
anachronistic, and turn enlightened, moral, and progressive ideas into 
reactionary beliefs and deeds.14
Others, such as Shafir (1989), argue that the exclusivist trends that became
most visible in the post-1967 settlement campaigns were not an aberration
from Israeli nationalism and indeed were innate to the earliest Israeli nation-
building activities that were established in Palestine between 1882 and 1914.15
Stemhell (1998) concurs, noting:
After the victory of June 1967, none of the major leaders of the [ruling] 
labor movement thought that Zionism drew its moral authority not 
from the distant, historical, and mythological past but from its 
character as a movement of rescue. They did not believe that Zionism 
simply exemplified the universal right of peoples to define their own 
identity and to govern themselves. None of the major leaders of the 
labor movement believed that the Palestinians deserved the same 
rights...No leader was capable of saying that the conquest of the West 
Bank lacked the moral basis of the first half of the twentieth century, 
namely, the circumstances of distress on which Israel was founded. A 
much-persecuted people needed and deserved not only a shelter but a 
state of its own. No one then argued that this objective had been 
achieved in 1949 and that there was a moral difference between the 
territories conquered in the War of Independence and those won less 
than twenty years later. Both had been won from Arabs, but for 
entirely different purposes. Whereas the conquests of 1949 were an 
essential condition for the founding of Israel, the attempt to retain the 
conquests of 1967 had a strong flavor of imperial expansion.16
The Israeli Labour government (with whom Rabin and Peres were
affiliated) had maintained that the right of Jews to immigrate to Israel that had
l4Meron Benvenisti, Conflict & Contradictions (New York: Villard Books, 1986):
78.
l5Gershon Shafir, Land, labor, and the origins o f the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
1882-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). See also Ran Greenstein, 
Genealogies o f Conflict: Class, Identity, and State in Palestine/Israel and South Africa 
(Hanover, NH: Weslayan University Press, 1995).
l6Zeev Stemhell, The Founding Myths o f Israel: Nationalism, Socialism and the 
Making of the Jewish State (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1998): 336.
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been secured in 1948 extended, ipso facto, to the territories occupied in the 
1967 conflict. The Israeli Labour party traditionally framed its rhetoric within 
socialist and universal terms and so its post-1967 nationalist agenda has often 
seemed less glaring when compared to the populist and messianic language of 
its Likud counterparts. But the two parties have largely been in concurrence in 
regard to Jewish settlement in the occupied territories, varying only tactically.
The Israeli Labour government constructed the first settlements in the 
West Bank, initially placing them in unpopulated, ‘security’ locations such as 
the Jordan Valley. These settlements were meant to establish a presence in 
areas that Israel would eventually annex, in order to enhance the strategic 
depth of the 1949 borders, which at one point was only 9 miles/15 km wide. 
But because of nationalist sympathies, successive Labour governments 
assented when religious zealots agitated for the construction of Jewish
1 7settlements within densely populated Palestinian areas. After coming to 
power in 1977, the Likud governments accelerated this process, building tens 
of Jewish settlements adjacent to Palestinian population centres. These 
‘political’ settlements were reinforced and the welfare and the personal 
security of their residents became paramount, despite their playing little role in 
terms of augmenting overall strategic depth. But if the overall security value 
of this secondary category of settlements were challenged, the ‘inalienable’, 
historic Jewish right to settlement based on the pre-1948 experience was held 
up as justification instead.
It is crucial to understand that the Israeli government’s settlement 
policies would blur the distinction between nationalism and security, very
,7For example, in 1968 the Labour Eshkol government established the settlement of 
Kiryat Arba, near the Palestinian town of Hebron. In 1974 the Labour Rabin government built 
Kedumim in 1974, near Nablus in the West Bank.
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much shaping Rabin and Peres’s later propensity for ambiguity. Israeli society 
has largely internalised the precepts of national security doctrine, believing it 
to be vital to its very existence. Moreover, security stances have been further 
promoted by interweaving them within nationalist themes that justify the 
moral legitimacy of the pre-1948 return of Jews to their ancient homeland; and 
the Jewish historical experience in history, with its fears of persecution and 
killings. But the settling of lands captured in 1967 especially combined and 
distorted these themes. It is true that some of the settlements do enhance 
Israeli strategic depth. But many of the security arguments given to justify the 
Jewish settlement activity in the occupied territories were largely spurious in 
nature. The security relating to ‘political’ settlements was defined in the 
narrowest of terms, addressing only the personal safety of the settlers 
themselves, but not the underlying causes of the antagonism and potential 
danger toward them. Little consideration was given into the hastening role the 
settlements might play in the overall security threat. Moreover, despite the 
clear change in historical circumstances that prevailed before the 
establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, nationalist explanations were 
offered forth that justified Jewish settlement in the occupied territories as a 
‘historic right’ that exists irrespective of contrary positions of international 
law. It was this view that prevailed when Yitzhak Rabin’s Labour government 
assumed authority in 1992. Even this government, which was liberal by Israeli 
standards and even issued a ‘freeze’ on the construction of new settlements, 
was unwilling to dismantle any of the ‘political’ settlements that had been 
constructed by previous governments. Rabin and Peres were definitely 
committed to the security of Israel’s citizens. But this security pledge also
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extended to the Israeli settlers in the occupied territories, whom they were 
unwilling to uproot, and whose continuing presence had become largely a 
nationalist consideration.
Asymmetrical Recognition
Rabin and Peres were independent thinkers with regard to the 
resolution of the Palestinian question. It should be noted, moreover, that 
Rabin’s ideas were never as thoroughly developed as those of Peres. Rabin 
tended to have ‘working assumptions’ that were a product of his experiences 
in the military and government. Accordingly, it is more prudent to survey 
Rabin’s personal history to discern his views on the Palestinians. Peres’s 
views, on the other hand, can best be gleaned from his numerous writings that 
deal with the issue of the Palestinians. It is also worthwhile to cite accounts of 
Peres’s many diplomatic overtures in this regard. Yet both Rabin and Peres’s 
evolving views toward the Palestinians and the PLO reflected asymmetrical 
recognition, a prime component of modulation. It is necessary to relay their 
attitudes in order to convey that the 1993 recognition of the PLO was not the 
act of men whose fundamental perceptions had been transformed, but rather 
that of pragmatic chauvinists who never saw the Palestinians as their equals. 
Rabin’s Evolving Views
For most of his political career, Rabin had adhered to a wholly state 
centred conception of international relations. As a consequence, he long 
viewed the Palestinians merely as refugees and stateless sub-nationals, an 
element but not the crux of the protracted Arab-Israeli conflict. Addressing a 
joint session of the US Congress in 1976, for example, Rabin insisted that the 
Palestinians were not the root of the Arab-Israeli conflict and to view them as
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such was ‘to put the cart before the horse’.18 Even after the emergence of the 
PLO as a political actor, Rabin continued to maintain his state centred 
worldview, believing the Arab states and not the PLO to be the primary threat 
to be confronted at war and encountered at the negotiation table. In this vein, 
Rabin had hoped that the 1977 diplomatic breakthrough between Israel and 
Egypt would have had a ripple effect and bring about peace accords between 
Israel and other Arab states, thus ‘ending’ the conflict of which the 
Palestinians were a part, but not the core. Jordan was particularly crucial in 
this regard, because Rabin sought to resolve, or rather sidestep, the Palestinian 
question through a territorial compromise with Jordan. It was even difficult for 
him to accept the Palestinian autonomy plan that was a component of the 
Camp David Accords. As a minister in the 1984-1989 Labour-Likud 
government of national unity, Rabin had initially believed that Palestinian 
autonomy would be acceptable only if it were reframed as an interim 
arrangement in which Israel and Jordan would establish a dual-control regime 
over the West Bank and Gaza strip. He believed that since Palestinians 
composed a sizable proportion of Jordan, and were thus an integral part of the 
Hashemite regime, a solution to their political aspirations should be found 
within a Jordanian-Palestinian federation. It was only quiet pressure from the 
Jordanians that prompted Rabin to relent and accept some form of Palestinian 
participation in a future dialogue. But Rabin had made such a concession only 
to try to induce Jordan to begin formal peace negotiations. His gesture was by 
no means a response to the growing international status of the PLO or the 
support for its call for Palestinian statehood.
,8Avi Shlaim, ‘Israeli Politics and Middle East Peacemaking’, 21.
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Rabin differentiated between the PLO and the Palestinian population 
of the occupied territories. He maintained a relatively forthcoming attitude 
toward the Palestinians of the West Bank and the Gaza strip, but at the same 
time he did not deem these ‘native residents’ to be a fully-fledged national 
group deserving of an independent state. He regarded the ‘local’ Palestinians 
solely a social community that was entitled to live in peace and economic 
prosperity under a system of limited, devolved of authority.
Rabin did not consider the PLO to be a legitimate representative of the 
Palestinian people, but simply a ‘terrorist organisation’. While he did not 
believe that the PLO posed as grave a threat to Israel as the Arab states did, he 
nonetheless saw the organisation as a force to be reckoned with militarily. He 
held such an assessment even after the 1982 Lebanon war, when a largely 
weakened PLO was forced to move its base of operations to Tunis. He 
believed the PLO continued to play a politically destabilising role, and 
commented, for example, that the organisation would be used as a pawn by the 
Soviet Union in the global superpower confrontation, in order to undermine 
American diplomatic efforts in the Middle East.19 As long as the PLO was 
fully committed to the establishment of an independent Palestinian state, 
Rabin believed it to be a totally unacceptable partner for negotiations. This 
precept remained unchanged despite the enhanced international status of the 
PLO and the Jordanian insistence in April 1985 that the Palestinians must join 
the negotiating process.
Rabin’s management approach to the ‘local’ Palestinian population in 
the territories was very much a product of what might be called ‘democratic
,9Hemda Ben-Yehuda, ‘Attitude Change and Policy Transformation: Yitzhak Rabin 
and the Palestinian Question’ Israel Affairs Vol. 3, No. 3 (1997), 205.
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nationalist’ convictions. In 1992 he commented in this regard, on the ‘right’ of
Jewish settlement in the occupied territories versus the Palestinian question:
I believe in the Jewish people’s right to the entire Land of Israel. But 
the actual problem is the 1.7 million Palestinians in the territories who 
are a community that is completely different from us -  in religious, 
cultural, and political terms. Therefore, even though I recognize the 
Jews’ claim to all of Israel I do not want to annex 1.7 million 
Palestinians against their will because this will make Israel a binational 
state.20
The national character of the State of Israel as the ‘Jewish state’ would be 
jeopardised if the West Bank and Gaza strip were officially annexed. 
Annexation would require granting Israeli citizenship to the Palestinians of the 
West Bank and Gaza strip, following the precedent set in 1949 with regard to 
the Arab population of Israel. But if the Palestinians were legally 
enfranchised, the combined numbers of Arab citizens of Israel would 
eventually outnumber Jews. Through the democratic process, these Arab 
citizens could assume control of the government and undo the Jewish national 
character of the Israeli state. After annexation, it would only be possible for 
Israeli nationalists to preserve this character through the juridical 
disenfranchisement of the majority Arab population, in a manner similar to 
Apartheid South Africa. Rabin was therefore opposed to annexing the 
territories for democratic reasons, but as a nationalist he rejected the idea of 
uprooting the Israeli settlements that had also been built there. He did however 
seek a ‘functional disengagement’ of settlements from Palestinian towns and 
cities. In order to secure a new territorial compromise with Jordan, Rabin 
advocated that Israeli settlements should be established in relatively 
unpopulated ‘security areas’, such as the environs of Jerusalem and the Jordan
20Ibid., 208.
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valley of the West Bank. But these criteria were only broad policy guidelines. 
As was relayed, Rabin did not strenuously object, for example, to ‘ideological’ 
settlements that were constructed in the midst of Palestinian areas, nor was he 
willing to support their subsequent dismantlement once they had been 
established.
Rabin’s attitude toward the Palestinians changed as a result of his 
acceptance of the limits of Israel’s significant military power. But his overall 
bearing toward them remained basically unaltered. After the 1982 Lebanon 
war confronted Rabin with the recognition of PLO military power, he began to 
search for a political solution that would accommodate both Israeli nationalist 
considerations and security needs. Rabin accepted the idea in April 1985 of an 
inclusion of local Palestinians who were not PLO followers as part of a joint 
negotiating delegation with Jordan. By 1986 he even agreed to accept PLO 
supporters from the territories in such a delegation, but not from the 
Palestinian Diaspora. But it must be understood that this new outlook still 
reflected his belief that bilateral negotiations between Israel and the Jordan 
would alone to lead to a comprehensive peace agreement. His moderated 
stance to the Palestinian population was but a slight repackaging of past 
ameliorative gestures offered in the economic and welfare, but not the political 
domain.
By 1989, Rabin had converted his approach towards the management 
of the Palestinians in the territories, as well as his awareness that Israel was 
unable to overcome the PLO by military means, into a new policy: an iron-fist 
response towards the intifada accompanied by the search for negotiations with 
moderate local Palestinians. When the Palestinian uprising began in December
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1987, Rabin was Minister of Defence in the Labour-Likud national unity 
government headed by Yitzhak Shamir. Rabin was critical of Shamir for not 
using sufficient force to crush the intifada, issuing a notorious order to Israeli 
troops to ‘break the bones’ of Palestinian protesters. But when this policy 
failed, and his army commanders explained that the uprising was a political 
problem with no simple military solution, Rabin coined the phrase ‘marching 
with two feet’, meaning that he favoured a strategy utilising the military foot 
and the political foot. But Rabin still did not consider the PLO to be the 
genuine representative of the Palestinian people. He often lamented the lack of 
an authentic Palestinian leadership in the territories willing to ‘resolve the 
conflict’ and expressed hope that ‘if Jordan and such a leadership [of local 
inhabitants] emerge, that would be wonderful’.21 Rabin tried in vain to locate a 
suitable Palestinian partner and approached various figures in the Palestinian 
public with the question: ‘Are you, any group among you, prepared to say that 
you -  the residents of the territories -  are willing to be our partner in a 
political settlement?’22
Rabin modified his belief that autonomy was acceptable only as a 
means to renew Jordanian participation in the peace process. He departed from 
his earlier view that the Arab-Israeli conflict was wholly an inter-state issue, 
recognising the existence of a far more complex situation involving several 
non-state elements. ‘The Palestinian uprising, which he had initially 
(mis)perceived as frequent and large scale riots, but eventually came to view it 
as a civil uprising of a politically-aware population, convinced him that the 
Palestinians had openly declared both their hostility to Israel and their
readiness to carry out an uncompromising struggle’.23 In May 1989 he and
Peres proposed a four-phase plan for Palestinian autonomy. The plan called
for a calming period, after which the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza
strip were to elect representatives who would serve as the core of autonomous
authority and that would later negotiate a final status agreement with Israel at
the end of an interim period. Rabin placed his hopes on the dynamics that
would develop during the transitional phase:
to create through an interim agreement...a new reality which may bring 
about a change in positions. We hope this change occurs on their side, 
but they have the right to hope the change occurs on our side. This is 
the logic and I think the wisdom of dividing progress toward peace into 
stages.24
Rabin believed the independent-mindedness of the intifada could be harnessed 
by Israel to create a leadership clique of local Palestinians who would 
gradually reconcile themselves to the Israeli presence in the territories once 
experiencing relative empowerment.
For Rabin, negotiations with local Palestinians were about prioritising 
Israeli interests. Rabin did not hesitate to inflict collective punishment, even at 
the expense of those Palestinian elements that had begun to negotiate with 
Israel late in 1991 -  who had argued to their fellow Palestinians that doing so 
would improve their lives and end the occupation. In response to a series of 
sensational knife attacks by Palestinian extremists against Israeli civilians in 
early 1993, Rabin initiated a closure policy, sealing off the West Bank and 
Gaza strip and preventing any Palestinians from entering Israel. The action 
brought about an end to the violence toward Israelis, but Rabin did not 
consider its devastating effect on the economy and the everyday life of
23Ibid., 209.
24Ibid., 211.
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Palestinians, how it would foment greater frustration and incentives to
violence. He argued to his constituents that the closure was in a fact a preview
of the autonomy deal that he sought to reach with the Palestinians, an
arrangement that would be of ultimate benefit to Israel.
Peres’s Vision for the Palestinians
In his memoirs as well as in his later works, Shimon Peres reveals an
evolving strategy that conceives of new boundaries and borders as a way to
substitute material and economic gain for full sovereign rights for the
Palestinians. At first glance, Peres’s vision seems quite enlightened:
The New Middle East, as I envisage it, is neither a pipe-dream nor an 
expendable luxury. It is a vital necessity without which we shall not be 
able to raise the living standards of the people of our region. As the 
standard of living goes up, the level of violence and tension will go 
down.25
But the desire to raise living standards in the Middle East is not an admission 
by Peres that all peoples of the region share equal national and political rights. 
On the contrary, economic development is intended to offset the severity of 
the rather different understanding that Israel is entitled to extraordinary rights 
vis-a-vis the Palestinians. It is within this context that Peres believes that the 
issue of the political status of the Palestinians, which remains open-ended and 
is thus potentially destabilising, must be resolved:
Before laying the foundation of this New Middle East, as before 
any building project the ground must be cleared. In our case, the 
ground is sown with mines, and these must be painstakingly defused.
I have never doubted that the Palestinian problem is a mine that 
could trigger any number of others, and that defusing the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the key to regional peace. That 
perception became all the more true, and all the more urgent, in the 
wake of Camp David and the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty. I
25Shimon Peres, Battling for Peace: Memoirs, Edited by David Landau (London: 
Weidenfeld andNicolson, 1995): 297.
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constantly searched for new and creative ways of tackling the 
Palestinian issue.26
For Peres, ‘new and creative ways of tackling the Palestinian issue’ meant to 
search for political solutions that would address the status of the Palestinians 
but that would simultaneously prevent them from attaining an independent 
state.
Peres built on the ideas of his mentor, Moshe Dayan, who long sought 
to shape a ‘functional’ compromise for shared rule of the occupied territories 
between Israel and Jordan. In a clandestine meeting with King Hussein of 
Jordan in 1975, for example, Peres, who at the time was Minister of Defence 
in the 1974-1977 Rabin government, first began to articulate his conception of 
this idea:
I proposed that a possible solution lay in the creation of three political 
entities: Israel, Jordan, and a Palestinian entity that would be 
administered by the other two jointly. The Palestinian entity, 
comprising of the West Bank and Gaza, would be wholly 
demilitarized. It would fall under no single sovereignty; instead, 
residents carrying Jordanian passports [meaning Palestinians] would 
vote for the Jordanian parliament, and those with Israeli citizenship 
[meaning Jews living in Israeli settlements] would vote for the Knesset 
in Jerusalem. The [Palestinian] inhabitants of the Gaza Strip, many of 
whom were stateless refugees, would receive Jordanian passports... 
Our basic position was that we opposed the creation of a separate 
Palestinian state.27
It is misleading of Peres to describe his idea as a ‘Palestinian entity’ because it 
was to be neither Palestinian in national character nor an entity in political 
form. Peres was not even advocating a restoration of the sovereignty exercised 
by Jordan over the West Bank from 1948-1967. He was suggesting instead 
that both Jordan and Israel exercise a kind of extra-territoriality in the West 
Bank and Gaza strip, akin to the 19th century concession system in which
26Ibid., 298-9.
27Ibid., 301.
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European consulates were granted full authority over their nationals within 
designated areas of China and the Ottoman Empire. But in Peres’s design, it 
would be understood that the extra-territorial powers given to Israel and 
Jordan would not be exercised in a sovereign host-state, but rather in a 
mutually agreed ‘no-man’s land’! Despite Jordanian receptivity to these ideas, 
the loss of power of Peres’s Labour party in 1977 effectively ended his official 
ability to explore non-sovereign solutions to the Palestinian question for the 
next decade.
The ‘Jordanian option’ remained as Peres’s solution to the Palestinian
question for many years. In April 1987, as Foreign Minister in the Labour-
Likud government of national unity, Peres secretly drew up a programme with
King Hussein for an international conference, to be held under the auspices of
the Great Powers, which would sanction the implementation of an Israeli-
Jordanian dual-control regime in the West Bank and Gaza strip. It was to be a
conference where international actors facilitated, but did not impose
conditions on, the parties:
I was ready for a conference, but wanted no ‘laying down’ by anyone. 
Solutions must evolve out of free, bilateral negotiations between the 
Middle East parties, and the conference must merely serve as a useful 
framework under the aegis of the international community.28
Facilitation was to give a veneer of legitimacy and objectivity to an agreement
that was fundamentally rooted in power politics and that was to be.
implemented at the expense of the national and political rights of the
Palestinians. Peres intended to create an irreversible fait accompli that would
28Ibid„ 307.
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isolate, and be the death-knoll, of Yasser Arafat and the PLO.29 But to Peres’s 
dismay, the plan did not succeed.
Peres had tried to circumvent the authority of the Likud Prime 
Minister, Yitzhak Shamir. Since he knew that the staunch nationalist Shamir 
would be opposed to the convening of a conference that would address 
changing the status quo in the occupied territories, Peres attempted to engineer 
his conference plan as though it were an outside initiative that the Prime 
Minister could not outright oppose. (Either Shamir would eventually accede to 
the outcome of the conference, or he would lose power because of the 
opposition from the public, in which case Peres could be elected and pursue 
the conference aims as Prime Minister.) As such, Peres requested US 
Secretary of State George Shultz to put forward the agreement reached with 
King Hussein as an American proposal. Shultz recalled that, ‘the foreign 
minister of Israel’s government of national unity was asking me to sell to 
Israel’s prime minister, the head of a rival party, the substance of an 
agreement made with a foreign head of state...Peres was informing me, and 
wanting me to collaborate with him, before going to the prime minister’.30 
Peres avers that Shultz was mistaken and not only he did inform the Prime 
Minister of the agreement but also that he explained to Shamir that it was 
necessary to present the agreement as an American proposal because 
Hussein’s standing would be damaged from the revelation of secret meetings 
with Israel. Shamir, who confirms Shultz’s account of Peres’s duplicity,
29Ibid., 306.
30George P. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph -  My Years as Secretary o f State (New 
York: Charles Scribner and Sons, 1993): 939.
3'Peres, Battling for Peace, 311.
32Yitzhak Shamir, Summing Up: An Autobiography (London: Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, 1994): 169.
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sent a personal emissary to the Secretary of State to express his opposition 
toward, and thus effectively undermine, Peres’s conference plan. It is 
important to understand that the endgame intentions and operative mechanics 
that were first generated during this failed episode, the use of international 
facilitation to legitimate an agreement that essentially overrode Palestinian 
national rights and the generating of peace negotiations by ‘roundabout’ 
means, would surface again as the central components of Peres’s diplomacy in 
Oslo.
After the onset of the intifada in December 1987, Peres became even 
more adamant of the need to change the status quo in the occupied territories. 
Although he was convinced the uprising would not have occurred had his plan 
with Jordan been implemented, Peres understood that a new reality had been 
created and that it would no longer be possible for Israel to politically 
circumnavigate the Palestinians. This is not to say that Peres embraced the 
idea of a Palestinian state as a solution to the intifada. He merely believed that 
since Israel could no longer sidestep the Palestinian issue by dealing with 
Jordan, it had to deal directly with Palestinian representatives, a local 
leadership who, after being granted substantial devolved powers from Israel, 
could cool the passions ignited by the uprising. In was in this vein that, in 
1989, Peres had authorised regular meetings between his deputy, Yossi Beilin, 
Beilin’s acquaintance Professor Yair Hirschfeld of Haifa University, and 
Faisal Husseini, a prominent Palestinian from Jerusalem. Hirschfeld met 
Husseini at least once a week, and would become well acquainted with the 
Palestinian leadership from the occupied territories. Moreover Beilin met 
Husseini every few months and Peres met the prominent Palestinian eight to
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ten times.33 Indeed it was this very link to the Palestinians that would later 
play a crucial role in generating the Oslo back channel.
As was noted above, Peres co-authored a plan with Rabin in May 1989 
to hold elections in the territories for nominating representatives that would 
conduct negotiations for a transitional period of self-rule and later for a 
permanent settlement with Israel (p. 112). But in March 1990 the Labour party 
left the coalition government after Prime Minister Shamir had spumed an offer 
of the US Secretary of State, James Baker, to facilitate a modified form of the 
proposed Israeli-Palestinian dialogue. This falling out was not due to Shamir’s 
objection to Palestinian statehood, for in this regard Peres completely agreed 
with him. Peres in fact opposed Shamir’s refusal to seriously explore non­
sovereign alternatives that might be used to assuage the Palestinian uprising.
A Refinement o f Asymmetrical Recognition
Rabin and Peres’s evolving attitudes toward the Palestinians can be 
seen as a refinement of asymmetrical recognition. Rabin’s views in his early 
career represent the most extreme end of this equilibrium, since he virtually 
denied a distinctly Palestinian component of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Both 
men gradually acknowledged the Palestinians, but only as a sub-national 
grouping whose fate was ultimately bound up with the Hashemite regime in 
Jordan. Moreover, this shallow recognition was more a function of a concern 
for the internal political nature of Jewish Israeli society and did not reflect a 
perception of a rival with an equivalent national claim. This relative 
acceptance translated into recognition of the need for limited self-government 
under Israeli auspices after the outbreak of the intifada in 1987, and, as will be
33Idem Andrew S. Buchanan, Peace with Justice: A History of the Israeli-Palestinian 
Declaration o f Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (London: Macmillan, 
2000): 92.
shown in chapter four, would later facilitate the recognition of the PLO as a 
prelude toward complex co-optation.
Gradually Diminishing Concessions 
The following section recounts how Rabin believed that the Jewish 
Israeli population had become fatigued, how it would be less able to endure 
future challenges which had never before been encountered, and would thus 
impel the national leadership to forego the ‘inalienable’ Jewish right of 
settlement in the territories captured in 1967 in exchange for an end to 
protracted conflict. He therefore sought to utilise the strategic climate 
favouring Israel that emerged in the Middle East after the 1991 Persian Gulf 
War in order to pre-empt this situation and attain regional peace agreements 
that would meet his security concerns and nationalist considerations instead. 
When his tactics proved unsuccessful, Rabin was forced to adopt a different 
strategy formulated by Peres. It is necessary to discuss all of these factors in 
order to outline the dynamic that would be reconstituted as the ‘gradually 
diminishing concession’ component of a complex-co-optation agenda.
A General Fatigue
Rabin was aware that the Israeli population had become increasingly 
beleaguered and weary of the continuing protracted conflict with the 
Palestinians and the Arab states. Moreover, this general fatigue had begun to 
translate into a diminishing consensus for past security policies, thus 
restricting the use of force. Losses in materiel and casualties had grown 
sizably over the course of six wars, adding to a natural desire for stability and 
normality. This is especially so in a society with universal compulsory military
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service and active mobilisation of reservists, where the bulk of the population 
has become directly sensitised to the price of protracted conflict.
Rabin seemed especially attuned to the consequences of a war-weary 
Israeli society. He began to fathom the long-term implications of an Israeli 
society reluctant to sustain a protracted conflict for the sake of nationalist 
principles. (In Deleuzian terms, he grappled with the ‘breakdown’ of the 
Zionist consensus.) In private forums, Rabin compared the behaviour of the 
Israelis when bombed by the Egyptians air force in 1948 to the response to 
Iraqi Scud missile attacks in 1991.34 He lamented how in 1948 over thirty 
civilian casualties left no imprint on daily life in Tel Aviv, while in 1991 tens 
of thousands fled the city and its suburbs. His felt that by losing some of their 
perseverance and determination, Israelis had changed for the worse. He also 
publicly stated his assessment that the staying power of Israeli society and its 
willingness to pay a painful price, a core element of the security consensus of 
the Israeli leadership, had significantly diminished. Having experienced the 
difficulties of state building and defence, Rabin saw the Israeli public of the 
1990s as being spoiled and too easy to panic. He feared that in future conflict, 
there would be much pressure to end the war quickly, preventing the Israeli 
military from achieving a decisive victory in battle. In this regard it is also 
pertinent to relay that Ehud Barak, who was chief of staff during the Rabin 
government, shared Rabin’s concerns about the fabric of Israeli society. 
Barak, who Rabin was grooming as his protege and successor, described these 
changes as negative phenomena that had to be confronted by a concerned and 
responsible leadership that was nonetheless faithful to Israeli nationalist
34Efraim Inbar, Rabin and Israel's National Security, 161.
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principles and counter: ‘...accumulated weariness and cynicism, accompanied 
by an aggressive and intrusive media, depreciation of the Zionist deeds, the 
development of a cleavage in the consensus over Israel’s political goals, even 
over the objectives of the use of force (we have seen it in Lebanon and in the 
Intifada) -  all these create a perception, as well as reality of weakness’.35
Rabin was concerned that the next, more liberal generation of his 
Labour party would not be able to adequately maintain Israeli security or 
remain true to nationalist principles in future negotiations with Arab 
neighbours. As the first native-born Israeli Prime Minister, Rabin was 
involved in the conflict to an extent considerably more than any of his 
predecessors. As a result of his experiences as a commander in the 1948 war, 
as chief of staff of the Israeli army during the June 1967 war, as ambassador to 
the United States, and later as Prime Minister and as Minister of Defence, he 
had come to see himself in his later life as kind of guardian of his nation. Eitan 
Haber, Rabin’s adviser and speechwriter, saw this perceived guardian role as 
shaping the Prime Minister’s central desire to address and offset the growing 
psychological exhaustion of Israeli society. The opposition Likud 
parliamentarian Ariel Sharon, who held regular meetings with Rabin -  despite 
their holding of differing political opinions, quoted him as saying, ‘The people 
are weak...The people will have difficulties withstanding an additional 
war...this is why we have to make concessions’.37 Yisrael Tal, a reserve 
general and colleague of Rabin, confirmed that the Prime Minister was 
especially concerned of the corrosive effects that the intifada had placed on
35Ibid.
36Ibid., 162.
37t u ; j
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the staying power and the morale of the Israelis. ‘The off-the-record Rabin
expressed a great measure of pessimism about the direction of Israeli society
and the capacity of the IDF to meet the security challenges facing Israel’.38
The New Strategic Threat
Why did Rabin believe that the Israeli people would be less able to
endure future threats as they had done in the past? His assessment seems to
have been greatly shaped by knowledge of how the changing scope of warfare
would alter a future Middle Eastern conflict. Although Rabin did not leave any
writings that dealt systematically with the Arab-Israeli conflict or the peace
process that began under his administration, it is possible to utilise speeches he
gave in the early 1990s, when he held no governmental office, to reconstruct
the strategic mindset he formed during the period immediately prior to his
election in 1992 and the signing of the Oslo Accords shortly thereafter in
1993. Despite his conviction that Israel’s deterrence strategy had helped
foment a peace treaty with Egypt in 1979 and that it continued to function
effectively, Rabin was nonetheless acutely sensitive to ongoing military
changes in the region.39 He cautioned that Israel had grown overly accustomed
to wars in which its armed forces had been able to reverse the tide of battle
from defensive to offensive action, transferring the fighting to Arab territory
and attaining defeat as quickly as possible.40 He started to suggest a finite
utility to existing Israeli defensive strategies that were designed to deter war:
We have learned the hard way from previous wars-irrespective of their 
origins-that Arab armies undergo a rapid refurbishing of their military.
38Ibid., 163.
39Yitzhak Rabin, ‘Deterrence in an Israeli Security Context’, address given to the 
JafFee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, May 1991, in Aharon Klieman and 
Ariel Levite ed., Deterrence in the Middle East: Where Theory and Practice Converge 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1993): 10.
40Ibid., 11.
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To date, experience has shown that following each war, Arab countries 
have obtained armaments in greater quantities and improved quality. I 
cannot remember a war where the country defeated by us did not 
subsequently improve the quantity and quality of its arms.41
He began to speak of the possibility of a new style of Arab-Israeli warfare, an
environment far more painful than the Israeli home-front had ever
experienced: ‘Today, we know that hostile Arab states intend to attack us, in
the next war, on three fronts simultaneously: on the battlefield, at our rear
logistical and support bases, and at our civilian population centers’.42 Rabin
predicted that a launch of missiles at Israeli cities would cause massive alarm
and he was certain that the Palestinians and the Arab states neighbours would
be better able to withstand the attrition involved in a protracted conflict.
Rabin seems to have pondered all the strategic possibilities available to
Israel. He expounded on the gap between Israel’s foremost goal of
transforming and conditioning neighbouring Arab states in line with its
national interests and strategic vision and its actual status as a small country:
When one’s objective is to destroy the enemy’s forces, one must ask 
“for what purpose?” In order to impose your political will! A case in 
point was World War II. The Allies defined the war’s objective as the 
unconditional surrender of Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, and Imperialist 
Japan-and they attained this objective. They then implemented radical 
reforms: Macarthur implemented social reform in Japan, the Allies 
divided Germany, and West Germany underwent a transformation, as did 
Italy.
The first question that requires a clear-cut answer in the formulation of 
the Israeli security policy: is the result attained by the Allies a feasible 
alternative in the Arab-Israeli conflict? Realistically, can we undergo 
five years of economic austerity and devote the budget to an IDF 
military buildup-and then conquer the Middle East? Are we capable of 
bringing the Arab nations to a state of affairs comparable to that of the 
Axis powers at the end of World War II? This question must be 
answered before a security policy can be formulated.
41Yitzhak Rabin, ‘After the Gulf War: Israeli Defense and Its Security Policy’
. address given to the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Bar-Ilan University, 10 June 
1991, translated by David M. Weinberg; in Efraim Inbar, Rabin and Israel’s National 
Security, Appendix A: 174.
42 Ibid., 177.
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We must strive to defend the state and attain a solution to the conflict 
with our neighbors, but there are great differences in the international 
situation pertaining in World War II and the international situation today 
of Israel. I once said that between the Allies, the Axis, and the 
“Almighty,” there wasn’t any entity that could have restricted the actions 
of the Allies. In the case of the Arab-Israeli conflict, there are 
superpowers and international actors that stand between the Arab 
countries at war with Israel and the “Almighty.”
Furthermore, in the situation that exists today, Israel cannot formulate 
a security policy involving the imposition of preferred peace 
arrangements following upon the defeat or conquest of Arab countries. 
This is not a pleasant situation-but is a given! I repeat and further 
emphasize: without agreeing in this regard, a security policy cannot be 
fashioned. And therefore, we cannot set for ourselves far-reaching 
political goals such as the imposition of peace as a security policy.43
Since Israel could not feasibly impose its will on the Arab states, and past
deterrence strategies were seen as less of a guarantee against a harsh new type
of regional war, Rabin desired that an accommodation be sought with the Arab
states during the strategic climate favouring Israel in the early 1990s.
Upon taking office in 1992, Yitzhak Rabin saw a strategic ‘window of
opportunity’ to resolve the conflict with Israel’s Arab neighbours and best
secure the status of Israel as regional hegemon. The end of the Cold War and
the subsequent dissolution of the USSR had disadvantaged Syria and the PLO
because these former Soviet clients were no longer receiving the financial and
military assistance that had previously been central in sustaining their
confrontation with Israel. Similarly, the 1991 Persian Gulf War had severely
weakened the conventional fighting capabilities and nuclear potential of Iraq,
the only regional state that heretofore was capable of rivalling Israeli military
strength. Rabin believed that he had to act quickly in order to permanently
cement the new regional status quo that had emerged overwhelmingly in
Israel’s favour. Rabin furthermore sought to make use of this ‘window of
43Ibid., 173-4.
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opportunity’ to counter the rise of Iran, fearing the Islamic Republic could
attain strategic parity with Israel by the end of the 1990s:
Iran has replaced Iraq in its megalomaniacal ambitions in empire 
building.. ..Within seven years from today, this [rising power] will be the 
threat [to Israel] in the Middle East. We have this time to resolve 
problems. I believe we will succeed.44
Rabin believed that attacks by ‘second tier’ states like Iran or Iraq would be
unlikely if Israel were to attain peace treaties with its immediate neighbours.45
In March 1992, he wrote that, ‘...if we succeed within five to seven years to
conclude peace, or almost peace, with the Palestinians, Jordan, and afterwards
with Syria, we will have largely limited the motivation for a [nonconventional]
9 46arms race .
The Madrid Framework: An Avenue for Rabin’s Aims
After the defeat of Iraq in the 1991 Persian Gulf War, the United States 
and the Soviet Union co-convened an international conference in Madrid, 
Spain to discuss a diplomatic resolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. In this 
context, bilateral negotiating rounds began between Israel and a delegation of 
Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza strip. The first phase of the Israeli- 
Palestinian negotiations were to deal with the status of Palestinian self- 
government in the West Bank and the Gaza strip, and at the end of three years 
of such a regime, negotiations were to begin on the final status of these 
territories. Negotiations were conducted on the basis of UN Security Council 
Resolutions 242 and 338. The first five rounds of the talks (which had moved
^Yitzhak Rabin, Speech delivered at the International Center for Peace in the Middle 
East, Jerusalem, 17 December 1992, cited in Idem David Makovsky, Making Peace with the 
PLO (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996): 113.
45Effaim Inbar, Rabin and Israel’s National Security, 140.
46Yitzhak Rabin, ‘Making Use of the Time Out’ Politico (Hebrew) 44 (March 1992): 
29, cited in Inbar, 140.
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from Madrid to Washington) were held while the intransigent Shamir 
government was still in power.47
Rabin inherited the Madrid talks upon coming to office but was unable 
to use the framework to achieve his aims. But he ‘failed to follow through in 
the role of the role of “Israel’s de Gaulle,” which one highly informed 
observer of Israeli politics, Shlomo Avineri, had predicted’.48 In the first 
weeks of office the Rabin government sought to promote progress on the 
Palestinian track. Hundreds of political prisoners were released and 
restrictions that had been placed on Palestinians during the intifada were 
eased. Yet the Palestinians did not respond to these good will gestures that 
were meant to demonstrate that the new administration was serious about 
reaching an accord:
Rabin the strategist believed in “marching with two 
feet”-coordinating diplomatic and military moves so that one 
strengthened and complemented the other. He saw no contradiction 
between offering better terms in Washington at the same time that the 
army stepped up its assault in the territories; like a general, he thought 
in terms of softening up the enemy, forcing him to table. “If you 
continue to pull the trigger,” Rabin warned the Palestinians, “it will be 
unfortunate because your fate will be bad and miserable. We say to 
you: consider your deeds well....You will bear the consequences of 
your mistakes.”
But Palestinian society did not function as one coherent organism, 
with gunmen and negotiators serving as different arms of the same
47After losing an election to Yitzhak Rabin’s Labour party in June 1992, Shamir 
admitted that he had sent a delegation to the conference and successor talks solely to please 
the superpower sponsors. His true goal had been simply to negotiate indefinitely, while 
simultaneously increasing the Israeli settlement presence in the occupied territories: ‘I would 
have conducted negotiations on autonomy for ten years, and in the meantime we would have 
reached half a million people in Judea and Samaria’. Interview with Joseph Harif in Ma ’ariv, 
26 June 1992, quoted in Time, 7 July 1992, cited in Ibid. Andrew S. Buchanan, Peace with 
Justice: A History o f the Israeli-Palestinian Declaration o f Principles on Interim Self- 
Government Arrangements, 132.
48Idem Myron J. Aronoff, . ‘Labor in the Second Rabin Era: The First Year of 
Leadership’ in Robert O. Freedman, ed., Israel Under Rabin (Boulder, CO: Westview Press,
1995): 139.
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body. The army’s tactics enhanced the stature of the Palestinian 
fighters while undermining the negotiators.49
There was no response because the actions that had been intended to generate
rapid progress at the bargaining table had occurred in tandem with hard-line
security measures that simply alienated Rabin’s Palestinian interlocutors.
Rabin was a rather one-dimensional thinker, indifferent to the
incommensurability issues marking his approach of ‘marching with two feet’.
(This is not to suggest that security concerns are not compatible with the
search for diplomatic and political solutions to conflicts, but only that Rabin’s
widely developed use of force was not matched by an equally sophisticated,
political understanding of the ‘local’ Palestinians with whom he wished to
reach an agreement.) Cobban (1995) confirms this assessment, noting that
when he operated on the basis of ‘marching with two feet’ as Minister of
Defence from 1988-1990, ‘Rabin seemed to have absorbed none of the
lessons-arrived at over the preceding years by some of his country’s most
thoughtful political commentators-about the real links that exist between the
security condition in which Palestinians were living in the territories and the
political balance within the Palestinian community’.50 Shlaim (1995) agrees,
noting that while Rabin was not as immovable as his ultra-nationalist
predecessor Yitzhak Shamir,
A lifetime spent as a soldier inclines him to proceed with caution, on 
the basis of “worst-case analysis,” and makes him reluctant to assume 
any political risks. Rabin is not endowed with imagination or vision, 
and he certainly has no empathy for the other side in the conflict. Like 
a staff officer, he concentrates on the practical side, examines 
alternative courses of action, and carefully weighs the costs and
49Glenn Frankel, Beyond the Promised Land: Jews and Arabs on the Hard Road to a 
New Israel (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994): 334.
50Helena Cobban, ‘Israel and the Palestinians: From Madrid to Oslo and Beyond’ in 
Robert O. Freedman, ed., Israel Under Rabin (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995): 97.
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benefits of each. This is his greatest strength and greatest limitation as 
a statesman....Rabin likes to think of himself as a great strategist, like 
Henry Kissinger, combining the use of force and diplomacy to achieve 
political ends. But his political thinking is crude, his diplomatic style is 
unsubtle, and his use of force is extremely heavy-handed.51
Rabin’s approach to conciliation was a bizarre combination of accommodation
and recalcitrance. He was determined to achieve an agreement with the
Palestinians, but lacked the requisite savoir-faire in order to do so.
The incident that best illustrates Rabin’s ‘marching with two feet’
strategy prior to Oslo was the deportation of 415 Palestinians that began on 17
December 1992. The immediate background to the incident involved the
staging of ambushes by Hamas gunmen against Israeli soldiers in the Gaza
strip and the West Bank. Escalating the violence, a Hamas cell operating
inside Israel kidnapped an Israeli border guard, and demanded the release of
Sheikh Ahmed Yasin, the imprisoned leader of the Islamic movement, in
return for the soldier’s freedom. In response, Rabin ordered mass arrests of
suspected Hamas activists and sympathisers (1200 people total). When the
body of the abducted Israeli was discovered shortly thereafter, Rabin decided
to deport some 415 men assumed to be the primary leaders and organisers of
the arrestees. Rabin argued that the action was necessary for the sake of the
peace process; it was a pre-emptive operation against violent incidents being
planned by Hamas, including the assassination of the Palestinian negotiators
with whom Israel was dealing in Washington. But the deportation order was
without precedent. (Even the Shamir government had rejected proposals of
this sort on legal grounds.53) Indeed none of the alleged Hamas leaders were
5,Avi Shlaim, ‘Prelude to the Accord: Likud, Labor, and the Palestinians’ Journal o f  
Palestine Studies 23 no. 2 Winter 1994: 12.
52Frankel, 336.
53Ibid.
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charged, tried, or allowed to appeal before being ‘dumped’ in a no-man’s land 
in Lebanon:
The deportation exposed Rabin as an unreconstructed Arab-basher. 
Having recognized the need to march with both feet, the military foot 
and the political foot, he reverted to his old habit of kicking with the 
military foot. Far from demonstrating that the only language the 
Palestinians understand is force, his action revealed that force is the 
only language he himself instinctively resorts to in dealing with the 
Palestinians. Rabin had plainly stated that for him security takes 
precedence over peace, and in this sense he was true to his word. The 
problem with his notion of security is that it denied the basic human 
rights of the Palestinians. This was a major reason for the lack of 
progress in the peace talks. During the [1992] election campaign, 
Rabin ran as a candidate who would conclude an agreement on 
Palestinian autonomy within six to nine months. Yet six months after 
taking office he dealt a body blow to the entire peace process by his 
savage treatment of the Palestinians.54
An undertaking intended to weaken Hamas instead discredited the peace talks
and weakened Palestinian moderates.
Peres’s Contribution
It was Peres who would provide the framework that Rabin was unable
to formulate of his own volition. While he lacked the security credentials and
subsequent public trust that was enjoyed by the Prime Minister, Peres had
much greater savvy than Rabin.
Upon returning to office as Foreign Minister in 1992, Peres began to
search for a way to implement a particular framework of Palestinian self-rule:
Since we had effectively lost the ‘Jordanian option’, at least for the 
time being, we had no choice but to develop a Palestinian option. I felt 
that there was no real prospect of implementing the [purely functional, 
non-territorial based] Palestinian autonomy plan as originally proposed 
by the Likud governments as their interpretation of the Camp David 
agreements in 1978. Negotiations on the basis of the Camp David 
formula had led nowhere in the past. I believed that genuine 
implementation would mean in practice negotiating in practice the 
handover of the entire West Bank and Gaza to Palestinian rule, for 
which we were not ready. Instead, I supported the idea of an interim
54Avi Shlaim, ‘Prelude to the Accord: Likud, Labor and the Palestinians’, 16.
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agreement. If we could not agree at this stage on a map, at least we 
could reach an agreement on a timetable, in the hope that time would 
alter the circumstances so that we would eventually be able to agree 
with the Palestinians on a common map.55
It is misleading of Peres to say that the Labour government was ‘not ready* to
negotiate the ‘handover of the entire West Bank and Gaza to Palestinian rule*.
Peres should instead say the Labour government was ‘unwilling’ to
completely give up the West Bank and Gaza strip. Indeed this understanding is
implied in his statement. Peres asserts that if Israel and the Palestinians could
not agree on a map, then hopefully time would ‘alter the circumstances’ so
that two sides could later reach a compromise. Either Peres means that Israel
would reverse its stance and eventually agree to handover the entire West
Bank and Gaza strip, or that, after experiencing the future fruits of self-rule,
the Palestinians would reconcile themselves to the unwillingness of Israel to
relinquish the whole West Bank and Gaza strip to them. Since for Peres ‘[a]ny
attempt to forcibly remove [Jewish settlers in the occupied territories] could
create an irreparable split within the nation’56 and given that his ‘overlapping
sovereignty’ plan with Jordan had allowed for Israeli settlements to remain in
the West Bank and Gaza strip, it is unlikely that after the interim period, Israel
would alter its position and come to accept the Palestinians’ ‘map’.
Peres understood that the local Palestinian leadership did not have the
power or the public support to foreswear statehood. Unlike the role that Peres
had earlier planned for Jordan, the Palestinians with whom Israel was
negotiating could neither make such a monumental decision, nor outflank the
55Ibid., 321.
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PLO. Peres began to contemplate an idea of dealing with the PLO in a manner
that was tantamount to complex co-optation:
My Cabinet colleagues, including the Prime Minister, believed that the 
indigenous Palestinian leadership who comprised the negotiating team 
in Washington would gradually gain stature and independence and be 
able to negotiate without the close and stifling supervision of the PLO. 
I felt that they were mistaken. But they felt that I was wrong and were 
concerned that it would be impossible to negotiate with Arafat. In 
August 1992, in a private conversation with Rabin, I suggested that 
Israel should reconsider its position on negotiating with Arafat. But 
there was no agreement between us.
In January 1993, in another private meeting with the Premier, I told 
him again that, in my view, we must take bold steps toward negotiation 
with the PLO. As long as Arafat remained in Tunis, I argued, he 
represented the ‘outsiders’, the Palestinian diaspora, and would do his 
best to slow down the peace talks. I suggested that we propose to 
Arafat and his staff that they move to Gaza. Once there, they would 
have the right to vote and stand in elections; and if elected, they would 
represent the Palestinians directly in negotiations with Israel. My 
criticism of the Washington talks was that we were trying to reach a 
declaration of principles without any reference to specific territorial 
issues. The way to succeed, I believed, was to link a declaration of 
principles to a tangible concept of ‘Gaza first plus’.57
Peres advocated negotiations with the PLO, but it is important to note that he
never said that Israel must recognise the political programme of the
organisation that called for the establishment of a Palestinian state. Similarly,
Peres’s description of his proposal for ‘Arafat and his staff to ‘move to Gaza’
and ‘stand in elections’ implicitly conveys co-optation goals. Peres in fact
begins to suggest an idea of specifically installing Arafat as Israel’s junior
partner in Gaza, in order to place the PLO Chairman in a position of
substantial authority, which, despite any painful concessions he might make,
would be in his interest to maintain. Such an understanding is implied when
Peres links a potential negotiation with Arafat with a ‘declaration of principles
on specific territorial issues’. Peres notes his criticism that the parties at the
57Ibid., 323-4.
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Washington talks were attempting to reach a declaration of principles without 
any reference to particular territorial issues. But the ‘territorial issues’ were 
implicit for the Palestinian delegation in Washington. They were operating 
with the intent to secure self-rule over all Palestinian areas that Israel had 
occupied since 1967, the entire West Bank and Gaza strip. So for Peres, 
‘redefining’ territorial issues through his understanding of ‘Gaza first plus’ 
would have meant establishing the boundaries of an interim period negotiating 
map that would favour Israel, creating a fait accompli that Arafat -  the new 
negotiating partner -  would eventually be forced to accept.
‘Gaza first plus’ was designed to give the PLO a foothold in the West 
Bank, overriding the concerns of the leadership of the organisation that Israel 
was only willing to give them control of the Gaza strip, but it is crucial to 
understand that the plan gave the Palestinians territorial jurisdiction within 
both areas in order to try to alter their understanding and perception of what it 
meant to control land. The plan not only redrew boundaries, it was an attempt 
to change their very nature, to create an incipient, substitute concept of land. 
Peres says:
I came up with the idea of “Gaza first” in 1980.1 thought it would 
make things easier if we could reach an agreement in two strokes-first 
Gaza, then [specific areas, but not] the [entire] West Bank...[But] [n]ot 
one Arab country [that could serve as a substitute interlocutor for the 
Palestinians] has shown a readiness to annex the Gaza Strip. Yasser 
Arafat well understood the situation and turned his attention to Gaza, 
where he could gain not only yet another television appearance but 
also a territorial foothold. Israel, too, I believe had an interest in his 
doing so.
But, again, how could this be accomplished? I assumed if we 
proposed “Gaza first,” the Palestinians would suspect we were offering 
“Gaza only.” Without a clear sign for continued negotiations regarding 
the West Bank, the Palestinians could not agree. I had also learned that 
offers made out of hand tend to be rejected, whereas those made in 
response to a demand are considered victories. In other words, the
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chance of getting “Gaza first” depended on two prerequisites: that it be 
“Gaza plus” and that the Palestinians ask for it.
...Finally the offer was framed and consolidated, with Gaza and 
Jericho first in accordance with demands by the PLO... I preferred to 
offer Jericho as a sign of our intent to continue negotiations, even if 
“Gaza first” would be the main policy. There were no Jewish 
settlements in the immediate Jericho area, therefore there would be no 
need to discuss their fate. We proposed that an administrative center be 
set up in Jericho to take the pressure off [Palestinian claims to nearby] 
Jerusalem...[I]n contrast to the Washington negotiations, the Oslo 
accord also included a paragraph on the Gaza strip and Jericho. Thus, 
in Oslo the Palestinians gained not only philosophical principles, 
though important in themselves, but also land. 8
Peres, belittling Arafat for being a self-interested figure that sought television
appearances above all else, saw the PLO Chairman as open to manipulation if
he were offered land. In order to persuade Arafat to come to the Gaza strip, he
needed to be led to believe that he had achieved a victory -  that his
administration would eventually extend into the territory o f  the West Bank.
But Peres had in mind a rather different semantic distinction. ‘Gaza and
Jericho first’ would reframe lands under PLO jurisdiction simply as ‘territories
in the West Bank’, meaning the territory not in its entirety or even as
contiguous areas of control. It was to be a system of substitutes, such as when
Peres notes that the town of Jericho could serve as the Palestinians’ West
Bank administrative centre instead of East Jerusalem. The Palestinians would
be given what they coveted most, land, in order to prevent them from
achieving statehood.
Peres spoke of gradually institutionalising the sub-sovereign role of the
PLO:
[Palestinian autonomy] is a station on the road to a permanent 
solution, but not in itself a permanent solution. Yet I felt at the time 
and I still feel that we have to reveal our vision gradually. If we reveal
58Shimon Peres, The New Middle East (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1993):
20-23.
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it ahead of time not only will we encounter unnecessary opposition, but 
we will give away before negotiations what we should keep for our 
fallback position.5
The ‘unnecessary opposition’ to be avoided was a demand for a Palestinian 
state at the end of the interim period. Peres believed that the Palestinians 
would benefit so much from economic co-operation with Israel that they 
would be eventually persuaded to accept sub-sovereignty over statehood. He 
thought it possible to bring about this situation by casting the sub-sovereign 
arrangement designed for the Palestinians in supra-national terms:
The concept of sovereignty was introduced in the sixteenth century, 
but since then sovereignty has lost a great deal of its meaning. Because 
as in the Middle Ages, when we went from cities to states, today we 
are in the process of going from states to communities, or 
commonwealths. This is clearly true on the economic side, but it 
doesn’t stop there -  it goes from economy to strategy to common 
passports and common currencies.
Now I think the next step should be an agreement that we will be 
based on three different borders or frontiers: a military one, an 
economic one, and a political one. The military border should be the 
Jordan River line, which means that no foreign army may cross the 
Jordan River and threaten Israel. And whatever territories are given 
back to the Palestinians will remain demiltarized. And also I think the 
Jordanian, Palestinian, and Israelis economies should cooperate. You 
cannot put an endless number of custom posts and barriers on such a 
small territory.
...I’m talking about a sort of Benelux. Politically any agreement 
should take into consideration the demographic layout. Wherever there 
are densely populated Palestinian areas it should be under the rule of 
the Palestinians, except for the security locations. In the beginning it 
will look strange, but lets not forget that the Gaza-Jericho agreement -  
the nature of [Palestinian] autonomy was also unprecedented. We 
created precedents, we didn’t follow precedents...
You see, the great story about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not 
so much the size of the land or the number of people, but the complex 
nature of the conflict. On such a small piece of land, with such a long 
history, with such a great conflict -  it’s very hard to find a solution. 
We came in at the last moment. Because in politics it’s like in your 
own kitchen: you can break eggs and make omelets [sic], but you 
cannot make eggs again from omelets [sic]. Bosnia, for example, is an 
omelet [sic]. We are being very careful now to stop the omelet-ing, so
59Shimon Peres and Robert Littell, For the Future o f Israel (Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1998): 77.
134
to speak, of the Arab-Israeli conflict. And to cut it exactly is not a 
simple matter. But that it what we have to do and what we will do.60
Peres is describing a customs union between two sovereign states and a sub­
sovereign entity. In his vision, Israel would continue to maintain an armed 
presence alongside Palestinian-ruled territories, which would not constitute a 
sovereign state. The Palestinian economy would be integrated with those of 
Israel and Jordan, and the benefits of such an arrangement should suffice to 
compensate for any diminished sense of Palestinian national honour that might 
emerge from a lack of conventional sovereignty. Yet it is inaccurate to 
describe his proposal as a type of Benelux, which was a customs union of 
three fully sovereign states. Indeed, Peres’s concession that the future 
arrangement ‘will look strange* as well as his jargon about the ‘complex 
nature of the conflict’, ‘creating precedents’, and ‘cutting political omelettes’ 
all refer to the permanently sub-sovereign Palestinian entity that he expected 
the PLO to govern.
Peres provided a revealing window into his thoughts regarding the 
PLO at a UNESCO conference in Grenada in December 1993 -  two months 
after the official signing of the Oslo Accords. Discussing a ‘hypothetical’ 
outcome of the final status talks, Peres not only suggested that the Accords 
were simply a means to implement his past ideas of ‘functional compromise’, 
but also that the decision to recognise the PLO was motivated by designs 
similar to complex co-optation. Developing the idea that he secretly proposed 
to King Hussein in 1975, Peres argued that after the interim period of 
Palestinian autonomy, the West Bank would differ politically from the Gaza 
strip. While the latter area would eventually become a demilitarised,
^Ibid., 123-125.
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independent state, the West Bank would acquire a different status, developing 
instead as an autonomous polity composed of Palestinians and Israeli 
settlers.61 A local parliament would be established for the West Bank, in which 
both Palestinians and Israeli settler candidates would stand for election. This 
devolved assembly would be responsible for all internal matters, while 
security and foreign relations would remain under the aegis of Israel. At the 
same time, Peres noted, settlers would continue to be Israelis and vote in 
elections for the Israeli Parliament, while Palestinians would be able to vote 
for candidates in the Jordanian Parliament (but not the Palestinian national 
legislature to be based in Gaza city, hence blocking any future Palestinian 
legal claims to sovereignty over the West Bank!). Peres anticipated that the 
final status agreements would implement these ideas, establishing a permanent 
legal basis for Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza strip. It should 
be noted that the notion of complex co-optation is implicit in such a 
programme. ‘[Peres] acknowledges, and promotes, the PLO as the vehicle for 
implementation of this idea’.63 Only if the PLO were co-opted, would it ever 
conceivably consent to establish a Palestinian state in the Gaza strip, but not in 
the West Bank! Peres seems to have believed that PLO would eventually be 
‘mollified’ into accepting a system of substitutes, consenting to the functional 
division of the West Bank into spheres (security, local affairs, Israeli 
settlement, etc.) with responsibility apportioned between itself, Israel, and 
Jordan.
6lAmnon Barzilai, ‘For Peres -  Yet Another Vision’, H a’aretz, 28-11-94, cited in 
Geoffrey Aronson, Settlements and the Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations: An Overview 
(Washington: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1996): http://www.ipsjps.org/html/book.html.
62Ibid.
63Ibid.
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A Synchronisation
It is important to recognise that Rabin’s approach to peacemaking, 
when augmented by Peres’s formulations, was capable of becoming 
reconstituted as the ‘gradually diminishing concession’ component of a 
complex-co-optation agenda. Indeed, the following chapter will detail how 
Peres’s strategic gradualism would come to synchronise with Rabin’s concern 
for security, an evaluative criterion geared entirely toward Israeli concerns and 
wholly indifferent to Palestinian needs and operating constraints.
Predispositions or Premeditation?
It has been illustrated that Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres both 
possessed general tendencies toward asymmetrical recognition, ambiguity, and 
a gradual diminishment of concessions in their peacemaking efforts with the 
Palestinians. Yet predispositions do not confirm that the two Israeli leaders 
actively premeditated to co-opt the PLO. Chapter four will in fact show that 
complex co-optation came about not because of an initial collaboration 
between the two Israeli leaders, but rather as a result of Peres’s subterfuge and 
insubordination! Nonetheless, Peres’s efforts produced a situation in which 
both men’s predispositions would assume their final, ‘modulatory’ form.
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Chapter Four 
Mapping Co-optation
This chapter maps the process in which complex co-optation unfolded. 
It suggests the independent Norwegian initiative that created a line of contact 
with the PLO provided a divergent opportunity for Shimon Peres to achieve 
his desired political solution for the Palestinians. But since his influence and 
decision-making power were limited, Peres had to engineer the backdrop of 
the Oslo negotiations through somewhat shifty means. Despite this 
‘uncoordinated’ catalyst, an environment was nonetheless created that 
provided an outlet for Yitzhak Rabin’s own burgeoning predispositions toward 
complex co-optation. Rabin then took a role in shaping the negotiations, 
whereupon the co-optation element came to be structured as a kind of ‘phased 
diminishment of expectations’, beginning with the 1993 DoP, gradually 
developing in the 1994 Cairo Agreement and culminating in the 1995 Oslo II 
Agreement.
Oslo: The ‘Modulatory’ Foundation is Lain
The following section recounts at length a number of events pertaining 
to the Oslo negotiations between December 1992 and September 1993. It is 
necessary to recount these events for several reasons. First, it is to demonstrate 
how Shimon Peres directed the setting of the Oslo negotiations, and how his 
actions created an independent momentum that would eventually appeal to 
Rabin. Second, it is to show that the government of Israel recognised the PLO 
in a manner equivalent to Michael Hardt’s ‘whatever identity’, embracing the 
organisation as the sole, legitimate representative of the Palestinian people but 
negating its agenda of independent statehood. Third, it is to reveal that that the
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interim stage of DoP was structured with a ‘modulatory’ foundation, as open 
to constant tactical modification and revision by Israel.
Oslo as an Extension o f a Long, Petty, Internal Political Feud
Shimon Peres believed that the secret back channel that emerged in 
Oslo might provide the means to achieve his political aims vis-a-vis the 
Palestinians. But why, as introduced above, would Peres have to resort to 
unconventional tactics in order to sell Rabin on negotiations with the PLO? It 
should not be misconstrued that Rabin was simply implacable and thus would 
not listen to the ideas of his own Foreign Minister. Rather it should be borne in 
mind that Rabin and Peres had long been bitter rivals. Rabin’s ascension to 
leadership of his party in 1974, and consequently the post of Prime Minister 
until 1977, was due largely to his being one of the few Labour party leaders 
who was not involved in, and whose reputation had thus not been harmed by, 
the ill-preparation and mismanagement of the October 1973 war. But Shimon 
Peres had also coveted the post. Peres, a protege of the Israeli founding leader 
David Ben-Gurion, had been responsible for building up the nation’s defence 
infrastructure and nascent nuclear programme in the 1950s and 1960s. 
Because of these political considerations, Rabin felt impelled to give Peres the 
powerful post of Minister of Defence in 1974. The tension between the two 
was quite intense and often adversely affected the functioning of government. 
‘From that moment on, the two never stopped bickering, stabbing each other 
in the back, stealing each other’s glory, hiding important facts and events from 
each other, trying to keep each other out of power’.1
'Amy Wilentz, ‘The Heart of Israel: A biography of Yitzhak Rabin and a chronicle of 
his country’s 50-year road toward peace’ New York Times Book Review, 24 May 1998, 
http:///www.nytimes.com/books/98/05/24/reviews/9805024.24wilentt.html.
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The rivalry continued after April 1977, when Peres displaced Rabin as
leader of the Labour party. From 1984-1986, during his tenure as Prime
Minister in the Labour-Likud coalition government, Peres often sought to
contain Rabin’s influence. Rabin’s disdain for Peres thus grew considerably,
reaching its apex in 1990, when his rival engineered a failed no-confidence
vote in the government of Yitzhak Shamir. ‘[Rabin] had lost his revered post
as defense minister and was convinced that his old rival had sacrificed the
* • • 2unity government and the peace process in the name of blind ambition’. In 
1991 the Israeli Labour party had adopted a party primary system to choose its 
head. In the new system, all of the party’s registered members and not just its 
central committee chose its leader. The new arrangement was to the detriment 
of Peres, who was far less popular on the Israeli ‘street’ than Rabin. In 
February 1992, Rabin assumed control of the Labour party and thereafter 
began to take many measures to marginalize the influence of Peres. Rabin 
even gave an anti-Peres speech on his election night in June 1992. Upon 
taking office, Rabin deprived Peres of the defence portfolio, a post the latter 
very much desired to hold in the new government. Peres had also been 
sidelined from the bilateral negotiations in Washington and much of the US- 
Israeli relations that were central to the peace process.
The Oslo Channel Begins
The Norwegian connection began in April 1992, when Peres’s deputy 
Yossi Beilin met Teije Rod Larsen, the director the Oslo-based Institute for 
Applied Social Sciences (FAFO) to discuss a study on Palestinian living 
conditions in the occupied territories. In their conversation, the two agreed that
2Idem Glenn Frankel, Beyond the Promised Land: Jews and Arabs on the Hard Road 
to a New Israel (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994): 138.
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it was necessary for Israel to initiate back-channel contacts with the PLO, as a 
means to get round an Israeli ban on contacts with the PLO and to provide a 
forum for discussing the deadlocked talks in Washington. When Beilin 
became the Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister in June 1992, Larsen notified 
contacts in the Norwegian Foreign Ministry of their discussion. In September 
1992, Jan Egeland, the Norwegian Foreign Minister, who was visiting Israel 
and the occupied territories in connection with the FAFO project, suggested to 
Beilin that Norway would be willing to arrange a discreet back channel for 
negotiations between Israel and the PLO. The Norwegians attempted to 
schedule substantive meetings either in Oslo or Jerusalem, but to no avail. 
Since Rabin had vetoed Peres having private meetings with Faisal Husseini, 
Beilin had feared conducting ‘official’ back channel negotiations and 
preferred unofficial, private conversations instead. In this regard, he 
dispatched Yair Hirschfeld -  who had been Peres’s and Beilin’s unofficial 
attache to the local Palestinians since 1989 (pp. 117-118), to meet with Hanan 
Ashrawi, an academic in the Palestinian delegation at the Washington talks, in 
order to discuss the opening of an unofficial back channel to accompany the 
multilateral talks.3 She recommended that Hirschfeld meet with Ahmed Qurai, 
a PLO official who would be in London to confer with the Palestinian 
negotiating team. (Qurei co-ordinated the Palestinian teams in the various 
multilateral negotiations in the Madrid framework.) The two met in the British 
capital and, aware of the Norwegian facilitation offer, agreed to begin 
unofficial pre-negotiations to be held under the academic auspices of FAFO in 
Oslo. Hirschfeld consulted with, was given approval, by Beilin, who ‘saw
3Pinhas Inbari, The Palestinians between terrorism and statehood (Brighton: Sussex 
Academic Press, 1994): 210.
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potential in the FAFO-disguised talks: participation by private Israeli citizens 
in an academic context would circumvent the Israeli ban on contacts with the 
PLO; academic talks could reconnoitre PLO positions without obligation or 
commitment; by conducting talks under FAFO auspices and funding, the 
Israeli government avoided official sanction maintaining full official and 
credible deniability’.4
The first of five rounds of secret, exploratory talks were held under the 
guise of an academic conference at Borregard estate in Sarpsborg, Norway on 
20-22 January 1993. Hirschfeld and another academic, Ron Pundik, 
represented the Israelis, while Qurai and deputy PLO officials represented the 
Palestinians. The two Israelis were instructed not to engage in negotiations, 
but to determine sensitive issues and identify common ground. Teije Larsen 
and his wife, Mona Juul, served as a facilitation team. Larsen maintained daily 
contact with Beilin in Jerusalem and PLO leaders in Tunis while Juul served 
as the Norwegian government’s liaison, keeping officials in Oslo appraised of 
progress and requesting official intervention when necessary. The first round 
of talks produced the Sarpsborg document, an agreement on three points:
(1) Israeli withdrawal from Gaza;
(2) Scaled economic devolution based on proven cooperation, leading 
to economic institution building; and
(3) An international economic assistance plan for the Palestinian entity 
in Gaza.5
4Idem Andrew S. Buchanan, Peace with Justice: A History o f the Israeli-Palestinian 
Declaration o f Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (London: Macmillan, 
2000): 93.
5Ibid., 95.
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With an initial framework in hand, Beilin approached Peres because he needed
the sponsorship of a senior party figure with the weight to promote and foster
the continuation of the back channel. Peres was eager to oblige. As was noted
earlier, ‘Peres, as Foreign Minister, had been sidelined by Rabin from being a
central figure within the Israeli peace policy making structure and saw in the
Oslo talks an opportunity to become involved in the policy-making process’.6
The Ripple Effects o f Peres’s 'Independent ’ Actions
In line with the circuitous methods of diplomacy that he had
undertaken in 1987, Peres began to act ‘independently’ of Prime Minister
Rabin in order to advance the Oslo momentum:
Whilst Rabin rebuffed Peres’s [January 1993] appeal [to officially meet 
with the PLO] he did however sanction the continuation of the Oslo 
backchannel, thus allowing Peres a foothold in the policy-making 
process. Peres thus embarked on a schedule, indulging in subterfuge 
and insubordination in his efforts to circumvent Rabin. Rabin requested 
that Peres delay the Oslo talks by several weeks because of an 
imminent visit to Israel by [US] Secretary [of State Warren] 
Christopher. Peres instead approved their immediate resumption. Peres 
[also] believed if East Jerusalemite Faisal Husseini joined the 
Palestinian delegation in Washington it would ...privately signal 
Peres’s power to the Palestinians in Tunis [with regard to the Oslo 
backchannel] and would publicly signal a shift in the Israeli attitude 
towards the inclusion of such a high-profile PLO figure from the 
occupied territories. Therefore Peres manoeuvred Rabin into adopting 
his negotiating strategy by raising the idea with Christopher in 
Washington on 16 February. Peres suggested that Rabin would be more 
likely to accept Husseini’s participation if the US proposed the idea. 
During Rabin’s first trip to the US in early March, Rabin assented to 
the US proposal to include Husseini in the talks.7
Peres thus set a crucial chain of events in motion which, when augmented by
further unilateral actions on his part, would result in an upgrade of the Oslo
talks to an official level.
6Ibid.
7Ibid., 97.
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The Oslo talks that Peres authorised to immediately resume, contrary 
to Rabin’s orders, had an important ripple effect. The parties drafted a 
declaration of principles over two sessions, beginning on 11-12 February and 
concluding on 20-21 March. The document, known as Sarpsborg III, served as 
the basis for the final version of the Oslo agreement. It contained 15 articles, 
with annexes on:
1) the status of Jerusalem and Palestinian elections (it was decided that 
Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem could both vote and stand as 
candidates in elections for a self-rule council);
2) the establishment of Palestinian economic institutions and economic 
development; and
3) proposals for aid from G7 countries and the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development to fund infrastructure and development 
projects.
Because they were operating at an unofficial level, the Israeli negotiators were 
able to make proposals to whet the appetite of their Palestinian interlocutors. 
They caused the Palestinians to start to place greater stock in the Oslo 
discussions, orienting them toward certain future expectations. For example, 
the Sarpsborg DoP discussed a complete but graduated Israeli withdrawal 
from the Gaza strip within two years of an agreement, to be held under the 
auspices of a UN trusteeship that would govern the territory in preparation for 
independence. After the upgrade to the official level, this notion of a 
trusteeship, which played an instrumental role in sustaining Palestinian interest 
in the back channel, would be dumped because Peres feared creating a 
precedent for UN involvement in Israeli administration of the occupied
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oterritories. The Palestinians would agree to forget the idea, fearing that
adherence to it might slow an Israeli withdrawal from Gaza.9 But in February-
March, the expectations of the PLO team were much higher, especially since
the trusteeship idea was included within proposals to negotiate on Palestinian
sovereignty and borders, as well as 1948 refugees, within the aegis of final
status talks on the occupied territories. They did not yet know that any specific
mention of future Palestinian sovereignty and borders would be removed from
later drafts of the DoP.
Peres decided again to enhance the growing momentum of the Oslo
talks. Peres knew that Rabin was moving closer toward his positions. For
example, Rabin admitted to US Secretary of State Christopher during a visit to
Washington in March 1993 that all Israeli attempts to promote an independent
Palestinian authority in the territories had failed. He acknowledged that the
Palestinians living in the territories were not willing to defy the PLO, and that
only Arafat could make a deal on their behalf.10 But Peres was also very much
aware that Rabin’s conclusion was merely a tactical analysis and did not signal
intent to recognise the PLO or upgrade the Oslo talks to an official level -
Rabin could simply decide to give up on reaching any accord with the
Palestinians. Peres notes:
[Rabin] was sceptical about the Oslo talks; sometimes he wholly 
disbelieved in them. When asked later why he did not share the secret 
with any of his close aides, he replied frankly that he doubted anything 
would come of Oslo.11
8Idem Shimon Peres, Battling for Peace: Memoirs, Edited by David Landau 
(London: Weidenfeld andNicolson, 1995): 333.
9Buchanan, 99.
l0Idem David Makovsky, Making Peace with the PLO (Boulder: Westview Press, -
1996): 39-41.
"Peres, Battling for Peace, 330.
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So Peres decided to ‘supplement’ his ongoing direct appeals to the Prime 
Minister of the need to reach a deal with the PLO. Without notifying or 
consulting with Rabin, Peres contacted the Egyptian Ambassador to Israel, 
Mohammed Bassiouny, in early April and relayed that Israel would be 
interested in giving the PLO territorial jurisdiction over the Gaza strip and 
Jericho. Bassiouny reported his conversation with Peres to President Hosni 
Mubarak, who in turn notified Arafat. Arafat told the Egyptian President on 12 
April 1993 that he would accept Peres’s proposal. Shortly thereafter, during 
the 14 April Rabin-Mubarak summit held in Ismailiya, Rabin was informed of 
Arafat’s apparent willingness to assume authority over Gaza and Jericho, if he 
were also given control of ‘key arteries’. Rabin was flabbergasted, and 
claimed that the Ismailiya summit had been the first time he had heard of the 
Gaza-Jericho idea.12 Peres maintains differently, that he discussed the idea of 
offering control of Jericho to the PLO, and only nonchalantly admits that he 
did not ‘specifically tell* the Prime Minister that he had contacted Arafat via 
the Egyptians.13
Although Peres’s insubordination had infuriated Rabin, it nonetheless 
yielded results. Unlike Yitzhak Shamir, who earlier had quashed Peres’s 
efforts to circumvent his authority (pp. 116-7), Rabin was willing to explore 
what Peres’s ‘roundabout’ diplomacy had produced. The ‘Gaza-Jericho’ 
proposal resonated with his views that political solutions for the Palestinians 
must be grounded in an asymmetrical relationship favouring Israel. Peres, who 
was unaware of the entirety of Rabin’s concerns about declining Israeli 
national stamina and the need to reach accords in order to stabilise the regional
,2Makovsky, 37.
13Peres, Battling for Peace, 331.
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political arena in Israel’s favour, had simply surmised that Rabin might 
consent to the Jericho plan, if it were presented to him from the ‘outside’, 
since withdrawal from the environs of Jericho had been a component of 
Labour party strategy since the 1968 ‘Allon plan’. Rabin was very much 
interested in the PLO offer to govern Gaza, but, at the same time, he was 
extremely apprehensive about the security implications of Arafat’s desire to 
control the border crossings into the self rule areas from Jordan and Egypt and 
a request for an ‘extra-territorial’ road linking Gaza and the West Bank.14 
Control of borders suggested an equality that was at odds with Rabin’s sub­
sovereign conception of the Palestinians. But he did not dismiss the offer and 
indeed began to explore it. ‘Rabin worried that Oslo had not ascertained the 
PLO’s true position, which led him, uninformed of Peres’s role, to test the 
PLO negotiators to find out if they were acting under the full authority of the 
PLO leadership’.15 
Arafat’s Manoeuvres
In the context of Rabin’s explorations, Arafat began manoeuvres to 
persuade the Israeli Prime Minister to sign an agreement with the PLO. The 
PLO leadership was enthusiastic about Peres’s hints about ‘Gaza-Jericho 
plus’, but was aware of the divergence of positions between Rabin and Peres 
and understood the need to create a direct line of communication with the 
Prime Minister. In order to demonstrate their seriousness and commitment to 
the Oslo negotiations, for example, the PLO complied with Rabin’s demands 
(communicated indirectly through the back channel) that the continuation of 
Oslo was contingent upon resumption of the Washington talks, that Faisal
14Buchanan, 103.
15Ibid.
147
Husseini be ‘appointed’ as head of the Washington delegation, that there be a 
cessation of posturing in the multilateral talks, and that Yusef Sayigh, a 
Palestinian delegate who was explicitly identified with the PLO, be removed 
from one of the plenary meetings in Washington. But to further sway the 
uncommitted Rabin to officially deal with the PLO, Arafat instructed the 
Palestinian delegation in Washington to sustain the talks without advancing 
them and, at the same time, the Palestinians in Oslo were told to make 
concessions that were of great appeal to the Israelis. For example, the 
Palestinian delegation in Washington brought the talks to a standstill by 
demanding the inclusion of East Jerusalem as an integral part of an interim 
agreement. (East Jerusalem had been formally annexed by Israel and the 
challenging of this status is extremely volatile in Israeli public opinion.) Yet at 
the end of the fourth round of Oslo talks, 30 April -  3 May, the PLO team 
agreed to exclude East Jerusalem from interim self-rule -  to address its status 
in final-status negotiations, and consented to the ambiguous idea that 
Palestinians from the city could ‘participate’ in elections, instead of 
specifically defining if they could be candidates as opposed to voters in 
elections for the interim self-rule authority.16 In exchange for respecting 
Rabin’s circumspection and the demonstration of goodwill, Arafat demanded 
that Israeli negotiators of equal stature with official status replace the 
academics at Oslo, or the talks would be discontinued. Arafat had shown a 
willingness to accede to Israel’s nationalist demands and its asymmetrical
16Makovsky, 42.
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rights. ‘Rabin was impressed by Arafat’s ability to impose his will and the
results were not long in coming’.17
Upgrade to the Official Level
Rabin and Peres agreed to upgrade the back channel in mid-May. Peres
relays of the meeting in which he and Rabin made the decision that:
We met alone on 14 May...In a series of lengthy consultations, I 
stressed that the PLO men in Oslo were more flexible, more 
imaginative and more authoritative than the West Bank-Gaza team 
negotiating in Washington. In Oslo, interesting proposals had been 
made to define the jurisdiction of the autonomy and to establish 
Israel’s residual status and powers during the interim period -  two 
issues that had long been deadlocked in Washington.18
Peres discussed how the institutionalised sub-sovereign role that both men
desired the Palestinians to hold had a distinct possibility of coming to fruition,
if the negotiations proceeded unchanged on their current path so that the post-
1967 Israeli military and settlement presence in the occupied territories -  what
Peres calls ‘Israel’s residual status and powers during the interim period’ -
could become permanently entrenched. The two agreed that Rabin would
retain political distance while Peres would nominate suitable negotiating
officials. Peres suggested that he personally head the delegation head but
Rabin vetoed this possibility as too high a level of political involvement. Peres
thus named Uri Savir, the director-general of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, as
the delegation head.
At the outset, the two sides approached official negotiations from
different viewpoints. The PLO team believed that ‘official status’ had meant
finalising the details on the Sarpsborg III document. Savir, however, was not
17Inbari, 208.
18Peres, Battling for Peace, 329.
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authorised to negotiate a deal, only to ascertain if it were possible to actually 
conclude an agreement.19 Savir and Qurai developed a close rapport and were 
quickly able to discern and address the fundamental wants and concerns of 
both sides. Savir understood that ‘the Palestinians needed to know that 
autonomy could lead to a state, while the Israelis needed to know that it would 
bring security, because once the ‘red lines’ were understood, everything else
could be negotiated. But if these were not understood, negotiations could
0(\continue for years without results’. Qurai needed an Israeli indication that an 
agreement would lead to statehood -  a Palestinian state would be the 
inevitable outcome, and not simply a clear possibility, of the interim period. It 
must be stressed that Savir pushed for a negotiating framework that would 
bridge the differing endgame expectations of the two sides through the use of 
‘constructive ambiguity’.
Bearing in mind the admonition of Aharon Klieman in chapter one that 
constructive ambiguity both offers the pretence of peacemaking as well as 
lacks the substance that is necessary for such an endeavour to truly prevail (pp. 
27-37), it is possible to see how the negotiating framework offered by Savir 
could have been used to strategically alter the dynamic of the Israel-PLO 
relationship:
Although the Israelis did not guarantee a state, their conditional 
inference that if an interim agreement was concluded which ensured 
Israeli security, maintained stability, established Palestinian institutions 
and elements of Palestinian sovereignty, linked Tunis with the 
occupied territories and resulted in economic cooperation, then the 
impetus would exist to go beyond an interim stage to a final status 
which would inevitably include negotiating statehood. Thus Savir and
19Savir was instructed to 1) ensure the PLO continued the Washington talks; 2) 
maintain total secrecy regarding Oslo; 3) ensure that East Jerusalem was not part of an interim 
agreement; 4) temporarily waive Jericho; and 5) ensure Israel’s veto on referring disputes to 
arbitration.
20Emphasis added, Buchanan, 106.
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Qurai established a negotiating modus vivendi based on implied mutual 
recognition and respect for each other’s aspirations, namely security 
and a state, bolstered by economic interdependence.21
If the ‘conditional inference’ and the ‘implied mutual recognition and respect
for each other’s aspirations’ are viewed from the critical perspective informing
this study -  as an acknowledgement of past repressed identities but not as a
precursor to normative change, then such notions can be seen only to indicate
a changing economy of power on the part of Israel, as opposed to an
acceptance of the inevitability of Palestinian statehood. For the Israelis, the
negotiating framework would be used to transmute the ‘red lines’ of the PLO,
so that the leadership of the organisation would modify its positions and
eventually settle for less than statehood.
A Decisive Tactical Advantage
Ambiguity acted to cloud the Israeli intentions, ironically, by an initial
mapping of common ground. Agreement was reached on a security annex,
calling for a demilitarised Gaza, a Palestinian police force that would maintain
security in the population centres under its control, and a redeployment of
Israeli armed forces outside of Palestinians towns and cities. But while it was
certainly necessary to focus on the arrangements of the interim stage, agreeing
to defer the most contentious issues until later gave Israel a decisive tactical
advantage. Savir, energised by the pace of the talks, reported to Rabin that an
agreement was possible. Savir recommended to Beilin that a legal expert
should examine the draft understandings, and so Yoel Singer, an attorney who
had served in the legal department of the Israeli army and had been involved
in the Camp David negotiations, was brought in to consult. Singer produced a
2lIbid.,106-7.
22Makovsky, 47.
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brief legal analysis that, while critical, noted that there was potential to 
develop some of the proposed ideas.23 Although Singer believed that the 
Sarpsborg document lacked legal precision, he was enthusiastic about the 
large substantive areas about which the PLO was willing to compromise, in 
contrast, for example, to the Palestinian negotiators in Washington who had 
insisted that during the interim period of autonomy the Palestinians should 
have jurisdiction over Israeli settlements and East Jerusalem and that a 
declaration of independence should be prepared. He confirmed to Rabin that 
the ambiguity that straddled Israeli security and nationalist considerations -  
and was to be the basis to sustain the settlements in the West Bank and Gaza 
strip -  could be made operationally secure in an agreement with the PLO. 
Rabin very much trusted Singer, whose analytical assessments, attention to 
detail, and critical temperament reflected his own concerns, and so asked the 
lawyer to travel to Oslo to determine if the PLO offer was genuine.
Singer began to consolidate Israeli positions upon his participation in 
the Oslo sessions from 25-27 June. ‘When the two delegations broke to brief 
their respective leaders, it was Singer’s role which proved crucial and 
pivotal’.24 He briefed Rabin that an agreement could be achieved, and told 
Peres without mincing words that, ‘if we don’t make peace with these people, 
we are idiots’.25 The Israelis were extremely pleased to hear from Qurai via 
Singer that the arrival of Arafat in Gaza would not only galvanise the 
Palestinian public against Hamas, but also that Arafat would end terror against 
Israel. But their understanding of how this programme would be implemented
23Buchanan, 107.
24Ibid., 109.
25Idem Jane Corbin, Gaza First (London: Bloomsbury, 1994): 104-5; Makovsky, 53.
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was guided by their past tendencies to manage the Palestinians in the West 
Bank and Gaza strip through the recourse to force.
The Israelis believed that if Arafat were installed in Gaza and 
subsequently buoyed up, he would accept their security dictates tout court and 
would use any means necessary to maintain his authority. They did not appear 
to be open to other alternatives or scenarios. Rabin echoed this belief on 9 
September 1993, just before the official signing of the DoP. He seems to have 
expected the PLO to act in par with his own dealings with the Palestinians 
during the intifada and in the December 1992 deportation episode (pp. 110- 
111,128-9):
I prefer the Palestinians to cope with the problem of enforcing order in 
the Gaza Strip. The Palestinians will be better at it than we were 
because they will allow no appeals to the Supreme Court and will 
prevent the Israeli Association for Civil Rights from criticising the 
conditions there by denying it access to the area. They will rule by 
their own methods, freeing, and this is the most important, the Israeli 
army soldiers from having to do what they will do.26
Since the PLO had consented to forego control over Israeli military and
settlements areas during the interim period, and because the commitment to
police Gaza on behalf of Israel suggested that Arafat’s self-interest
predominated above all else, the Israelis decided that they could very likely
structure an agreement to create an irreversible fait accompli in their favour.
Repackaging the Bottom Line
The Israelis presented the PLO team with the first written draft Israeli-
PLO document on 4 July at a session in Gressheim, Norway. The new DoP,
which superseded Sarpsborg III, ‘represented for the Israelis an arrangement
26Yediot Aharonot, 9 September 1993.
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to cohabit rather than a plan to divorce’.27 It contained many noteworthy 
altered provisions:
1) an Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and Jericho, except settlements, within 
three months of the DoP being signed;
2) Israeli settlers, settlements, foreign visitors to the territories and Israeli 
military locations to be exempt from PLO jurisdiction;
3) The PLO to have functional jurisdiction, ‘early empowerment’, over 
health, education, welfare, taxation and tourism -  but any additional 
Palestinian administrative responsibilities would require mutual 
agreement with Israel;
4) Israel to retain responsibility for external security, Israelis in the 
occupied territories, as well as ‘internal security’ in the Palestinian 
self-rule areas; and
5) An Israeli military redeployment from Palestinian population centres in 
the West Bank to other parts o f the territory, upon withdrawal from 
Gaza.
Echoing Peres’s desire to redefine territorial issues, Rabin had demanded that 
redeployment, which would essentially demarcate the territories to be under 
Palestinian jurisdiction, be made an issue for Israel’s sole discretion. The 
Declaration called for ‘consultation’ with the Palestinians on this matter, but 
did not require ‘agreement’ with them. In line with Rabin and Peres’s 
predilection for ambiguity, the interplay of nationalist and security 
considerations was to be solely an Israeli concern. For Rabin, the movement of 
Israeli forces relating to strategic defence and for the protection of Israeli
27Buchanan, 111.
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civilian settlements in the West Bank and Gaza strip would not be conditional 
on the consent of the Palestinians. The Gressheim document proposed the 
initial redeployment of Israeli armed forces on the eve of Palestinian elections, 
but without specifying from which population centres. It linked further 
redeployment to an Israeli evaluation of Palestinian performance on security, 
but it did not fix any criteria for such an assessment.
The Gressheim DoP, free from many of the ambiguities that marked 
the earlier Israeli-PLO understandings, very much represented Israel’s 
underlying intentions at Oslo. Rather than simply reflecting a common 
bargaining tactic, in which diminutive initial offers are scaled upward in 
subsequent talks, the document demonstrates just how little Israel was 
prepared to offer its Palestinian interlocutors. After the Palestinians angrily 
raised objections to the Gressheim DoP, its formulae were simply repackaged 
with the same ambiguity-based satisfiers that had been previously used. For 
example, in the Gressheim document, Israel tried to scrap its earlier 
commitment to negotiate over Jerusalem in final status talks. Following 
considerable Palestinian protest, the Israelis agreed to reaffirm their prior 
agreement, which was to acquiesce merely to discuss the status of Jerusalem 
in final status talks, but without making any predefined concessions or even 
commitments to the nature of the discussions. In a similar environment of 
contention, the two sides were still at odds over five broad areas:
1) the inclusion of UN SCRs 242 and 338;
2) the permanent status negotiations;
3) the nature of ‘Gaza/Jericho’ first;
28Peres, Battling for Peace, 33.
155
4) elections and Jerusalem; and
5) the issue of Palestinian displaced persons from 1967.
It was in the negotiation process, and subsequent air of crisis, over these issues 
of dispute that the ‘modulatory-’ foundation would begin to assume its 
functional form.
Counter-Proposals
Advised by Taher Shash, an Egyptian lawyer who had worked on the 
Camp David Accords, the PLO demanded more than 20 revisions of the 
Gressheim document. Arafat, who was personally behind the new 
Palestinian proposals, believed that certain conditions of proto-statehood 
within the autonomy regime would guarantee eventual Palestinian sovereignty 
as well as control over East Jerusalem. In particular, Arafat sought ‘the 
replacement of the word ‘Palestinian’ with ‘PLO* in respect of the political 
body with whom the agreement was made and with whom the Israelis would 
be partners [believing that explicit recognition of the PLO brought with it 
implicit recognition of the PLO’s political agenda, that is, the right to an 
independent state]; control of the Allenby bridge [the international border over 
the Jordan river], extraterritorial roads between Gaza and Jericho (including an 
air corridor), with Gaza/Jericho crossing points ‘under the responsibility of the 
Palestinian authorities, with international supervision and in cooperation with 
Israel’; and Palestinians from East Jerusalem to be eligible in elections for an 
autonomous authority’.30
The Israelis would not countenance the Palestinian counter-proposals. 
The negotiating environment faced collapse and the Norwegian sponsors had
29Makovsky, 59.
30Buchanan, 112.
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to make a great effort to resuscitate the talks. Buchanan notes of this crisis 
period that, ‘[m]uch of the Norwegian effort resolved around the human 
dimension, that is convincing both sides as to the real and genuine desire of 
the other to reach an agreement, rather than concentrating on purely technical 
and substantive points of disagreement*.31 Phrased differently, as the 
aforementioned critique of Deiniol Jones in chapter one demonstrated (pp. 46- 
48), the Norwegians believed in the need to bring about a breakthrough in 
Israeli-PLO mutual recognition and endeavoured to build connections between 
the representatives of the two sides, but did not act to ensure equality of rights 
for the Palestinians. Their efforts convinced the Israelis that their goals were 
feasible. On 11 July, under cover of an official visit to the Tunisian President 
Zine El Abedine Ben Ali in Tunis, the Norwegian Foreign Minister, Johan 
Jurgen Holst, accompanied by Larsen and Juul, met with Arafat. They assured 
the PLO Chairman that Israel was very keen to reach an agreement in Oslo 
and were able to ascertain that he too was fully committed to the success of 
the negotiations. They sent a letter to Peres on 12 July that the talks were 
worth pursuing:
Holst stressed his impression that Arafat was very much behind the
Norway talks. He was involved in the details and dedicated to the
* 12talks’ success. This made an impression on the Israelis.
Larsen and Juul met with Peres in Jerusalem on 13 July. After discussing the
details of an accord, Peres told them that Israel would allow Arafat to settle in
11Gaza and administer self-rule personally. Larsen and Juul notified Holst of 
their meeting with Peres, who in turn related the news to Arafat. Arafat then 
immediately conceded on issues of extraterritoriality and Rabin permitted the
3'ibid.
32Makovsky, 61.
33Ibid.
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talks to continue. Arafat had foregone those elements of his proposals that
were explicitly linked to notions of future sovereignty. He assumed that the
impending recognition of the PLO by Israel would achieve the same aim, and
did not consider that the act might reflect a different purpose.
Mutual Recognition on Israeli Terms
The Israelis sought to use mutual recognition for tactical reasons:
[I]t was clear from Oslo that the PLO wanted a ‘package deal’, the 
DoP for mutual recognition. Arafat’s approval was a sine qua non for 
any agreement, as he believed that return to Gaza not only symbolized 
the embodiment of Palestinian nationalism, it was also important for 
his and the PLO’s existence, the importance of which to Arafat was not 
lost on the Israelis when extracting concessions.34
Rabin authorised Savir to offer specific terms of mutual recognition at the 25-
26 July session. But the PLO insisted that discussions on mutual recognition
be interlinked with their objections to the Gressheim document, which related
to security issues and the nature of Gaza/Jericho. The Israelis would not
change their stances on the security of settlements, borders, redeployment, and
control over internal and external security. The PLO was particularly loath to
concede over issues such as the powers devolved to the Palestinian
autonomous authority, where the self-rule council would be located, the
timetable of transfer of responsibilities, and the competencies to be
transferred.35 The Israelis outright refused to renegotiate these issues, and as a
result, Qurai stated his intention to resign. But on the verge of Qurai’s
departure, Savir privately reached a compromise with him. On par with the
system of substitutes conceived by Peres in relation to giving land to the
Palestinians, Savir’s plan set down seven pre-conditions for mutual
34Buchanan, 113.
35Corbin,134.
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recognition in tandem with ‘eight for eight’ concessions, so that if the PLO 
assented to seven pre-conditions and gave way on eight points of contention, it 
would receive eight substantive concessions from Israel in return.36 But the 
Israeli pledge to make concessions turned out to be a de facto bluff that 
sustained the momentum of the negotiations. In the end, the Palestinians 
would make the exact sweeping concessions desired by the Israelis, in 
exchange for recognition of the PLO and allowing their return to Gaza.
A second back channel, in the form of a secret exchange of letters 
between Rabin and Arafat, prompted the PLO to yield to Israeli positions. 
Without disclosing Oslo, Arafat asked Ahmed Tibi, a prominent Arab Israeli 
doctor with links to both the PLO and the Israeli government, to establish an 
independent line of communication with the Prime Minister. Tibi met the 
cabinet minister Haim Ramon on 17 July, exhorting him to ask Rabin to 
exchange letters with the PLO. Neither letter was explicitly directed to the 
other party or was initialled by its source. Moreover, Rabin believed he was 
contacting Mahmoud Abbas, a senior member of the PLO Executive 
Committee who was the chief Palestinian ‘patron’ of the Oslo talks. Rabin’s 
letter aimed to discern the PLO’s understanding of functional and territorial 
jurisdiction; to elicit how they interpreted the status of Jerusalem during the 
interim period; and to convey that mutual recognition need not be formally 
linked to the DoP. In addition, Rabin wanted Israel to hold ultimate authority 
for all security issues in Gaza and Jericho, for the Israeli forces that had
36The seven preconditions were: 1) PLO recognition of the right of Israel to exist in 
peace and security; 2) PLO commitment to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on the 
basis of UN SCR 242 and 338; 3) repeal of provisions in the PLO covenant calling for the 
destruction of Israel; 4) PLO renunciation of terrorism and cooperation with Israel in 
combating violence; 5) PLO call to stop the intifada-, 6) PLO commitment to resolve all 
outstanding issues with Israel peacefully; 7) Agreement by Arafat to represent himself as 
‘Chairman of the PLO’ and not as the ‘President of Palestine’.
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redeployed in the occupied territories to have sanction to intervene in the self- 
rule areas pre-emptively, in retaliation, or for the ‘hot pursuit* of subjects.37 
(Rabin would not allow the PLO to have unqualified jurisdiction over 
settlements and military locations in the occupied territories beyond Gaza and 
Jericho, in order to prevent the Palestinians from claiming de facto sovereignty 
over the entire West Bank during the final status negotiations. ) Arafat 
responded by agreeing to Israeli control over settlements, settlers, and Israeli 
travellers in the territories, but qualified that Israeli jurisdiction would be over 
‘external’, rather than as Rabin had phrased, ‘overall’ or ‘comprehensive’ 
security; he also agreed to exclude East Jerusalem from the Palestinian self- 
rule area, and linked these concessions to the Israeli acceptance of mutual 
recognition. Rabin acclaimed this correspondence to have been ‘the turning 
point’ that led to the breakthrough.39 For in this act Arafat had allowed Rabin 
to accept the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people and, at the 
same time, virtually nullify its goal of independent statehood from taking hold. 
A Growing List o f Concessions
Israel was able to win further concessions from the Palestinians by 
giving the false impression of making progress in bilateral talks with Syria.40 
Moreover, on 26 July, Israel began a bombing campaign to combat the 
activities of Hezbollah in southern Lebanon, an event that prompted US 
Secretary of State Christopher to visit Jerusalem and Damascus, the major 
influence over the Shiite militia group. An impression of ‘shuttle diplomacy’ 
was created by Christopher’s actions, intimating progress on the Israel-Syria
37Makovsky, 67.
38Ibid.
39Ibid.
40Ibid., 64.
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track where none existed. In this context, Peres wrote a letter to Foreign
Minister Holst, to be shared with the PLO, suggesting that the Oslo
negotiations could be eclipsed, if they were not quickly concluded:
I must share with you my view that they [the PLO] may opt to aspire 
for a too-perfect solution....The vacuum may be filled by opposing 
forces, or with other initiatives, including the possibility of desired 
progress between Israel and Syria. Secretary Christopher is at this very 
moment visiting our region.41
Peres’s impetus seems to have succeeded as ‘the PLO made a number of
concessions in the first week of August, precipitated by a strong concern that
Israel was possibly in the process of shifting its focus and emphasis in
negotiations from the Palestinian to the Syrian track 42 Rabin even commented
that, by mid-August, he was surprised by the growing list of PLO
concessions.43
The PLO accepted ‘modulatory’ compromise. For example, Rabin 
authorised Ramon to contact Abbas via Tibi to enquire if the PLO would 
change its attitude on assuming responsibility for ‘comprehensive security’ 
and its insistence for authority over territory that included military 
installations. But on 7 August the PLO responded that it would not alter its 
stance. It favoured ‘flexible’ phrasing, but would not concede on these two 
issues.44 But, the ‘threat’ of Israel turning to the Syrian track, coupled with the 
very real danger of a domestic political corruption scandal involving a junior 
coalition partner threatening the future of the Rabin government,45 made the 
PLO even more agile and, at an unofficial meeting in Paris, its leadership 
agreed to restart the back channel. At the 13-15 August round of Oslo talks,
41Peres, Battling for Peace, 343.
42Buchanan, 115.
43Makovsky, 66.
44Ibid., 67.
45Peres, Battling for Peace, 345.
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substantive disagreement over important interim issues remained. But these 
differences were simply glossed over:
What the negotiations concluded was an agreement to disagree whilst 
pressing on with reaching an agreement. At this point, it seems that the 
negotiators were intent on concluding an historic deal, with finer 
points of interim period disagreement, let alone final status 
disagreement, to be left to future, post-deal negotiations.46
There were no guarantees the future interim negotiations would proceed with
success.
The PLO clearly had a different understanding from Israel of what
would be the end result of the agreement to disagree:
Those [PLO leaders] who oversaw the creation of this diplomatic 
framework either wilfully ignored the centrality of settlements, or, 
more likely, inexplicably failed to understand their importance as a 
prime indicator of Israeli intentions. For while Palestinians may have 
conceded that many if not most settlements would remain as part of a 
peace agreement, they have failed to confront the notion that the 
continued existence of these outposts also legitimises a permanent, 
preponderant Israeli military role throughout the territories. Palestinian 
leaders have failed to acknowledge the critical importance of 
settlements in the ongoing contest for control of lands between the 
Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River.47
Unaware of Rabin’s earlier conclusions, the PLO leaders feared that if they
had not made the concessions on settlements, Israel would somehow manage
to reach an agreement with the delegation in Washington instead, splitting the
Palestinians in the occupied territories and the diaspora.48 Arafat believed that,
in spite of the restrictions during the interim period of autonomy, he would be
able to reapply the techniques of influence and rule he had employed when the
PLO was based in Lebanon. For example, in August 1993
46Buchanan, 120.
47Geoffrey Aronson, Settlements and the Israel-Palestinian Negotiations: An 
Overview (Washington DC: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1995):
http://www.ipsjps.org/htmFbook.html.
48Inbari, 204.
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Arafat had said: “I ruled Lebanon from Faqahani -  and Gaza is several 
times larger than Faqahani.” What he meant was that he had ruled all 
of Lebanon from the Beiruti quarter where the PLO command was 
sited and from the much larger Gaza he would also be able to run the 
West Bank.49
In addition, the PLO Chairman had faith in future diplomacy with his new 
partners, as can be seen, for instance, when he told Hanan Ashrawi that ‘[t]he 
Palestinian state will start in Gaza-Jericho and from there I will negotiate with 
the Israelis to end the occupation in the rest of the Palestinian territories on par 
with the other Arab leaders’.50 The PLO leaders convinced themselves that 
mutual recognition had meant that Israel had accepted the inevitability of 
Palestinian statehood: the autonomy offered in the DoP could somehow lead 
to independence if enough rhetorical statements were made.51
Israel had achieved the first step necessary for complex co-optation. 
While Rabin, in line with his secret correspondence with Arafat, did moderate 
his demand for comprehensive Israeli responsibility for external security and 
granted the Palestinians jurisdictional ‘early empowerment’ -  the immediate 
transferral of civil responsibilities such as education and taxation, he 
nonetheless extracted the crucial concession, first grasped by Peres, to 
negotiate the precise borders of the self-rule entities, both of the Gaza strip and 
the ill-specified Jericho ‘area’, during later implementation talks. Shortly 
thereafter, the DoP was initialled in a secret ceremony in Oslo on 20 August. 
Letters of mutual recognition between Israel and the PLO were exchanged on 
10 September and the Accords were formally inaugurated at a ceremony on 
the White House lawn on 13 September. Israel thus structured the interim
49Ibid. 196-7.
50Hanan Ashrawi, This Side o f Peace (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994): 259.
51Idem Edward W. Said, The Politics o f Dispossession: The Struggle for Palestinian 
Self-Determination 1969-1994 (London: Chatto and Windus, 1994): 416.
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stage of DoP as open to constant tactical modification and revision in its 
favour, an ordering mechanism akin to Gilles Deleuze’s ‘modulations’ of 
control. It recognised the PLO in a manner tantamount to Michael Hardt’s 
‘whatever identity’, embracing the organisation as the sole, legitimate 
representative of the Palestinian people but negating its agenda of independent 
statehood.
Phased Diminishment of Expectations
The purpose of the next section is to suggest that the post-DoP peace 
process was directed in line with Rabin and Peres’s past propensities for 
offering gradually diminishing concessions. Evidence for such a claim can be 
seen in several noteworthy instances that occurred throughout 1994 and 1995. 
First, the Israeli decision to uphold its settlement policy in the wake of a 
massacre of Palestinian worshippers by an Israeli settler gunman, rather than 
make changes to alleviate the strained new political circumstances, is 
especially revealing. Second, the structures of the May 1994 Cairo Agreement 
and the September 1995 Oslo II Agreement suggest a broad strategy in which 
the Palestinians would receive concessions in the form of devolved powers but 
which nonetheless reinforced Israel’s power over them. Moreover, Israeli 
actions in the midst of deadlocked negotiations as well as statements made 
afterward by Rabin and Peres, during the signing of the Oslo II Agreement, 
seem to confirm such an interpretation.
Rabin’s Response to the Hebron Massacre: Presaging Co-optation
The Rabin government’s co-optation intentions are evident in its 
response to crises that occurred in the months between the September 1993 
signing of the DoP and the May 1994 implementation agreement for interim
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self-government arrangements in Gaza and Jericho. For example, on 25
February 1994, the Israeli settler Baruch Goldstein gunned down 29
Palestinians in the Tomb of the Patriarchs in the West Bank city of Hebron.
After the massacre, the Palestinians seem to have realised the extreme folly of
their reasoning that the Israeli government would gain the public approval to
dismantle settlements in final status negotiations only after their constituents
had fully internalised the existence of Palestinian partners in peace during the
interim period. The Palestinians made the killings the core of a massive public
relations campaign to call for a revision of the Oslo provisions on settlements.
Yet Rabin’s response ‘offered clear evidence that he had no intention of
evacuating settlements during the interim period’.52 He rejected the calls for an
evacuation of the 43 Israelis families living in the midst of Hebron in favour of
more limited measures, such as banning the more militant settler
organisations. It should be noted that:
Had a decision been taken to remove to the zealots in the immediate 
aftermath of the bloody events of February, Rabin would have made 
both a political and security master stroke. The settlement movement 
and its political patrons were then unprepared for such a move, which 
would have won public support. The [Israeli armed forces], too, would 
have been relieved of assigning its soldiers for the thankless and 
tireless task of guarding the settlers.
But evacuation of Israeli settlers from Hebron would have established the 
precedent that dismantling settlements was an integral part of the Oslo 
process. It would have undermined the possibility that a permanently sub­
sovereign Palestinian entity would be the end-result of Palestinian autonomy. 
Rabin was not only committed to maintain settlements, even those as divisive 
as the one in Hebron, but also to assure their ‘natural growth’, or continued
52Aronson, Settlements and the Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations: An overview.
53Cited in Aronson, Ibid.
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expansion alongside the Palestinian self-rule areas. Indeed, it was this very
notion that was to guide the Israeli negotiation of the autonomy
implementation agreements.
The Cairo Agreement: An Anchor
The May 1994 Cairo Agreement, officially known as the ‘Agreement
on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area’, outlined the mechanisms and limits of
Palestinian autonomy according to the ‘Gaza-Jericho first’ framework. The
Agreement very much reflects the ‘modulatory’ style of governance
established in Oslo, whereby mutual recognition and ‘conditional inferences’
suggest one particular outcome of the peace process, but once the means to
implement the reached understandings are actually negotiated, Israel concedes
grossly less to the Palestinians. Israel manipulated the arrival of PLO forces in
the autonomous areas, an event of great emotional significance for
Palestinians, to its own ends. For Arafat’s constituents ‘the return of thousands
of Palestinians to the West Bank and Gaza was a sign that it is possible to
return to the homeland’.54 But for the Israelis, this ‘return’ was the crux of
complex co-optation. Peres intimates that it was to be a contained precedent:
I fully understood the tremendous political and emotional significance 
for the PLO of such a ‘return’, but I was convinced that this was the 
right step. I was determined to negotiate carefully so as to achieve a 
balanced accord, beneficial to both sides.55
The symbolism of the return was empty and was used solely to advance Israeli
interests. For example, Israeli leaders believed that outside ‘police forces’
would empathise less with the local population and preferred Arafat’s
Palestine Liberation Army, which had been scattered in Arab countries
54Helena Lindholm Schulz, One Year Into Self-Government (Jerusalem: Palestinian 
Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs, 1997): 9.
55Peres, Battling for Peace,337
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throughout the Middle East, to the training of a gendarmerie primarily from 
the West Bank and Gaza.56
The devolution of powers to the PLO-run Palestinian Authority (PA) 
created new cadres of middlemen. Azmi Bishara notes in this regard that:
A new Palestinian elite emerged from [Oslo]. It is composed of 
individuals in Palestinian leadership circles who have become part of 
the fabric of Israeli-Palestinian relations, who approach matters that 
relate to the general interest from the narrowest of perspectives -  that 
of their own vested interests. Certain matters rest in their hands, and 
their commitment to the Palestinian cause has become conditioned by 
their need for permits to pass through Israeli military checkpoints and 
by the commissions they get, thanks to their Israeli connections. 
Having good connections in Israel can make you rich. This group of 
co-opted individuals -  which includes also some former militants and 
prisoners -  has become, in a way, a clientelist network, and for them 
the main issue is how to keep the peace process alive under all 
circumstances. In the process itself their privileges can become a 
source of pressure on them; for example, after any ‘terrorist’ action or 
during Israeli holidays a hermetic closure in the Occupied Territories is 
imposed by Israel. During this closure all permits to pass the 
checkpoints are cancelled including those granted to the so-called 
VIPs. Only members of the exclusive status (VIP 1) -  a new category 
invented by Israel -  are allowed to keep the permits. Only Israel 
defines who and who is not a VIP 1.
My estimate is that the hard core of the new elite consists of a few 
hundred individuals, but the circle of people who have ties with them, 
and therefore benefit from the situation, number in the thousands. The 
group has a hierarchical structure, with several channels connecting 
them to Israel, from officials in the smallest ministry to the responsible 
for security, the economy or civilian coordination. The importance of 
any given individual varies according to Israeli calculations; one 
moment this individual is important, then, someone else is.
This pyramid of VIPs is a new phenomenon for Palestinian society. 
We have had PLO militants and bureaucrats who controlled the purse 
strings for the disbursement of contributions to the resistance 
movement. There have always been those with ties to Jordan, or other 
Arab countries, and their agendas. But being a VIP is something new. 
Israel decides who is a VIP, who has freedom of movement and who 
has the power to make deals.57
56Said K. Aburish, Arafat: From Defender to Dictator (London: Bloomsbury, 1998):
281.
57Azmi Bishara, ‘Reflections on the Realities of the Oslo Process’ in idem George 
Giacaman and Dag Jorund Lonning ed., After Oslo: New Realities, Old Problems (London: 
Pluto Press, 1998): 220-1.
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While empowering the Palestinian VIPs, Israel simultaneously attempted to 
gradually diminish the expectations of the new elites. This phased 
diminishment of expectations is first seen in the structure of the May 1994 
Cairo Agreement. In order for Israel to successfully execute this programme, 
the Palestinians would start to receive successively less than had been 
previously suggested.
The Cairo Agreement began to implement the demands prioritising 
Israeli settlements and security considerations that were first made clear at 
Gressheim (pp. 153-6). As such, the agreement 1) excludes settlements, 
settlers, and settler-related resources (land and water) from any Palestinian 
jurisdiction, interference, or control; 2) limits Palestinian land use near 
settlements; and 3) allows for continuing Israeli control over Palestinian 
zoning and land-use decisions. Regarding security, the agreement committed 
the newly created Palestinian Authority (PA) to maintain the existing system 
of military orders in the occupied territories, the legal basis of the occupation 
established by Israel. Following the August 1993 Israel-PLO understandings 
about ‘flexible phrasing’, the PA won some power to redraft these laws in 
order to better address the civic concerns of the people under its rule. Israel, 
however, retained a veto over all new legislation. Under the Cairo Agreement, 
Palestinian legislation cannot ‘deal with a security issue which falls under 
Israel’s responsibility’, nor can it ‘seriously threaten other significant Israeli 
interests protected by this agreement’.58
The Cairo Agreement gave form to Rabin’s earlier demand that 
redeployment, which would basically draw the map of the Palestinian
58Geoffrey Aronson, ‘Historic Israeli-PLO Accord Leaves Settlements Intact’ Report 
on Israeli Settlements - in the Occupied Territories, Volume 4 Number 4, July 1994: 
http://www.fmep.org/july94.html: 4.
168
territories during the interim period and thus define the nature of the final
status talks, be an issue for Israel’s sole discretion (p. 154). The Israeli
political commentator Hemi Shalev noted in May 1994 that:
Arafat’s arrival [in Gaza] symbolizes the PLO’s liquidation as an 
external, terrorist organization and its conversion into the Palestinians’ 
established political arm, operating in the territories under an Israeli 
eye. This, in actual fact, was the main goal of the Rabin government in 
the entire Oslo process.59
Israel had transformed the PLO from a threat into the guarantor of its presence
in the occupied territories. As previously agreed, the newly defined Jericho
‘area’ in the West Bank was completely surrounded by Israeli controlled
territory. But more significantly, under the terms of the Cairo Agreement,
Israel retained exclusive control over approximately 20 percent of the Gaza
strip: a northern area comprised of three settlements and surrounding land, and
the southern Katif bloc of 12 settlements and their environs. The Israeli
journalist Avraham Tal commented in the wake of the Cairo Agreement that,
‘[u]nder these conditions, the ‘independent government’ of the interim period
lacks all meaning, and from the Palestinian perspective, is pathetic’.60 In order
to lay the actual ground in which the PLO would begin to adjust to a
permanently sub-sovereign arrangement, the agreement created territorially
contiguous blocs of Israeli settlements amidst non-contiguous blocs of
Palestinian autonomy (See Map I, p. 259).
Delaying Negotiations, Shifting Priorities
Israel sought to limit the expansion of Palestinian rule once Arafat had
returned to Gaza in July 1994. Throughout the remainder of the year, Rabin
shared an informal consensus with settler groups of the need to delay the
59Aronson, Settlements and the Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations: An overview.
60Avraham Tal, Ha ’aretz, 6 May 1994, cited in Ibid.
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expansion of Palestinian self-rule and, at the same time, pursue an accelerated
programme of settlement construction in Jerusalem and its West Bank
environs.61 On an official level, Rabin led the Palestinians to believe
otherwise. He cited different reasons why redeployment was being delayed,
namely rooted in security as a number of sensational attacks by Palestinian
militants on Israelis inside Israel and in the occupied territories had occurred
during this period. (See chapter five.) But security, while extremely important
for Rabin, was not his sole motivation for the delay. The negotiations on
redeployment continued haphazardly throughout 1994 and the first half of
1995, providing, from the Israeli perspective, the period for the Palestinian
leadership to begin to adapt to diminished expectations. Azmi Bishara noted in
1995, in the midst of this period ostensibly deadlocked over security:
Look at what Israel is doing on the ground. It is investing millions of 
dollars for an infrastructure of roads that will link up most of the 
Jewish settlements in the West Bank and fragment the Palestinian 
‘areas’ into so many townships. And the end of the day, we can call 
these townships a state if we wish. We can call Arafat an emperor if 
we wish. But the reality is bantustanisation. Now, when the Israeli and 
Palestinian negotiators sit down to negotiate the final status, they are 
going to be the same negotiators who negotiated the bantustans. They 
are going to operate according to the same imbalance of power. If we 
add that, by that time, Israel may also have peace treaties with the 
frontline Arab states, where is the incentive for Israeli withdrawal? The 
aim of autonomy is separation without withdrawal, and it’s realisable. 
Why would the Israelis throw it away?62
The negotiating impasse seems to have been largely of the Rabin 
government’s own making, in order for the PLO leadership to adapt to the 
foothold they had been given in Gaza while Israel consolidated its hold over 
the West Bank. Further evidence for such broad designs can be seen in the
61Ibid.
62Graham Usher, ‘Bantustanisation or Binationalism? An interview with Azmi 
Bishara’ in Uta Klein and Christian Sigrist ed., Prospects o f Israeli-Palestinian Co-Existence 
(Munster, Germany: Lit Verlag, 1996): 142.
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instance on 17 April 1995, when Rabin offered to consider a Palestinian state 
in the Gaza strip if Arafat would forego sovereign claims to the West Bank 
until permanent status negotiations.63
It is worthwhile follow up the observation that the delayed negotiations 
allowed the Israelis to shift their diplomatic priorities. In line with Rabin’s 
views on the need to reach peace agreements because of growing domestic 
war fatigue and the danger of new strategic threats, Israel utilised the 
improved climate promoted by the peace process in order to advance relations 
with its other Arab neighbours. In June 1994, Israel and Jordan signed a 
preliminary agreement ending the state of war between them, and a formal 
peace treaty was signed on 26 October 1994. Soon thereafter, several other 
Arab states established lower-level diplomatic relations and economic ties as 
well. Even Syria agreed, in effect, that its dispute with Israel was no longer 
existential and concerned only the return of the Golan Heights. If these events 
are understood as having occurred within the context of Rabin’s position that 
Israel had asymmetrical rights vis-a-vis the Palestinians, than it can be seen 
that the Palestinians were but a legitimating stepping stone for Israel’s 
integration into the Middle East and, as such, it was only necessary to continue 
to concede the bare minimum to them.
Oslo II: Preserving Israel’s Cardinal Interests
On 28 September 1995, Israel and the PLO initialled the ‘Israel- 
Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip’ (also known 
as ‘Oslo II’ and the ‘Taba Agreement’ for the Egyptian resort where it was 
negotiated.) The agreement outlined the next stage of Israeli redeployment in
63Samuel Segev, Crossing the Jordan: Israel’s Hard Road to Peace (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1998): 364.
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the West Bank and detailed the mechanisms and limits of extending 
Palestinian self-rule beyond the Gaza strip and Jericho to significant portions 
of the West Bank.
The territorial principles intended to make the PLO adjust to a 
permanent sub-sovereign role that were first secured in the Cairo Agreement, 
the creation of territorially contiguous blocs of Israeli settlements amidst non­
contiguous blocs of Palestinian autonomy, were reaffirmed, and expanded 
upon, in the Oslo II agreement. The main feature of the agreement is the 
division of the West Bank into three areas, ‘A’, ‘B’, and ‘C’, each with a 
different mix of Israeli and Palestinian responsibility (See Map II, p. 260). 
‘The true import of the treaty-which aims to end the century-old conflict over 
the lands of Palestine-can not be understood without these maps’.64 Area A, 
which is about 1 percent of the West Bank, consists of the major Palestinian 
cities, in addition to Jericho: Bethlehem, Hebron, Jenin, Kalkilya, Nablus, 
Ramallah, and Tulkarem. (In Hebron, however, a 3.5 sq. km area inhabited by 
400 Israeli settlers and 20000 Palestinians remains entirely under Israeli 
control.) In Area A, the Palestinian Council has complete authority over 
civilians. Area B, which totals 27 percent of the West Bank in which Israel 
retains ‘overriding security responsibility’, consists of all other Palestinian 
population centres. In Area B, powers not related to territory are transferred to 
the Palestinian council. In Area C, comprising 72 percent of the West Bank, 
including all settlements, military bases and areas, as well as ‘state lands’, 
Israel continues to hold full authority. The agreement includes a timetable for
^Geoffrey Aronson, ‘Oslo II Heralds New Era in Israeli-Palestinian Relations’ 
Report on Israeli Settlements in the Occupied Territories, Volume 5 Number 6, November 
1995: http://www.finep.org/july94.html: 3.
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the transfer of undefined parts of Area C to Palestinian control, beginning in
the latter part of 1996. The Oslo II interim accord thus ‘reflects, in large
measure, Israel’s successful effort to preserve what it consider to be its
cardinal interests in the West Bank-principally its demands to remain in
strategic control of the entire area and to preserve its exclusive control over its
settlements and settlers’.65
The Israelis intended Oslo II to be an irreversible path in which the
PLO would have to accept a sub-sovereign role. For Rabin, ‘the Cairo and
Oslo II agreements represented a great victory in his campaign to secure a
permanent Israeli role in the occupied territories. Winning the PLO’s
collaboration in a system of continuing Israeli rule in Gaza and the West Bank
was first among his achievements, he believed’.66 While official rhetoric
suggested otherwise, the interim agreement transformed the Israeli occupation
into a partnership operating with Palestinian consent:
On the ideological level, Rabin, more forcefully than any previous 
leader, repudiated what he called “the hallucination of Greater Israel”-  
which claimed Israel as the exclusive heir to a divinely ordained 
sovereignty throughout “Judea and Samaria.” In the wake of Oslo II, 
one can no longer speak of a single entity called Judea and Samaria, 
but rather many Judeas and Samarias with pieces of the West Bank 
sandwiched among them.67
This transformation was synonymous with what Michael Hardt had called a
‘simulacrum of the social’; it promulgated a departure from past norms, but in
fact was intended to preserve these norms in new form.
65Ibid„ 5.
66Ibid.
67Geoffrey Aronson, ‘Oslo II Heralds New Era in Israeli-Palestinian Relations’ 
Report on Israeli Settlements in the Occupied Territories, Volume 5 Number 6, November 
1995: 5.
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Revealing Speeches
At the onset of Oslo II, there seems not to have been a complete
understanding between the senior Israeli policy makers, Rabin and Peres, on
what would be the exact outline of the permanent status arrangement with the
Palestinians that the agreement was to lead to. Peres’s deputy Yossi Beilin
confirmed as such in an interview on 7 March 1997:
[T]he heart-to-heart talks about “where the process was leading” were 
held only between the sides but not within them. Talks like this were 
held between us and the Palestinians, and later between Likud people 
and Labor people. But within the Labor Party, within the government, 
and within the negotiating team, I don’t recall any genuine discussion 
on a permanent solution.6
This is not to say that the end goals of Rabin and Peres sizably differed. At the
signing of the Oslo II Agreement in September 1995, Peres’s vision was more
developed than that of Rabin. However, both men seemed inclined toward a
common end. Indeed such an understanding is perfectly consistent with the
premise of this study -  that the strategic endeavour at the heart of the Oslo
Accords was not planned per se, but rather was a series of evolving and
somewhat disconnected tactics that nonetheless sought to preserve Israel’s
guiding nationalist vision in changing form.
Rabin discussed the final status arrangement that he broadly intended
the interim agreement to eventually bring about, when he presented Oslo II
before the Israeli parliament on 5 October 1995:
We view the permanent solution in the framework of the State of 
Israel which will include most of the area of the Land of Israel as it 
was under the rule of the British Mandate, and alongside it a 
Palestinian entity which will be home to most of the Palestinian 
residents living in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.
68Idem ‘Interview with Yossi Beilin on the Permanent Status Arrangement’, 
H a’aretz, 7 March 1997.
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We would like this to be an entity which is less than a state, and 
which will independently run the lives of Palestinians under its 
authority. The borders of the State of Israel, during the permanent 
solution, will be beyond the lines which existed before the Six Day 
War. We will not return to the 4 June 1967 lines.69
Rabin also called for the annexation of settlement areas straddling the Israel-
West Bank border and the establishment of extra-territorial Israeli settlement
blocs within the territory of the future, sub-sovereign Palestinian ‘entity’.
Explaining how such an outcome would indeed come to be, the Prime
Minister echoed the principles of ‘modulation’ that had first been grasped by
Peres:
I must emphasise that we have not committed ourselves, and I repeat, 
we have not committed ourselves to the scope of the redeployment at 
each stage. Most importantly, it was defined in the agreement that the 
restrictions on the completion of the redeployment are issues that will 
be discussed on the permanent settlement, as is stated in the Agreement 
itself.. .70
Israel’s Palestinian interlocutors, wishing to maintain the power they had been 
given, would have no choice but to accept the terms that would later be 
imposed on them.
It was Peres who more fully articulated the underlying aims of the Oslo 
II agreement. In his address before the opening of the winter session of the 
Israeli parliament, Peres argued that the structure of the interim agreement, 
which prioritised Israeli over Palestinian national claims, was simply a 
‘natural’ norm:
We have not given up anything we possessed. We have recognized 
a reality in which some parts of the western Land of Israel [meaning 
Palestinian population centres in the West Bank and Gaza strip] were 
not in our possession. Gaza was not in our hands. All we have given up 
is something that we had not possessed in real terms. The people who
69Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, Ratification of the Israeli-Palestinian Interim 
Agreement, Address to the Knesset, 5 October 1995, at Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
internet site, http://www.israel-mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp7MFAHtelO.
70Ibid.
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live in Nablus and Bethlehem are Arabs, not Jews. Why should we be 
their bosses or their police?
We have not forfeited our historical right to the Land of Israel. 
History is not a matter for concessions or changes. However, it is 
similarly impossible to disregard a reality that has taken shape over 
hundreds of years. We are not the ones who partitioned the country; it 
was partitioned between the Jewish population and the Palestinian 
population. It is not the Oslo Agreement that created the map; the map 
created the Oslo Agreement. What we can choose is the type of 
partition we want -  a partition by knives or by agreements. We can 
build a place of eternal strife, or, as one of our leading authors 
proposed, a duplex dwelling.71
The growing demographic presence of the Palestinian people, described in
Peres’s parlance as the ‘reality that has taken shape over hundred of years’,
needed to be politically addressed in order to protect the Jewish national
character of the State of Israel. At the same time, this ‘reality’ did not have the
right to independence. Peres ironically declared that ‘we are not the ones who
partitioned the country’, meaning that Israel was somehow not responsible for
the settlement of Jews in the occupied territories. Since he believed that
settlement was an inalienable Jewish right, the presence of Israeli settlers in
the occupied territories was simply deemed as normal to that of the
Palestinians. He went further, saying that the presence of settlers in the West
Bank, which the international community has decried as a violation of the
Geneva Conventions, was no different than the existence of the Arab minority
in Israel:
Israel has a million Arab citizens, and our relationship with them is 
respectful and free of violence. In the territories there is the same 
composition of population as Israel, though not in the same proportion, 
and there is no reason in the world that the relationship that prevails in 
Israel should not prevail in the territories.72
7'Remarks by Foreign Minister Shimon Peres at the Opening of the Winter Session of 
the Knesset, 23 October 1995, at Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs internet site, 
http://www.israel.org/mfa/go.asp7MFAH016fO.
72Ibid.
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This analogy implicitly conveys that Israel would remain in de facto control 
over the West Bank.
The interim agreement, far from preparing Israelis to digest the idea of 
withdrawal and eventual Palestinian independence, would allow settlers to 
remain permanently alongside the Palestinians. Peres notes that ‘[t]he edifice
7^we are building is based on a change in relations, not in location*. He asks
rhetorically, ‘Is the autonomy a blueprint for a Palestinian state?* His answer
reflects his earlier formulations.
Not necessarily. For example, it also can be a framework including 
demilitarized zones, even an arrangement for areas without 
sovereignty.74
Peres’s answer of ‘not necessarily’ suggests that, in his eyes, the final status 
agreement was to resemble what he had proposed in his 1993 UNESCO 
speech. There would be a Palestinian mini-state in the Gaza strip while the 
‘arrangement for areas without sovereignty’ means that a Palestinian ‘entity’ 
in the West Bank, despite having links to the government in Gaza, would be 
part of a ‘functional’ compromise arrangement with Israel and Jordan. It was 
not to be a territorial compromise. Shalom Yerushalemi, an Israeli journalist, 
confirms this interpretation of Peres’s remarks:
Anyone who heard Peres’s speech at the opening of the Knesset’s 
winter session understands... [that he] would like to stabilize the map 
of the interim settlements, hoping that this will be the permanent map 
of Israel and the Palestinian entity: Neither separation, nor annexation. 
To swallow the Palestinians, but not to eat them. That is why Peres is 
so enthusiastic about the Oslo II accords which gave the Palestinians 
control of about only 27 percent of the West Bank, and left Israel with 
the authority over Palestinian security and foreign affairs. Perhaps that 
is also the reason that he rubbed his hands with glee after the accord 
was signed and said in private conversation at the home of the Chinese 
ambassador, “We screwed the Palestinians.”
73Ibid.
74ru ,j
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Indeed Peres conducted the lengthy [Oslo II] negotiations at Taba 
mainly about the authority to be transferred to the Palestinians and said 
hardly anything about the borders. Peres believes, or want to believe, 
that the 140,000 Jewish settlers will remain in the territories in 
perpetuity, and that no Jewish settlement will ever be evacuated.75
The maintenance of settlements in a functional compromise arrangement
cannot be reconciled with Palestinian independence. Peres’s blunt statement at
the home of the Chinese ambassador concurs with Rabin’s general vision: the
final status talks that were to eventually proceed on the basis of the Oslo II
Agreement would result in a continued degree of Palestinian autonomy, but
not true sovereignty.
A Destabilising Effect?
The Israelis managed to secure Palestinian signatures to the interim 
agreements. But how effective was the Rabin government in actually 
implementing ‘control society’ forms of governance? The following chapter 
details the destabilising effect that designs akin to complex co-optation had on 
the autonomy regime headed by Yasser Arafat.
75Shalom Yershalemi, ‘Trying to Understand Peres’ Maariv, 25 October 1995, in 
Israel Shahak, ‘Translations From Israeli Hebrew Language Newspapers’, Washington Report 
on Middle East Affairs February/March 1996, 117-118, http://www.washington-
report.org/backissues/0296/9602018.html.
Chapter Five 
An Extra-Dialectical Condition
It will be recalled from chapter two that Gilles Deleuze noted the 
phenomenon of subcontracting as being particularly emblematic of ‘control 
societies’ (pp. 75-6). Such a observation relates intimately to the subject of 
this chapter: Israel’s subcontracting of its security to the PLO, the on-the- 
ground relationship between Yasser Arafat’s Palestinian Authority (PA) and 
the Rabin government in 1994 and 1995. The chapter recounts these events, 
highlighting crises in particular. In this context, it discusses how Arafat 
instated a system of personalised authoritarianism, a means of rule that, while 
corrupt and undemocratic, nonetheless indicated a genuine commitment to a 
co-operative relationship with Israel and diplomatic resolution of the conflict. 
It suggests that the failure of the Rabin government to wholly embrace 
Arafat’s modus operandi to its advantage, and its seemingly contradictory 
practice of disempowering its partner in peace instead, can best be understood 
as traits of an ‘extra-dialectical’ condition that had come to define the 
relationship between Israel and the PLO after Oslo.
Differing Conceptions of Security 
Rabin and Arafat had differing conceptions of what the subcontracting 
of security entailed. These disparate approaches emerged immediately after 
the DoP implementation talks began in October 1993. There was great discord 
over what were to be the means by which Arafat would ‘eliminate terrorism’. 
It will be recalled from chapter four that Rabin had assumed during the DoP 
negotiations that Arafat would accept Israeli security dictates without 
qualification, the PLO Chairman would act in the same Draconian manner
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towards Palestinian militants as Rabin had done during the intifada and in the
Hamas deportation episode (pp. 128-9). Arafat’s position in response to
Rabin’s demands is well illustrated in a December 1993 meeting held in Tunis
between the Palestinian leader and the Israeli Minister of Housing, the reserve
general Benjamin Ben-Eliezer. Arafat told Ben-Eliezer:
I understand your security concerns. However, instead of a civil war in 
the Gaza Strip, I prefer to try to integrate the fundamentalist 
groups-Hamas and Islamic Jihad-into my future administration.1
It is thus necessary to examine the interplay of these two disparate approaches.
How Sincere was Arafat?
Yasser Arafat has a reputation for duplicity and many have speculated
that his reticence to accept Rabin’s security programme was because he did
not ‘irrevocably abjure violence, unleashing it if not by command, then by a
subtle acquiescence’.2 In other words, it is assumed that Arafat was still
committed to the use of violence to help his political cause and thus did not
prevent attacks by Palestinian militants as a sort of roundabout negotiating
tactic to pressure Israel to further withdraw from the West Bank and Gaza
strip. But this was not the case in 1994-1995, during the Rabin administration.
Yasser Arafat was committed to a diplomatic, political resolution of the
conflict with Israel because it was the only viable option for his political
survival. But it was this same base self-interest, and the resulting desire to
consolidate his rather tenuous authority vis-a-vis the Islamic opposition, that
often caused him to take a somewhat cavalier attitude toward the letter of the
Oslo Accords. For instance, after Arafat’s arrival in the autonomous areas in
hdem Samuel Segev, Crossing the Jordan: Israel’s Hard Road to Peace (New York:
St. Martin’s Press, 1998): 354.
2Ibid., 351.
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July 1994, there was an intensified Palestinian effort to smuggle arms and
ammunition into the Gaza strip, through tunnels from Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula
and by sea.3 Similarly, he was prone to idiosyncratic behaviour and verbal
posturing -  devices that were meant to veil the scope of his concessions to
Israel and to gradually bring the majority of the Palestinian population under
his fold, but which frequently gave his Israeli interlocutors the impression that
he still sanctioned violence as a negotiating strategy.
A telling example of Arafat’s diplomatically uncouth style of face-
saving and intended populist inclusion can be seen on 10 May 1994, when
shortly after the signing of the Cairo Agreement, the PLO Chairman addressed
a crowd of worshippers at a mosque in Johannesburg, South Africa:
Now, after this agreement, which is the first step and nothing more 
than that, believe me -  a lot remains to be done. The jihad will 
continue. Jerusalem is not only of the Palestinian people, but of the 
entire Islamic nation ... After this agreement you must understand that 
our main battle is not to get the maximum out of them here and there. 
The main battle is over Jerusalem. I regard this agreement no more 
than the agreement signed between our prophet Muhammad and the 
Quraysh in Mecca. We must remember that Caliph Umar refused to 
accept this agreement and considered it an ‘inferior peace agreement’. 
However, the prophet Muhammad accepted it, and now we accept the 
agreement, but in order to continue on the way to Jerusalem. Together 
and not alone.4
Arafat’s reference to early Islamic history could suggest that he was never 
truly committed to the Oslo Accords. After all, in 627 AD the prophet 
Muhammad reached a ten-year truce with the stronger Quraysh tribe in 
Mecca; but when the pagan rivals violated the agreement after only two years, 
the Muslim forces overtook them. In this context, Arafat appears to suggest 
that he never intended to seek a long-term conciliation with Israel, to make the
3Ibid, 366.
4Ha'aretz, 23 May 1994.
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concessions required to reach a final status agreement. Similarly, his talk of 
jihad seems to convey that he in no way sought to make the transformation 
from revolutionary leader to statesman, that he viewed the Oslo Accords 
solely as a mechanism to create a PLO-controlled state. But this was not so 
and the speech was only bravado. In the immediate wake of the Cairo 
Agreement, in which sweeping concessions had been made to Israel (pp. 166- 
171), it was necessary for Arafat to tout his nationalist and Islamic credentials. 
He intended to continue his commitments to Israel, but in order to do so he felt 
it was necessary to invoke imagery and to undertake populist actions that were 
bound to be unpalatable to the Israelis.
Arafat’s particular modus operandi did not mean that he sanctioned 
terrorism against Israel. He did in fact act to prevent violent deeds from 
occurring, but not solely through the means that Rabin had expected of him. 
The official Palestinian responses to crises that arose in 1994-1995, a 
potentially successful system of control was that was considerably undermined 
by the actions of the Rabin government, cannot be understood without first 
relaying the central operative dynamic and structure of the Arafat regime.
Personalised Authoritarianism
Immediately upon arriving in Gaza, Yasser Arafat established a 
dictatorial regime. His consolidation of power in such a manner disappointed 
many Palestinians, but it was not at odds with the agreements that were 
reached between the PLO and Israel. It could even be said that the 
authoritarianism of the Palestinian Authority, as well as its anti-institutional 
personalisation of power, fostered a better climate in which to negotiate with 
Israel. Israeli leaders have typically found many advantages in dealing with
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Arab strongmen. President Anwar Sadat of Egypt, for example, was not 
accountable to the vagaries of domestic public opinion when he travelled to 
Jerusalem in November 1977.5 The Israelis often praised the ‘steadfastness’ of 
King Hussein of Jordan and even spoke of Hafez al-Assad as a potential 
partner in peace, noting in particular how the Syrian dictator continued to 
honour his 1974 separation-of-forces agreement with Israel. In the same 
manner, Arafat was perfectly willing to stifle dissent to advance his own 
interests, which included providing suitable security for his Israeli 
interlocutors.
In order to consolidate their own power, the PLO ‘outsiders’ who 
arrived in the West Bank and Gaza strip in 1994 instituted a system of 
personalised authoritarianism.6 ‘Personalised authoritarianism is the rational 
political response to the problems of power consolidation for a returning 
leadership socially and politically removed from the realities of Palestinian life 
since 1967’.7 Because its authority to govern ultimately came from Israel, the 
PLO had to create a politics antithetical to the system of decentralised 
decision-making that had emerged locally during the intifada. If it were to 
continue to receive Israeli sanction, the PLO could not maintain the tradition 
in which ‘neighbourhood, village, town and regional popular committees
o
formed a highly diffuse decision-making ‘structure” . After all, there was the 
likelihood that popular protest given expression in these institutions would 
oppose the concessions that would have to be made to Israel, and thus
5William Quandt, ‘Democracy’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73 No. 4 (Jul./Aug. 1994): 2.
6Glenn E. Robinson, Building a Palestinian State: The Incomplete Revolution 
(Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1997): 174.
7Glenn E. Robinson, ‘The Growing Authoritarianism of the Arafat Regime’, 
Survival, vol. 39, no. 2, Summer 1997,48.
8Ibid.
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destabilise Arafat’s authority. In order to permanently stifle these voices, the 
PLO ‘outsiders’ therefore implemented a new, authoritarian system based on 
personalities.
Authoritarianism and personalism, in this case, were not the natural 
results of some teleological political culture or even the by-product of 
the psychology of Yasir Arafat. Rather, these two intertwined 
phenomena were the result of the political logic of state-building in the 
unusual circumstances of Palestine. Ruling by decree limited the 
necessity of “doing politics” in Gaza and the West Bank -  that is, 
directly engaging a vibrant civil society -  a task which the “outsiders” 
were little prepared to undertake and at which they may not have been 
terribly successful. At the same time, the personalisation of politics 
directly undermined the core political strength of the new elite, which 
was collective action through institution building. Rather than play into 
the strength of the “inside” PLO, the PA changed the rules of the 
game, emphasizing personalism, demoblization, and deinstitutionalism 
instead.9
Proximity to key individuals, not institutions, would define the distribution of 
power in the Palestinian autonomous areas. In order to achieve this aim, an 
environment of confusion was deliberately fostered in terms of political 
hierarchy. ‘The key bit of evidence to suggest that such confusion is deliberate 
and not just the by-product of creating a new polity is the sustenance of 
ambiguous lines o f authority throughout the PA’.10
The absence of a clear chain of command built on a method of rule that 
Arafat had used before with success in Lebanon and Tunis, a form of order 
that has been described as ‘one boss but a thousand franchises’.11 In this 
system, horizontal forces without clear hierarchy vie with each other in order 
to gain the attention of Arafat, the ‘boss’ who controls the distribution of the 
spoils of power and is thus never challenged by a unified opposition. In the 
PA, the ‘franchises’ were concentrated within four broad areas: police and
9Robinson, Building a Palestinian State: The Incomplete Revolution, 181-2.
l0Emphasis added, Ibid., 186
nEhud Ya’ari, ‘Can Arafat Govern?’, Jerusalem Report, 13 January 1994: 27.
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security forces; ‘state’ bureaucrats; the notable social class; and a 
reconstructed cadre system from Arafat’s Fatah faction of the PLO.
The police and security forces comprise the prime component of the 
Arafat regime, as a result of their frequently used coercive authority. 
Reflecting the PA Chairman’s organisational preferences, there is no 
functioning chain of command and the heads of four different police and 
security forces report directly to Arafat. ‘Such fragmentation is purposeful, 
preventing the emergence of a strong and unified security apparatus which 
might pose political problems for Arafat in the future’.12 This structure of 
fragmentation allowed in particular for an effective ‘carrot and stick’ approach 
to be used with militant opponents of the regime, particularly from Hamas and 
Islamic Jihad. For example, many, but not all of the leaders and personnel of 
these services are returning ‘outside’ Palestinians, insuring loyalty against 
‘inside’ discontent. The implicit message to the Palestinian man on the street 
was that political misbehaviour would warrant heavy-handed treatment by 
‘outsider’ police. Indeed, security forces composed of ‘outsiders’, such as the 
civil police in Gaza city headed by Ghazi Jabali, have been known to arrest, 
torture, and kill members of opposition groups who jeopardise the viability of 
the regime. On the other hand, security forces made up largely of ‘insider’ 
Palestinians, such as the Preventive Security Force (PSF) run by Jibril Rajoub 
in Jericho and Muhammad Dahalan in Gaza City, have been used successfully 
to promote dialogue and rally support for the PA. Many Palestinians, even in 
the Islamic opposition, regard the leadership and personnel of the PSF as
12Robinson, Building a Palestinian State: The Incomplete Revolution, 178.
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representing authentic Palestinian nationalism.13 But it must be noted that the 
PSF has been just as effective in implementing the PLO-Israeli security 
understandings.14
The bureaucracy is the second most important element of the Arafat 
political base, heavily anchored in a system of political patronage. When 
families of civil servants are included, for example, more than one-quarter of 
people in the Gaza strip are dependent on the PA for their livelihood.15 
Although the patronage machine is not as pronounced in the West Bank, the 
extensive distribution of ‘state’ jobs throughout the Palestinian territories did 
successfully foster dependency on, and hence support for, Yasser Arafat and 
the PA. In effect, Arafat attempted to gradually extend the web of the VIP 
system established by Israel that linked the personal self-interest of Palestinian 
administrators with Israeli security considerations (p. 167).
Arafat incorporated members of the formerly dominant, land-owning 
Palestinian elite, or ‘notables’, into his political base. This was an especially 
shrewd political move. ‘[G]iven their long political history and their still 
respectable resources, notables could confer upon the PA a certain
13See, for example, ‘Interview with Mahmud Zahhar’ Journal o f Palestine Studies 
Vol. 24, no. 3 (spring 1995): 81-89.
14In January 1994, Rajoub and Dahalan held security coordination meetings in Rome 
with Ya’acov Peri, head of the Israeli internal security police, and General Amnon Shahak, the 
Israeli deputy chief of staff, who was appointed chief Israeli negotiator. Because of political 
sensitivities that were involved, the meeting did not reach a formal accord, but rather a kind of 
tacit agreement instead. ‘This boiled down to modus vivendi where, in return for intelligence 
on the Palestinian opposition and especially the Islamists...[the Israelis] would grant Dahalan 
and Rajub free rein to create a de facto police force throughout the West Bank and Gaza, both 
before and during Israel’s redeployment from these areas’ (Graham Usher, ‘The Politics of 
Internal Security: The PA’s New Intelligence Services’ Journal o f Palestine Studies XXV, no. 
2 (Winter 1996): 27). ‘Free rein’ meant that ‘Fateh armed bands...will be charged with putting 
down any sign of opposition [to Oslo]; the intent is for them to administer show-punishments 
at the earliest possible stage, aimed at creating proper respect for the new regime (Ehud 
Ya’ari, ‘Can Arafat Govern?’: 23). On 18 September 1994, in response to a question in the 
Israeli cabinet, Yitzhak Rabin acknowledged that PSF personnel were operating throughout 
the West Bank in pursuit of suspects and opponents and in complete cooperation with Israeli 
security forces (Ha ’aretz, 19 September 1994).
15Robinson, Building a Palestinian State: The Incomplete Revolution, 178.
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respectability’.16 Yet, the position of the once-powerful notables had greatly 
diminished since 1967 and this class no longer had an autonomous base from 
which to oppose Arafat’s authority. At the same time, the notables owed their 
newfound political positions directly to Arafat, and it was to the PA that their 
loyalty was given. Since the wielding of authority of the old land-owning class 
remained a powerful memory in the Palestinian areas, Arafat was able to 
harness the strong clan loyalties (al hamula) that were still linked to these 
personalities to his own political advantage. Also, because such a move 
implicitly conveyed that the PA was the heir to an ‘aristocratic’ legacy rather 
than a democratic one, it had the benefit of further marginalizing those former 
intifada activists who remained a potential threat to the Arafat regime. 
‘Rolling back the partial gains of the Intifada brought added security to 
Arafat’s own position; there was no better symbol of this than making the 
notable social class a bedrock of PA power’.17
Arafat’s political faction of the PLO, Fatah, is also a pillar of PA rule. 
As the largest single faction of the PLO, Fatah contains many activists and 
institution builders who had helped mobilise Palestinian society before and 
during the intifada. Although decisions were often taken in the field and 
institutions run with regard to the local context, these cadres remained loyal to 
the PLO in Tunis. In line with his efforts to consolidate his authority, Arafat 
had to neutralize locally popular and partially autonomous cadres within 
Fatah. ‘Loyalist cadres -  numbering in the thousands -  were retained, while 
those with substantial autonomy were removed from decision-making
l6Ibid.,179. For a more detailed account of the past political power of Palestinian 
notables, see Muhammad Muslih, The Origins o f Palestinian Nationalism (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1988).
,7Ibid.
positions and were replaced’.18 But despite its reconstitution, Fatah preserved 
much of the important social structures, such as labour unions, women’s 
committees, voluntary works organisations and student blocs, which had 
catered to the everyday needs of the Palestinian population during the 
uprising. By preserving a semblance of these popular organisations, Fatah 
prevented the formation of a destabilising social vacuum that might have been 
completely filled by the Islamic opposition. The faction served another vital 
function in the PA. Although Fatah was not formally linked to the executive in 
Gaza, its leaders were nonetheless implicitly linked with it, and so for 
example, were quietly mandated by Arafat with a two-fold role: to cultivate a 
dialogue with the political leadership of Hamas, but to simultaneously ‘seek 
out and neutralise’ the independent military cells of the Islamic organisation 
that were planning attacks against Israeli targets.
The Security Relationship: An Extra-Dialectical Condition 
What value could a system that combined gross patronage, a deliberate 
lack of governing transparency, and a mass proliferation of police forces have 
played for the peace process? Personalised authoritarianism, while hardly 
constituting the ideal arrangement to advance conciliation and cooperation 
with Israel, was of worth because it was reconcilable to, capable of 
harmonising and integrating with, Israeli security requirements. Or in other 
words, to use the Hegelian concepts employed by Michael Hardt (pp. 78-92), 
the operative dynamic of the Arafat regime had the potential to be dialectically 
amenable with the interests of the Israeli state under Rabin.
18Ibid.
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A ‘dialectical’ scenario did not come about. It will be recalled from
chapter three that Rabin’s evaluative criterion for security was rather one­
dimensional in nature; this standard was bound to nationalist considerations 
(as reflected in the preservation and maintenance of Israeli settlements), and, 
reflecting his asymmetrical views of Israeli and Palestinian rights, was largely 
indifferent to Arafat’s face-saving requirements and operating constraints (pp. 
106-113). As such, the likelihood of a dialectical synthesis, which in terms of 
Israeli-Palestinian relations was comparable to an new arrangement that found 
satisfiers to successfully meet the needs and interests of both sides (security 
and a prelude to sovereignty), was essentially precluded.19 The previous 
‘dialectical’ aim for the Palestinians of the occupied territories, the intended 
synthesis of old forms of their identity with the ‘higher’ norms of the Israeli 
state, can be discerned from earlier Israeli political programmes that were 
meant to address the status of the Palestinians, the aforementioned ‘Jordanian 
option’ and post-1989 autonomy plans (pp. 106-119). Inherent to both 
proposals was a conception of the Palestinians as ‘folk residents’ to be 
acclimated to a sub-national political status under the continued aegis of the 
Israeli state. The Israeli recognition of the PLO as the official representative of 
the Palestinian people in 1993 and as its partner in the interim self-government 
arrangements should have logically overridden this previous dialectical aim.
,9In contrast, during the Camp David negotiations, Israel and Egypt were successfully 
able to come to such a ‘dialectical’ arrangement over the related issue of security versus 
sovereignty. Egypt demanded that the Sinai Peninsula, which Israel had occupied in the June 
1967 war, be returned in exchange for a peace treaty. Israel insisted on keeping the territory 
for security reasons, as the large expanse served as a buffer to separate Israel proper from 
Egyptian forces. But American mediators were able to reconcile the two positions by 
reframing the concepts of sovereignty and security in a manner that was acceptable to both 
sides. Israel agreed to evacuate the Sinai, to have the territory be restored to Egyptian 
sovereignty, in exchange for guarantees of the permanent demilitarisation of the peninsula and 
the presence of a US-led border monitoring force therein. See Roger Fisher, William Ury, and 
Bruce Patton, Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In (New York: Penguin 
Books, 1991): 41-2.
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But a new synthesis of the two opposing national claims, one that resulted in 
recognition of the bi-nationality of the land, did not come about. Instead, an 
extra-dialectical condition emerged that, as the view of Raz-Krakotzkin 
conveyed in chapter one (p. 54), still sought to consolidate the predominance 
of the Israeli association with the land.
Israeli conflict management strategies for the Palestinians had assumed 
‘control society’ forms of rule and hence were no longer open to any possible 
‘unification of opposites’. The nature of security reflected that a bi-national 
synthesis of perspectives had not come about. A bi-national perspective 
recognises both the Israeli and Palestinian claims to the land as equals. A 
security approach rooted in such a view would translate into an equal 
prioritisation of the long-term approach to achieving stability and security of 
the national leaderships of both sides. It would neither ignore, nor only be 
expected to prioritise the immediate safety concerns of just one of the parties, 
Israel. As such, Arafat’s intent to slowly incorporate Hamas and Islamic Jihad 
into his political ambit would be viewed as a viable option to be fostered and 
encouraged to strengthen the overall security of both sides. But no Israeli 
recognition of this sort occurred. As the aforementioned quote by Michael 
Hardt relayed (p. 88), in the extra-dialectical condition, ‘[w]hat is subsumed,
what is accepted into the process, is no longer a potentially conflictive force
0 (\but a product of the system itself. After the inauguration of the Palestinian 
Authority in May 1994, this phenomenon manifested tangibly as a kind of 
Israeli hyper-management of the security role of the PA. It is certainly true 
that the PLO had assented to a junior partner status in the Oslo Accords, but
20Idem Michael Hardt, ‘The Withering of Civil Society’ in Eleanor Kaufman and 
Kevin Jon Heller ed., Deleuze and Guattari: New Mappings in Politics, Philosophy and 
Culture (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998): 35.
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the Israeli attitude toward the PA that emerged after the Cairo Agreement was
one of expected subservience and extreme indifference to the mood of the
Palestinian ‘street*. Rabin often acted toward his Palestinian partners as if they
were mere hirelings.
The Rabin government did not intentionally seek to vitiate Arafat.
Indeed, throughout 1994 and 1995:
...Israel sought to rule (as far as security matters were concerned) 
indirectly through the PA. Even when it did not believe the PA was 
doing enough [against Islamic militants], Israel had to lie low in order 
to bolster the PA’s legitimacy and independence in the eyes of its own 
people.21
Yet despite an official policy that was intended to shore up the Palestinian 
leadership, Arafat’s regime was considerably damaged by a series of actions 
taken by the Rabin government. This contradictory behaviour finds 
correspondence in the very tensions that embody the ‘control society’. It will 
be recalled from chapter two that the forms of ‘control’ increase subjection to 
dominant forces by allowing for greater perceptions of emancipation, and then 
by contrasting these new systems to the preceding, more restrictive forms of 
governance (pp. 74-5). But even in the midst of this process of improvement, 
the key traits of prior systems of order are only ostensibly transmuted and do 
not completely disappear (p. 71). It was shown in the previous chapter how the 
Rabin administration proceeded to enfranchise, and then offered gradually 
diminishing concessions to the PLO-run PA (pp. 164-178), the equivalent of 
the relative empowerment of the ‘control society’. Yet at the same time that 
Israel began to consolidate these gains, the efficacy of its new economy of 
power was slowly being jeopardised. Additional measures were taken, in
21Robinson, Building a Palestinian State: The Incomplete Revolution, 190.
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response to a number of security crises, that likely undermined a long-term, 
successful effort akin to complex co-optation from taking hold. While Rabin 
did have legitimate concerns about the safety of his own constituents, he took 
a series of responsive measures that only served to antagonise and collectively 
punish the majority of Palestinians, making it seem to them that the new 
circumstances under which they lived were not truly better than before they 
achieved self-rule. Rabin’s actions, seemingly inconsistent with his 
government’s stated goals with regard to the PA, can best be understood as the 
outgrowth of an extra-dialectical condition.
Addressing the Islamic Opposition
The entry of the PLO in the Gaza strip in May 1994 was marked by its 
own misgivings about the Palestinian Islamic movements. In this regard it 
should be understood that Hamas is a mass movement, the only Palestinian 
group capable of posing a challenge to the hegemony of the Fatah-PLO 
controlled PA.22 (Islamic Jihad, on the other hand, is a much smaller 
organisation; but it perceives itself as the vanguard of Palestinian society and 
is thus committed to waging an active and highly visible struggle against 
Israel.23) The Hamas activist Ghazi Hamad notes that since 1987, the growing 
stature of the group had unnerved the leaders of the PLO in Tunis.24 Despite 
amiable dialogues that were held with Arafat’s leadership, Hamas declined to
“ in opinion polls carried out by the Center for Palestine Research and Studies 
between October 1993 and March 1995, Hamas received between 12% and 18% of popular 
support, making it the largest supported movement after Fatah, and the only faction besides 
Fatah to obtain more than 10% of the total support. Cited in Idem Helena Lindholm Schulz, 
One Year Into Self-Government (Jerusalem: Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of 
International Affairs, 1997): 64.
“ interview with Mr. Ala Saftawi, Islamic Jihad sympathiser, cited in Ibid., 69.
24Ghazi A. Hamad, ‘The Relationship Between Hamas and the Palestinian National 
Authority (PNA): The Conflictual Past and the Unknown Future’ in Wolfgang Freud ed., 
Palestinian Perspectives (Frankfurt am Main, Germany: Peter Lang GmbH, 1999): 181.
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be incorporated into the structures of the PLO.25 After 1991, it tended to 
publicly oppose all PLO political and diplomatic initiatives. Hamas later 
opened several offices in neighbouring Arab countries, causing some PLO 
leaders to see the Islamic movement as trying to usurp the PLO position as 
official representative of the Palestinian people. Armed clashes between 
Hamas and PLO supporters occurred in the Gaza strip in 1992 and 1993. 
Moreover, both Palestinian Islamic movements declared their opposition to the 
Oslo Accords and vowed to continue violent actions against Israeli military 
and civilian targets. Indeed, in response to the February 1994 Hebron 
massacre, and despite a PLO-Israel agreement to investigate and take future 
preventive measures against such kinds of events from recurring, the military 
wing of Hamas, the Qassam brigades, bombed Israeli civilian targets in the 
towns of Afula and Hadera in April, killing 21 people total.26
The newly formed PA immediately began to engage the Islamic 
opposition. In spite of past turbulent relations, PLO leaders reasoned that the 
actual emergence of a Palestinian government would create a patriotic 
momentum and hence a conciliatory dynamic to foster links between the 
national and Islamic camps. There is some evidence to support such reasoning. 
After September 1993, Hamas leaders had argued that the DoP would unravel 
before its implementation had even begun, especially after the April 1994 
bombings in Afula and Hadera.27 But this did not occur and the onset of 
Palestinian rule in the Gaza strip was in fact met with widespread jubilation.
25In 1990 Hamas requested integration into the Palestine National Council (PNC), the 
principal decision-making body of the PLO, but with the conditions that it would receive 40- 
50% of total representation and that the PLO make far-ranging ideological concessions.
26The Qassam brigades are named after Sheik Izz al-Din al-Qassam, a radical and 
confrontational Palestinian Muslim leader who led armed campaigns in 1934-35 against 
Jewish settler targets.
27Robinson, Building a Palestinian State: The Incomplete Revolution, 193.
193
This euphoria was especially because the arrival of the PLO was a symbol of 
the Palestinian ‘right of return’, a key element of the Palestinian national 
narrative. In this regard, Hamas publicly welcomed the arrival of the PLO 
administrators and police, and there was a general feeling of good will 
between both groups. The first months of self-rule can be viewed as sort of 
assessment period, in which PA-Hamas dialogues were commonplace. It must 
be noted that Hamas leaders refused to meet personally with Arafat, for such 
an encounter would have conveyed an official endorsement of the PLO’s 
political strategy toward Israel. But in meetings with Arafat’s deputies and 
intermediaries, Hamas representatives largely mollified the apprehensions of 
the PA by stressing that the Islamic movement would not abide infighting or 
any sort of civil war amongst Palestinians. They even agreed to refrain from 
making inflammatory statements that would undermine the legitimacy of the
7 A  ^ # m
PA. At the same time, they refused to abandon armed confrontation, but in a 
manner that suggested they were waiting to see what Arafat would deliver, 
suggested that they ‘would be ready to continue such tactics in the future’, that 
the decision to engage in violence was not inevitable.31 Indeed, the first five 
months of PA rule were free of attacks against Israeli targets.
Arafat’s initial modus vivendi with Hamas was not a total guarantor of 
stability. The operating constraints of the PA related to the diffuse structure of 
the Islamic opposition groups. For example, Hamas, in a manner similar to the 
earlier PLO, had become an umbrella organisation with many different 
elements and factions:
28Hamad,181.
29Ibid., 185.
30Ibid.
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The political and military wings of Hamas had, years before Oslo, 
become independent of each other in order to preserve the vulnerable 
political decision-makers. The military wing came to resemble the 
earlier Islamic Jihad organisation: secretive, small and cell based. 
While there was clearly communication between these two wings, it 
was also clear that neither side controlled the other.32
In order to prevent violent acts against Israeli targets, the PA had to win over
the political leadership and act separately to try to contain the military cells.
But such an act was further complicated by the trans-national structure of the
Islamic opposition, whose leaders were based both inside and outside the
occupied territories. While the differing interests of these two constituencies
were not important during the intifada, sizable differences and goals between
the two communities became apparent after the Oslo Accords. The Diaspora
leadership, based in Amman and Damascus, tended to view Oslo as a process
only of benefit to the Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza strip. The
PA was not able to successfully cultivate ties with this ‘outside’ leadership,
who subsequently provided vast financial and logistical support to militant
elements such as the Qassam brigades.33
Crises
The first crisis that occurred after Arafat’s arrival in Gaza was in fact 
triggered by the actions of an autonomous Hamas military cell. On 9 October 
1994, the cell kidnapped an Israeli soldier, Nachshon Wachsman, and 
demanded the release of 200 Palestinian prisoners in exchange for his safe 
return. Despite any evidence, the Israelis insisted that Wachsman was being 
held in Gaza, in territory under the jurisdiction of the PA. They suspended 
peace negotiations in Cairo and implemented an indefinite closure of the Gaza
32Robinson, Building a Palestinian State: The Incomplete Revolution, 193.
33Ibid., Hamad, 184.
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strip. Arafat publicly condemned the act and vowed to punish the individuals 
who were responsible. The Palestinian security forces then began a methodical 
and extensive search, arresting and forcefully grilling 350 Hamas supporters. 
They even ‘severely interrogated Palestinian journalists on the hunch that 
since they had received Hamas’s message about the kidnapping they must 
know the provenance of the messenger’.34 The information gathered from 
these rather heavy-handed efforts enabled the Israelis to locate Wachsman, 
although the conscript was subsequently killed on 14 October, during a 
botched rescue attempt in the village of Beit Naballah, an area in the West 
Bank still under Israeli control. The central role played by Arafat’s forces in 
assisting the Israelis is most evident, for example, in a statement that Hamas 
issued shortly after the incident which warned the PA to ‘cease supplying 
information on our.. .mujahidin [i.e. military cells] to the Zionist intelligence 
and occupation authorities’.35 But the Israelis continued to blame Arafat and to 
demand a better performance from the Palestinian security apparatus, despite 
the fact that their previous accusations about the whereabouts of the kidnapped 
soldier had been incorrect. The internal closure of the Gaza strip that was 
implemented as an initial response to the kidnapping was kept in place and the 
resulting economic suffering and deprivation only served to foment anger and 
discontent with PA rule.
The Israeli response to the kidnapping seems peculiar. In many ways 
the Palestinian crisis management of the episode represents an ideal for Israel. 
When the military cells acted irrespective of Arafat’s constructive engagement
34Graham Usher, Palestine in Crisis: The Struggle for Peace and Political 
Independence after Oslo (London: Pluto Press, 1997): 69.
35Graham Usher, ‘What Kind of Nation? The Rise of Hamas in the Occupied 
Territories’ Race and Class October-December 1995, 77.
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efforts, he ordered mass arrests without charges, and did not hesitate to use 
forceful interrogations to gather the information required by Israel. As such, 
the actions could have warranted an acknowledgement that the PA had in no 
way been responsible for the abduction, Israel had erred by claiming that its 
soldier was being held in Palestinian controlled areas, and that full security 
cooperation had been given. But such reasoning presupposes an equal 
prioritisation of Israeli and Palestinian interests, which included allowing 
Arafat to save face in front of his constituents. Indeed Hamas was a popular 
social movement, whom the Palestinian leader was trying to court. His acting 
against them was domestically unpopular because it smacked of servitude. But 
if Israel had recognised the contribution of the PA, then Arafat could have 
argued to middle-ground elements within the Palestinian population that 
although the actions he took were painful, they were a necessary component of 
building a strategic relationship with Israel, a process that was delivering 
tangible results to them. A positive Israeli acknowledgement would have been 
such a marked departure from past, contemptuous attitudes toward the 
Palestinians that it would have added weight to the PA argument that security 
cooperation was an inevitable part of a ‘give and take’ process. But the actual 
Israeli reaction, being extra-dialectical in nature, conveyed that the PA was 
simply expected to do Israel’s bidding -  without receiving any empathy or 
expressed appreciation in exchange. (Moreover, as the retention of the closure 
indicated, ‘non-compliance’ would be met by collective punishment.) The 
scornful attitudes predating Oslo were still at play and Arafat was made to 
look like a lackey.
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Israeli actions and demands complicated Arafat’s stabilisation 
techniques. The internal closure of the Gaza strip that remained in place 
created a climate that led to further extremist acts.36 On 19 October Hamas 
claimed responsibility for a bus bombing in Tel Aviv that killed 22 people and 
left 50 wounded. After the bombing, Arafat publicly denounced Hamas as 
‘terrorists’ and ‘conspirators receiving orders from outside to destroy our 
dream of a homeland’. The PA Chairman had repudiated denunciations of 
terrorism for much of his political career and for him to use the term ‘terrorist’ 
to vilify others left a powerful impression on his supporters.38 It signalled an 
impending confrontation with the Islamic opposition. However, Arafat was 
mindful of the domestic political risks that an official crackdown on Hamas 
would entail and so he authorised the ‘independent’ armed Fatah cadres to 
pressure the group into quiescence. But these tactics were unacceptable to the 
Israelis, who demanded an official and visibly coercive clampdown instead. 
PA Planning Minister Nabil Sha’ath commented on the net effect of Israeli 
pressure tactics during this period: ‘I would suggest not making Arafat look 
like an Israeli agent, like an “Uncle Tom” serving his masters...the effect on 
us is devastating’.39
Dissatisfied with what they perceived as inaction by the PA, the 
Israelis chose to act unilaterally. Exercising the rights to ‘pre-emptive 
intervention’ and retaliation against Palestinian militants that were guaranteed 
by the Accords, Israeli undercover units assassinated a number of leaders 
affiliated with Hamas and Islamic Jihad, inside areas under the control of the
36Idem Hanan Ashrawi, This Side o f Peace (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994):
12.
37Usher, ‘What Kind of Nation? The Rise of Hamas in the Occupied Territories’ ,77.
38Idem Said K. Aburish, Arafat: From Defender to Dictator, 286
39New York Times, 9 November 1994.
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PA. Alluding to the efforts of the Palestinian security forces, Arafat made a 
personal appeal to Rabin to desist; he argued that by taking such actions 
within areas under PA jurisdiction and without consulting him, Israel was 
threatening him in the eyes of his constituency.40 For example, On 2 
November, Rabin authorised the assassination of the Islamic Jihad leader Hani 
Abed in Khan Yunis, a city in the Gaza strip under PA rule. After their chiding 
by Fatah cadres, Arafat had been successfully attempting to cultivate a new 
dialogue with the Islamic opposition groups.41 But the killing, which had been 
particularly spectacular, rendered Arafat’s conciliatory efforts null and void. 
Attending Abed’s funeral on 3 November, for example, the Palestinian leader 
was personally denounced as a collaborator and even physically attacked by 
angry crowds.42
The Israelis were not unaware of the need to strengthen their junior 
partner. ‘Rabin felt that after Arafat’s chilling experience in Gaza [at the Abed 
funeral] and in an effort to contain the constant erosion in Arafat’s popularity, 
Israel should take some steps to enhance his personal position’ 43 At a meeting 
held with Arafat at the Erez checkpoint on the Israel-Gaza strip ‘border’ on 8 
November, Rabin proposed that intensive negotiations should commence in 
Cairo, in order to resolve the remaining issues relating to the extension of 
Palestinian self-rule to areas in the West Bank outside of Jericho. At the Erez 
meeting, which has been described as the first truly successful personal 
meeting between Rabin and Arafat since the signing of the DoP in September
40Aburish, 286.
4lUsher, ‘The Politics of Internal Security: The PA’s New Intelligence Services’, 31.
42Aburish, 286-7.
43Segev, 364.
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1993,44 Rabin explained that the eventual Israeli redeployment of forces in the 
West Bank would be commensurate on Arafat’s fulfilling of security 
requirements. Arafat in turn reiterated the PA commitment to curb acts of 
terrorism. He acted in response, for example, on 11 November when an 
Islamic Jihad suicide bomber on a motorcycle (who was acting in retaliation 
for the assassination of Hani Abed) killed 3 Israeli soldiers and left 12 injured 
at the Netzarim military checkpoint in the Gaza strip. The Palestinian police 
soon thereafter arrested more than 140 people suspected of supporting Islamic 
Jihad.
The most extreme PA responses against the Islamic opposition did not 
satisfy the Israelis. On 18 November, Palestinian police used live ammunition 
to break up a Hamas and Islamic Jihad anti-Oslo rally in Gaza city, killing 
sixteen and wounding over 200. The Palestinian police had been expecting 
these protesters affiliated with the Islamic opposition, some 2000 in number, 
who had begun marching after attending Friday prayers in the city’s central 
mosque. The demonstrators had in particular been condemning Arafat’s ‘total 
complicity’ in recent Israeli security operations and were demanding his 
resignation. In the wake of the event, Hamas leaders maintained that the 
Palestinian police had open fire against the protesters without provocation.45 
They claimed further that the PA head of police in the Gaza strip, Nasser 
Yousef, had planned the shootings and thus would be targeted for 
assassination.46 The PA denied premeditative responsibility for the events and 
set up a commission of inquiry instead. While Hamas refused to participate in 
the commission, it did agree to the PA’s proposal for a temporary truce on 20
“ Ibid.
45Hamad, 181.
46Segev, 365.
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November. In a meeting in Washington with US President Bill Clinton on 21 
November, Rabin was reported to have expressed his extreme frustration that 
Arafat had called a truce and had not ‘finished the job’ against Hamas 
instead.47 During a personal meeting with Arafat in Madrid on 30 November, 
Rabin angrily rebuked the PA Chairman for his failure to ‘curb terrorism’, for 
not using the protests as a pretext to completely annihilate the infrastructure of 
the Islamic opposition.48 Arafat was said to have declared his total 
commitment to the peace process, and pleaded for understanding of ‘the 
critical situation facing all of us’ 49 He told Rabin ‘I cannot do more without 
imprisoning all my people’.50 Rabin showed no inclination to assist Arafat on 
this subject and instead limited the Palestinian leader’s options.
The Israeli security positions and actions toward the PA during the 
tension-laden period in October and November 1994 can be viewed as very 
pronounced examples of an extra-dialectical condition. Contrary to the 
position of some Palestinian opponents of the Oslo Accords, the Rabin 
government was not wilfully out to ‘destroy’ Arafat.51 The constant invocation 
and utilisation of the asymmetrical security relationship between Israel and the 
PA was simply the norm of a ‘control society’ form of governance. The 
guiding logic of this new condition was about recognition and empowerment 
of the PLO on Israeli terms. Evaluation of Palestinian performance was simply 
not open to Arafat’s alternative system of satisfiers. For example, Arafat did 
not appear opposed in principle to the series of assassinations undertaken by 
Israel during this period, since those singled out by the Israelis were hostile to
47Ibid.
48Ibid, 366.
49Aburish, 286.
50Ibid.
5,Ibid., 366.
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5 2  •him as well. Arafat’s objection was more a matter of economy. He sought to 
be informed if such ‘eliminations’ were to occur in areas technically under his 
control so he could prepare the requisite damage control measures beforehand. 
But this was not an option Israel would consider. While the Israelis were 
cognizant of the need to keep Arafat strengthened, as the 8 November meeting 
in Erez shows, they refused to see any utility in his ‘carrot’ strategies 
concerning the Islamic opposition. Since the recognition of their Palestinian 
partners was not bi-national in orientation, their conflict management 
strategies were not a synthesis of opposing national perspectives, and they 
therefore did not accord equal weight to Arafat’s means to attain stability and 
security. They simply expected a massive clampdown, for Arafat to have no 
qualms about gunning down his own people. The PA was expected to be just 
another deployment of force at the disposal of the Israeli state -  not unlike its 
undercover assassination units, ‘a product of the system itself.
Arafat Changes Style
Arafat did decide to change his style of governance. The adjustment 
seems to have been prompted by a meeting that was held with Rabin and Peres 
in Oslo on 10 and 11 December, after the awarding of their shared Nobel 
Peace Prize. In light of the deteriorating situation, Rabin presented two 
alternative scenarios to Arafat.53 The first stipulated proceeding with the Oslo 
Accords, but at a reduced pace, until Israeli security needs were met. The 
second proposed a ‘symbolic’ Israeli withdrawal from the major cities of the 
West Bank, so as to allow elections for the Palestinian legislative council to
52Usher, ‘What Kind of Nation? The Rise of Hamas in the Occupied Territories’, 65-
81.
53Segev, 366.
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occur, but for the actual implementation discussions of the redeployment to 
resume afterward, again after Israeli security concerns had been satisfied. 
Arafat rejected both options and insisted on adherence to the original 
timetable. But the very real prospect of reformulations and delays to an 
agreement that he already felt was to his disadvantage appears to have 
prompted the Palestinian leader to modify his general style of management to 
give even greater consideration to Israeli security demands. This is not to say 
that the Palestinian leader intended to altogether abandon his non-coercive 
techniques of conflict management. Indeed, in the wake of the social upheaval 
following the massacre in Gaza, for example, Fatah, Arafat’s unofficial arm in 
the autonomous areas, had procured a ‘non-aggression’ pact with the four 
main secular political movements in the PA areas on 25 November.54 (The 
agreement, which was upgraded to include the PA as well as Hamas on 12 
December, guaranteed the right to demonstrate and obliged all signatories to 
uphold public order.55) But once these efforts had achieved a basic stability, 
Arafat had resolved that the active use of force would have to feature more 
prominently in an attempt to create a loyal opposition.
Arafat altered the nature of his ‘carrot and stick’ approach towards 
Hamas and Islamic Jihad. ‘At base, what Arafat sought to do was split Hamas 
so that the military wing could be more easily crushed while the political wing 
could be a partner in the political process’.56 Indeed academic observers of 
Hamas believed during this period that if the Islamic movement’s political
54These included the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), the 
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Palestinian Democratic Federation 
Party (Fida), and the Palestine People’s Party (PPP).
55The full list of signatories included the PA, Fatah, PFLP, DFLP, PPP, Hamas, Fida, 
and the Popular Struggle Front.
56Robinson, Building a Palestinian State: The Incomplete Revolution, 192.
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leaders ‘were to achieve what they consider a fair deal in terms of power 
sharing, they would find a way to join the Authority’.57 Arafat merely intended 
to lower the threshold level of their demands through compulsion. (This 
refinement was essentially a reversal of his original strategy, which had been 
to emphasise common interests and cultivate a relationship with the Islamic 
movements, resorting to force only as a last resort.) His new, ongoing 
‘clobbering’ tactic was enacted soon after a double suicide bombing killed 21 
people at Beit Lid, near the Israeli town of Netanya on 23 January 1995.58 The 
PA Chairman did intend to reinitiate contacts after several months, but only 
after the enormity of his resolve had been fully digested.
Extreme measures were implemented to deal with domestic opponents 
of the PA. In addition to the coercive means of control that he had previously 
employed, Arafat issued an executive decree creating ‘special state security 
courts’. These notorious tribunals ‘operate independently of the civilian 
judiciary system, allow secret evidence, brook no appeal procedures, and are 
‘judged’ by PLO military personnel appointed by the PA’.59 During 1995, the 
PA authorities gave no advance notice of these trials, all of which were held 
secretly and, except for one case, reportedly took place in the middle of the
57Interview with Dr. Ziad Abu Amr, Beir Zeit University. Cited in Lindholm Schulz, 
65. In a similar vein, Lindholm Schulz notes: ‘In effect, Islamist movements in general and 
Hamas in particular, do not represent stubborn rejectionism, as often claimed. Hamas has 
different trends, with more or less conciliatory approaches. The moderate trend does not per se 
reject compromise solutions or negotiations, and its rejection of current agreements are not a 
principle but due to the perception that Israel has not gone far enough, while the Palestinians 
have not gained anything worth mentioning’ (65).
58See Lindholm Schulz, 25-26. Referring to events in 1995, Lindholm Schulz notes 
that: ‘Another change in official [Palestinian] nationalist discourse on Israel is reflected in the 
new sensitivity towards Israeli demands that the Palestinian Authority and Police takes (sic) 
actions against the Islamic movement in terms of preventing attacks and punishing those who 
carry them out. The turning point was the Beit Lid attack, when, as Nabil Sha’ath points out, a 
new Palestinian political discourse emerged. Israeli security became a Palestinian national 
concern’.
59Usher, ‘The Politics of Internal Security: The PA’s New Intelligence Services’, 32.
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night.60 Rather than recount each particular incident, it suffices to say that 
mass arrests and security courts trials frequently occurred between late 
January and September 1995. As part of a general crackdown, but also in 
response to three suicide bomb attacks that took place against Israeli civilian 
and military targets, as well to special requests by the Israeli authorities, over 
500 arrests were made, and the security courts were used more than 20 
times.61 In addition, PA security agencies provided crucial information to 
Israeli undercover assassination units, helping to enable, for example, the 
gunning down of Kamal Kaheel, a top leader of the Qassam brigades, on 16 
April.62
The logic behind Arafat’s reasoning seems to have been borne out. 
Ghazi Hamad notes that the continual arrest and torture of Hamas members by 
the PA’s security forces during this period prompted a vociferous internal 
debate within the Islamic movement.63 A number of Hamas leaders argued 
that a ‘freeze’, or de facto cessation, of acts of violence was more favourable 
than a self-defeating confrontation with the PA. It is true that the
60See Amnesty International, ‘Trial at Midnight: Secret, Summary, Unfair Trials in 
Gaza’ (London, June 1995), cited in Journal o f Palestine Studies XXV, no. 1 (Autumn 1995), 
141-161. The PA Attorney General, Khalid al-Qidrah, maintained that the relevant authorities 
started examining these cases during the day, and by the time they were ready for trial it was 
the middle of the night (144). On 29 April 1995, PA Planning Minister Nabil Sha’ath 
commented on public protests of the court, ‘It is very difficult to maintain security at the same 
time as maintaining all the regular legal precautions built into a civil court. The authority had 
to deliver a clear message that it will not accept or tolerate violations of this agreement or of 
its security. The State Security Court is a message, not a venue for the future behaviour of the 
Palestinian Authority’ (144).
6lThis figure was ascertained from a timeline of events for 1995 that was compiled 
by the Palestinian Academic Society for International Affairs (PASSLA). See internet site, 
http://www.passia.org/palestine_facts/chronology/19941995.htm. It should also be noted that 
clashes between Hamas supporters and the PA police personnel implementing arrest orders 
were not uncommon during this period. For example, an exchange of fire occurred on 18 
August when PA police surrounded a Gaza city house in which the suspected suicide bomber 
Wael Nassar was hiding. Four gendarmes and five civilians were injured as police were trying 
to disperse the crowd gathering at the site.
62Hamad, 182.
63Ibid.
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implementation of this growing consensus was complicated by the
autonomous structure of the military cells, which continued to receive support
from Hamas centres based outside the occupied territories. But by the spring
of 1995, PA security forces were increasingly uncovering and disabling the
military cells. As a consequence, the Hamas political leadership’s desire for
accommodation with the PA grew even greater.
Arafat gradually reopened a dialogue with the political representatives
of the Islamic movements. The first meetings, a kind of constructive
engagement, represented immediate stabilisation goals and were not outwardly
indicative of Arafat’s long-term political strategy toward them For example,
PA representatives met with Hamas and Islamic Jihad leaders on 14 and 16
April to discuss how attacks from cells based inside the self-rule areas might
be non-violently prevented. But by August 1995, all Hamas attacks ceased and
a rather intense internal debate began within the movement’s forums about
participating the political life of the PA, particularly the Palestinian legislative
council elections scheduled for January 1996.
Hamas’s dilemma was the most acute because it dealt with questions 
of political survival for the Islamist movement. Oslo began a process 
which redefined the viability of political groupings. Fatah and its allies 
in the PLO now had the weight of Israel, the West, and much of the 
Arab world behind them in establishing the PA. For Hamas to ignore 
this new reality risked oblivion, as it would be outside all decision­
making structures. However, the terms of the Oslo Accords were 
considered wholly inadequate by most Hamas members, and 
participation by the organization in the PA would be an implicit 
recognition of the legitimacy of the Oslo process. Thus barring a 
sudden collapse of the whole process, Hamas’s conundrum was to 
participate at the loss of its convictions or to not participate at the loss 
of its viability over the long run.64
^Robinson, Building a Palestinian State: The Incomplete Revolution, 192.
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Moderate elements of Hamas began to prevail at the end of this debate. For 
example, Imad Falouji, editor of the Hamas-affiliated newspaper al Wat an, 
argued during this period that there was a new reality in Palestine, like it or 
not, and so for the sake of posterity, Hamas could not let Fatah and its notable 
allies win all the seats on the legislative council.65
Arafat began to achieve his goals after PA and Hamas representatives 
met for a summit in Cairo. On 12 September, the two sides announced a ‘draft 
agreement’ in which Hamas would ‘cease all military actions in and from the 
PA areas’ and would ‘respect all agreements’ between the PLO and Israel.66 In 
return, the PA (with Israeli sanction) would grant Hamas a role in the self-rule 
government, likely in the form of an independent Islamic political party that 
could contest the PA elections. Indeed, it was noted by credible sources at the 
time that:
If Hamas holds to its commitments, Arafat will hold to his, since his 
aim has never been to eliminate Hamas altogether. Rather, Arafat 
wants Hamas domesticated to accept his authority. The September 
draft agreement, if kept, amounts to that acceptance. 7
A new shape of Palestinian politics was gradually emerging as a result of
Arafat’s efforts to fragment Hamas and incorporate its political arm. Within
this changing dynamic, the political centre was evolving to include Fatah and
the Muslim Brotherhood division of Hamas, while leftist and different Islamic
elements began to coalesce into a loyal opposition.
65Ibid., 194.
66Usher, ‘The Politics of Internal Security: The PA’s New Intelligence Services’, 31.
67Ibid. Arafat took a similar, yet somewhat deferred approach toward Islamic Jihad. 
Although Islamic Jihad had a different leadership than Hamas, Arafat believed that it would 
be greatly assuaged, if not reined in altogether, by the incorporation of the much larger Islamic 
movement into the PA. The PA would continue to act against Islamic Jihad’s military cells, 
but Arafat reasoned that such moves would be increasingly unnecessary and that the smaller 
group would come to follow the political lead of Hamas.
68Robinson, Building a Palestinian State: The Incomplete Revolution, 192.
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The Cairo meeting was additionally significant. In addition to its local 
representatives, the Hamas delegation had included leaders based outside the 
West Bank and Gaza strip. Even though the Diaspora Hamas was opposed to 
the PLO-Israel agreements, this group, like its ‘internal’ counterpart, had 
acknowledged that a new reality was taking hold in the self-rule areas and that 
its interests should therefore be heard and represented if a future Palestinian 
state were to emerge from the Oslo process. Arafat’s assenting to the inclusion 
of this other leadership was a particularly astute political move. He correctly 
reasoned that a relationship with the ‘external’ Hamas would help to slacken 
external financial and logistical support for the Qassam brigades, thus 
reducing bombing attacks against Israel.
A Quasi-Gramscian Programme
Arafat’s active incorporation of Israeli security criteria into his conflict 
management and state-building endeavours brought about a significant, yet 
simultaneously dubious, Israeli reward. In order to understand the nature of 
the Israeli response to the Palestinian leader’s extensive efforts to ‘divide and 
conquer’ Hamas, it is necessary to return to Michael Hardt’s critique, seen in 
chapter two, of the Gramscian utilisation of civil society for counter- 
hegemonic empowerment (pp. 82-6). Hardt’s account is particularly relevant 
because it relates to 1) the nature of the PA, particularly its incorporation as a 
sub-sovereign entity operating under Israeli overlordship; and 2) the post- 
December 1994 decision of the PA to vigorously follow Israeli security 
guidelines in the hope of securing further territorial concessions.
Hardt’s assessment of civil society after the assumption of ‘control 
society’ forms of governance pertains to the sub-sovereign status of the PA.
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Although the PA was not part of Israel proper, an internal social force trying 
to harness Israeli civil society to shape the actions of the Rabin government, it 
nonetheless was, as will be recalled, situated within ‘a space between the 
international and the domestic’ (p. 48). In a sense then, the PA was ‘inside’ 
Israel. As a sub-sovereign entity using cooperative behaviour to try to shape 
and redirect the governance practices of the Israeli regime, the PA’s 
relationship with Israel was more similar to that of civil society and the state 
than to one of bilateral relations between equal sovereigns. Within such a 
framework, the ability of the PA to sway Israel toward its favolxr through 
active co-operation mirrors the possibility of civil society developing along 
Gramscian lines in order to affect a higher state authority toward more 
enfranchising ends.
After his decision to change his style of rule, Arafat might be said to 
have adopted a quasi-Gramscian programme. It will be recalled that Gramsci 
advocated, in broad terms, an active cooperation between subaltern elements 
and dominant social groupings so as to bring about a ‘compromise 
equilibrium’ (p. 83). By participating in the imminent site of governance and 
assenting to basic rules, Gramsci believed that subaltern elements would 
demonstrate trustworthiness and thus be able to mollify their overlords. In this 
synergic realm, the forces embodying political power and legitimacy would 
then make organisational and structural concessions, which, if harnessed 
correctly by constructive actors, would assume a momentum of its own and 
lead to greater freedom. In this vein, Arafat changed in December 1994- 
January 1995 from a reactive to a proactive style of conflict management, in 
order to better. deal with Israeli security concerns. He had appealed
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unsuccessfully to Israel to understand his consensus-building strategies and 
subsequent reticence to use extra-punitive force against the Islamic opposition. 
No longer expecting the Rabin government to simply change of its own 
volition, the Palestinian leader chose to adopt Israeli security criteria. He 
undertook a wholesale pounding of the Hamas militant cells, combining these 
actions with the essence of his long-term political strategy - pushing the 
Islamic movement’s political wing into the fold of the PA. These propitiatory 
actions were meant to bring Israeli concessions, extend PA rule over the 
remaining occupied Palestinian areas in the West Bank. The reasoning behind 
such deeds was indeed Gramscian in orientation; it presupposed that a 
dialectical synthesis of positions, a two-fold, equal advancement of political 
agendas, could be fostered by the initiative of a junior partner.
The Israeli Response
Israel acknowledged Arafat’s newfound diligence, but in a ‘control 
society’ fashion. In this regard, it is important to reiterate Hardt’s dismissal of 
the Gramscian programme: if the willingness of dominant forces to engage 
subalterns was due to a changing economy of power, then the latter’s active 
participation and cooperation under the aegis of the former would be no 
guarantor of emancipation. Such a dynamic finds its equivalence in 1) the 
continued Israeli failure to recognise the value of Arafat’s non-coercive 
component, or coalition-building strategy, toward Hamas; 2) the subsequent 
resumption of assassinations of Islamic militants; and 3) the nature of the 
Israeli reward, the substance of the Oslo II agreement, which did not 
correspond to the immensity of Arafat’s (quasi-Gramscian) efforts.
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A telling example of Israel’s failure to see the value of the non- 
coercive component of Arafat’s strategy can be seen in an episode involving 
the Hamas militant cell leader, Awad Slimi. On 15 August 1995, the Israeli 
internal security police informed the Palestinian leader that Slimi’s cell was 
about to send a suicide bomber to Tel Aviv. Samuel Segev, an Israeli 
journalist who enjoyed access to the Rabin government, noted of this incident 
that:
Arafat ignored the warning. Angered by this attitude, Rabin reimposed 
the closure of the Gaza strip. Only then did Arafat move. On 18 
August, the Palestinian security services arrested three Hamas 
terrorists, including Slimi, and brought them to trial. Shortly afterward, 
however, Slimi managed to “escape” from jail. He was recaptured only 
a year later, when Benjamin Netanyahu became the prime minister.69
It is certainly true that Israeli leaders should have been concerned that a
terrorist incident was about to occur, but it is wrong to claim that Arafat
essentially condoned plans for this suicide bombing and only responded when
forced to do so by the imposition of a closure of the Gaza strip. It should be
bome in mind that Arafat had spent the last eight months battering Hamas, so
it was not as if he simply decided to switch courses and condone violence
against Israel. Moreover, this incorrect perspective ignores the different means
at Arafat’s disposal that could be used to pacify Hamas, such as pressure from
Fatah cadres. It was these other devices that likely were being utilised as the
Israeli demand for the arrest occurred just before the aforementioned PA-
Hamas ‘summit’ took hold in Cairo, when the PA was in the midst of
preparing to re-engage the political leadership of the Islamic movement.
Suicide bombings are gruesome acts that should not be countenanced (and
Hamas did in fact claim responsibility for such an act shortly thereafter on 21
69Segev, 370.
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August in Jerusalem). However, to suggest that Arafat was somehow 
complicit, as both Segev’s words and Rabin’s actions at the time convey, is 
largely ignorant, if not altogether oblivious, of the constructive efforts taken 
by the PA over the first half of 1995 that had the potential to provide long term 
stability. Such reasoning seems to confirm Hardt’s belief that after the 
assumption of ‘control society’ forms of governance, even extraordinarily 
cooperative efforts of subalterns will never truly be recognised and thus will 
fail to sway ruling forces in a ‘dialectical’ way.
The political endeavours of Arafat were not acknowledged in their own 
right. In this vein, Israel continued to ‘target’ Islamic militants without 
coordination with the PA. On 26 October, for example, Israeli operatives 
assassinated the main political leader of Islamic Jihad, Fathi Shikaki, in Malta. 
Although the killing of Shikaki did not occur in areas under the jurisdiction of 
the PA, and thus did not leave Arafat open to charges of collaboration, the 
Israeli action would very much complicate Arafat’s recent rapprochement with 
the Islamic movements. In a manner mirroring Hardt’s dismissal of the 
Gramscian option, the continued assassinations demonstrated that Arafat’s 
redoubled efforts to sell Israel on the value of his independent political 
initiatives, the stabilising power of the September PA-Hamas agreement, had 
come to nil. (It should also be noted that the Israeli policy of killings 
eventually led to the creation of new and independent militant cells that were 
beyond the control of the pacified Islamic opposition.70)
70Although this study is confined to an analysis of events that occurred from 1993- 
1995, it is also worthwhile to recount incidents that occurred in 1996 which appear to confirm 
that Israel’s continued assassinations policy was fostering the creation of new groups who 
were beyond the control of Arafat’s newly loyal Islamic opposition. For example, on 5 
January 1996, Israel assassinated Yahya Ayyash, known as the ‘Engineer’, the leading Hamas 
bomb maker. In retaliation, a splinter group, ‘The Cells of the Martyr Yahya Ayyash-the New
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Arafat’s security measures were ‘recognised’ by Israel. The Oslo II
agreement was signed on 28 September 1995, on the heels of the PA’s eight
month-long efforts to contain and pacify Hamas. It is possible to argue
accordingly that the Gramscian-type logic informing the Palestinian leader’s
actions during this period was impeccable. After all, Arafat had earned his
kudos by making a prolonged, concerted endeavour to meet Israeli security
needs. Israel, in turn, granted him control over the remaining Palestinian areas
of the West Bank, an enormous structural concession virtually guaranteeing an
independent state under his stewardship. But this was not the case and the
scope of Israeli concessions far from matched Arafat’s extensive actions. As
was relayed in chapter four, the Oslo II agreement did not provide the
Palestinians with any territorial contiguous areas of control within the West
Bank (See Map II, p. 260). In this regard Robinson has noted that:
The PA finds itself in charge of a geographically fragmented area. The 
West Bank in particular under Oslo II is a crazy patchwork of 
distributed control. Even assuming that a final agreement consolidates 
Palestinian control of large areas of the West Bank, it is likely that the 
Palestinians will end up with three geographically parts of their state: 
the northern West Bank, the southern West Bank, and Gaza. 
Supporters of the agreement are already referring to “cantons,” while 
opponents use the less generous “bantustans” to describe this 
fragmentation.71
Even if Robinson were correct in asserting that a Palestinian state was the 
intended end result of the agreement, the term ‘state’ would have to be used in 
its loosest semantic meaning. This view resonates with ideas of Raz- 
Krakotzkin that were noted in chapter one: the concept of a state, which once
Pupils’ committed four sensational suicide bomb attacks in the span of nine days, killing over 
60 Israelis. It is significant that the group issued communiques claiming credit for the 
bombings in its own name, not in the name of the Qassam brigades. ‘When both Hamas 
political leaders and leaders of the Qassam brigades disavowed the attack but promised a 
ceasefire anyway, the Ayyash cells issued a further communique ordering that their ‘brothers’ 
not speak for them’ (Robinson, Building a Palestinian State: The Incomplete Revolution, 195).
7,Ibid., 198.
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expressed the desire for emancipation, became a repressive idea that served to 
fulfil Israeli political goals (p. 56). The map of Oslo II, Israel’s ‘concessions’ 
to the PA, aptly demonstrates the relative empowerment of the ‘control 
society’. Hardt’s reproof of the Gramscian programme as a counter to 
‘modulatory* forms of governance once again seems to have credence. The 
fruit of Arafat’s rather extensive efforts to placate Israel on security issues was 
plentiful, but extremely bittersweet.
Amelioratory Concerns 
The preceding chapters have employed insights from Deleuze and 
Hardt to reconstruct the mechanics of the Oslo Accords under the Rabin 
government. It has been seen how Rabin and Peres acted upon propensities 
toward complex co-optation and how the extra-dialectical condition that was 
created as a result affected the efforts of Arafat to find satisfiers to meet Israeli 
security needs and consolidate his own authority. It is now necessary to apply 
what has been discerned from this critical reconstruction to the somewhat 
deficient conflict resolution remedies for Oslo that were recounted in chapter 
one.
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Chapter Six 
Implications for Conflict Resolution
This Chapter returns to themes that were introduced in chapter one, 
premises that have renewed significance in light of the theoretical and 
empirical insights that were subsequently gleaned. Specifically, it re-engages 
the conflict resolution prescriptions of Andrew Buchanan and Deiniol Jones. 
Building on notes of the misreading of the Oslo power dynamic, the chapter 
argues that Buchanan’s proposal that ‘the spirit of the agreement should be 
more important than the letter’ can only be given credence if, ironically, Israeli 
tactics akin to complex co-optation had initially been more refined and 
sophisticated. While this possibility is rejected, it does, however, suggest 
certain theoretical consequences that might be utilised to foster normative 
change. The chapter then goes on to assess the use of Jones’s 
recommendations to aid ‘systemically excluded’ peoples such as the 
Palestinians. It maintains that ‘cosmopolitan mediation’ would in fact create a 
Palestinian state, but at the same time would allow ‘control society’ forms of 
governance to operate on a supra-national level. Although the long-term 
efficacy of this programme is questioned, it is begrudgingly endorsed due to 
its ability to provide immediate relief to the Palestinians.
Improved Co-optation?
Buchanan advocates what might be deemed ‘attitudinal corrective 
measures’ for the deficiencies of Oslo. These prescriptions, inherent to his 
entire analysis, are an outgrowth of a reconstruction of events that saw the 
principal actors involved in Oslo as being guided by rational choices and with 
a normative end goal in mind. For Buchanan, the Israeli-PLO act of mutual
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recognition meant that a viable and basically fair process of conflict resolution
had begun. Despite gross structural asymmetries, the logical conclusion of
Oslo was to be the creation of a sovereign Palestinian state. It was not the
motives of the Rabin government that ‘derailed’ the peace process:
The good intentions stated by the original principals who initiated the 
Middle East peace process have been diluted by various factors, such 
as violent events, changes in personnel, and changes in the direction of 
political imperatives.1
Buchanan’s understanding is thus that the benign core of the Oslo Accords can
be revitalised. His reference to ‘violent events’ and ‘changes in personnel’ is
meant to suggest that it was only later occurrences -  gruesome, rapid waves of
suicide bombings committed by Islamic militants in February and March 1996
and the intransigence of the 1996-99 Likud government of Benjamin
Netanyahu -  that were the primary ‘negative catalysts*. But Buchanan is
mistaken. Indeed it is not necessary to address these subsequent episodes, not
only for the reason that they occurred beyond the chronological scope of this
investigation, but also because they were only symptoms, and not the primary
causes, of the Oslo problematic. Buchanan’s pronouncement of blame, and
thus his ensuing remedy, overlooks the entirety of the power dynamic that
initially shaped the Oslo Accords.
Buchanan’s presentation of events is straightforward and seemingly
convincing. To recap, he argued that the Rabin government found itself in an
environment in 1992 and 1993 in which there was not only a loss of
superpower conflict by proxy, but also where Iraq no longer posed an
existential threat to Israel. A regional political compromise was thus desired at
’idem Andrew S. Buchanan, Peace with Justice: A History o f the Israeli-Palestinian 
Declaration o f Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (London: Macmillan, 
2000): 344.
a time when Israel was at its strongest, both militarily and politically. Once the 
secret channel in Oslo emerged and was subsequently borne out, it seemed 
prudent to seek the first breakthrough on the Palestinian track because 1) the 
intifada had begun to radicalise under the influence of the Islamic movements 
and was increasingly difficult to manage; and 2) the PLO was materially 
exhausted and so more willing to make initial concessions than, say, Syria. For 
Buchanan, the resultant DoP signified Israeli recognition of the Palestinians’ 
right to self-determination. Indeed, it provided ‘for the denial of the assertion 
that Israel was never really intent on pursuing a meaningful peace with the 
Palestinians, demonstrating an Israeli willingness to negotiate an alternative to 
military occupation and repression and regional isolation’. The interim nature 
of the Oslo Accords, designed to gradually acculturate the PLO to the role as 
Israel’s security partner, would, if pursued sincerely, eventually translate into 
an independent Palestinian state.
Buchanan’s survey of the Rabin government’s interpretation of the 
international situation immediately prior to the Oslo negotiations, in terms of 
short-term opportunities and long-term considerations, is somewhat wanting. 
As was conv.eyed in chapter two, a truly complete analysis of national 
decision-making should seek to account for the impact of immaterial elements 
of power, the influence of past guiding beliefs, even in the midst of a period of 
profound change or if these former ideas no longer seem to be relevant 
phenomena. Buchanan makes a crucial omission of this very sort and, 
accordingly, paints a picture of Rabin and Peres’s life-long positions toward 
the Palestinians and the PLO as having transformed far more than in fact was
2Ibid., 341.
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the case. It is true that Rabin and Peres’s decision to recognise the PLO was 
motivated by rational considerations, in the sense of making use of methods of 
analysis and planning to bring about a projected result, but since their thinking 
was still predicated upon an assumption of Israel’s permanent asymmetrical 
rights vis-a-vis the Palestinians, it cannot be said to have been nationalistically 
dispassionate in nature or motivated by cosmopolitan normative concerns.
Rabin and Peres recognised the need transform the nature of Israeli 
nationalism. But they sought structural innovations precisely in order to 
preserve, not to forego, the post-1967 Israeli settlement presence in the West 
Bank and Gaza strip. As was relayed in chapter three, there were less obvious, 
but equally important issues peppered among the desire of Rabin and Peres to 
secure regional peace agreements within the political climate that was 
favouring Israel in the early 1990s. Rabin was convinced that the Israeli 
population had become too fatigued by protracted conflict and as a result 
might therefore ‘force’ a future government to eschew lands that he 
considered to be Israel’s historical birthright. He wanted to retain the West 
Bank and Gaza strip, but not the Palestinian inhabitants who resided within 
these territories. Whereas his predecessor Yitzhak Shamir had chosen to 
stealthily attain this goal over a prolonged period of time, Rabin sought the 
opposite temporal approach: to achieve such an aim through active diplomacy. 
Since annexation of the occupied territories would change the Jewish national 
character of the Israeli state and a forced depopulation of the territories would 
bring about international isolation, a ‘third way’ of sorts was required. Rabin 
had come to understand that addressing the Palestinian question would be the 
springboard to peaceful relations with the Arab states that neighboured Israel.
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But he lacked the political sophistication needed to devise an agreement that 
could ‘exist in a space between the international and the domestic’. Had it not 
been for the slightly underhanded efforts of Shimon Peres, who grasped the 
general principles of complex co-optation, this programme might never have 
assumed a mechanism of diffusion. Yet the long-time Israeli political rivals 
were able to reconcile through the crafting of the Oslo Accords. Both leaders 
agreed that by recognising the PLO on its own terms, Israel would both have 
an outlet to the Arab world and be able to secure a permanent presence in the 
West Bank and Gaza strip.
An acknowledgement of the changing shape of Israeli nationalist 
thought during the 1993-1995 period directly affects Buchanan’s prescriptions 
for conflict resolution. For example, Buchanan typically notes that ‘the 
fundamental flaw of the Israeli-Palestinian particular peace process.. .is that it 
has no inbuilt mechanism to redress or resolve the asymmetrical nature of the 
power relationship’.3 But if it is understood that the meta-logic underpinning 
Israeli nationalism assumed ‘control society’ forms of governance under the 
Rabin administration, then the only way to avoid discarding Buchanan’s 
general recommendation is to note that the Israeli devices analogous to 
complex co-optation were not distilled enough to be effective. For if these 
tactics had truly been successful, the asymmetrical nature of the power 
relationship would have seemed much less bothersome to the Palestinians, 
who would have been considerably mollified, if not assuaged altogether, by 
Israel’s system of substitute satisfiers.
3Ibid., 367.
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Israel’s rigid security criteria hampered the long-term success of 
complex co-optation within the Israeli-Palestinian setting. It will be recalled 
from chapter five that even as Israel devolved powers to the PA, and sought to 
prop up the autonomy regime, additional measures were taken, in response to 
a number of security crises, that jeopardised its new economy of power (pp. 
191-2). The Rabin government’s curious practice of undermining its partner in 
peace was emblematic of the somewhat conflicting trends that embody the 
‘control society’, in which greater freedoms and forms of recognition are 
enacted, but at the same time, the characteristics of preceding systems of order 
are only outwardly transformed and do not completely disappear. Reflecting 
these tensions, Israel’s security responses often made it seem to Palestinians 
that life was not palpably better than before the onset of PLO-led self-rule. 
Despite recognising the PLO as the official representative of the Palestinian 
people, the Rabin government did not recognise Palestinian validity claims as 
being equal to those of Israel. Subsequently, its approach to security gave 
value only to the immediate safety concerns of Israeli citizens and did not 
recognise the comprehensive security value of Arafat’s attempts to placate and 
incorporate the Islamic opposition. Even the substantially intensified efforts 
undertaken by Arafat between January and August 1995 were not able to 
fundamentally alter the evaluation and response of the Rabin government in 
this regard. Taken as a whole, the overall environment promoted in 1994 and 
1995 does not seem amenable to successful complex co-optation. If his 
constituents felt the Oslo Accords had enfeebled more than empowered them, 
and the most extraordinary of efforts failed to move Rabin and Peres toward a 
more flexible middle ground, why would Yasser Arafat ever have the
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incentive to readily accept a future fmal-status arrangement that offered a 
‘virtual state’ or permanently sub-sovereign entity?
Was it ever possible for the Rabin government to have succeeded with 
complex co-optation? Since ‘control society’ types of governance are tenuous 
in general -  because of the interplay of new forms of empowerment and the 
retention of past devices of rule that essentially act to obfuscate and contain 
them, how could Rabin and Peres’s strategy for dealing with the PLO have 
been refined, akin to the analogous forms of ‘control’ that Deleuze noted as 
having taken hold in other places? In order to make such a speculation, it is 
necessary to consider that there still might be a degree of leeway and 
manoeuvrability within the ‘extra-dialectical’ condition that characterises the 
‘control society*, that the somewhat precarious relationship of past and present 
forms of population management can nonetheless be loosely managed so as to 
secure the long-term hegemony of the new system of rule. In the Israeli case, 
this understanding would have meant that Rabin and Peres were aware that 
their nationalist predilections could interfere, on a deliberative level, with 
ostensibly tenable policy positions taken toward their Palestinian junior 
partners.
The Rabin government might have succeeded with complex co­
optation under different circumstances. Rabin and Peres seem to have grasped 
the need for increased sensitivity toward the PA and for an ongoing 
improvement of life on the Palestinian street. Rabin’s later speeches and 
pronouncements began to reveal more awareness of the complex political 
balance within the Palestinian self-rule areas. After a suicide bombing in 
Jerusalem on 21 August 1995, for example, Rabin commented that:
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[Israel’s efforts against Hamas and Islamic Jihad are being conducted] 
to a certain extent with the cooperation of the Palestinian Authority. 
These enemies are also its enemies, and the time has come to make a 
distinction between the murderers among the Palestinians and those 
who want to reach a political settlement. We will cooperate with those 
who seek a political solution.. .4
Shimon Peres understood as well that it was crucial to rigidly differentiate
between the PA and the Islamic opposition, to recognise that Arafat had to
balance between his DoP commitments to Israel and the bonds he felt for his
own people. After leaving office, Peres commented:
You see we [Rabin and Peres] tried to look upon Arafat as a 
partner.. .Arafat cannot exist as an agent. You cannot give him orders. 
You have to offer him incentives, too. Many people have asked me if 
Arafat is trustworthy. What do they mean by that question? He didn’t 
become a Zionist, neither will he become a Zionist. It’s nonsense. He’s 
the leader of the Palestinians, and that’s what he will remain. We can 
meet as partners for peace, but we cannot make out of him an 
instrument to realize our policies.5
Rabin and Peres’s intentions were not met by their actual deeds, as was
demonstrated at length in chapter five. Moreover, it will be recalled that
complex co-optation is to some extent guided by immaterial elements of
power that are beneath the level of reflection of its instigators. But if the two
Israeli leaders had been more aware of the confluence of factors shaping the
extra-dialectical condition that came to define Israeli-Palestinian relations in
1993 (i.e. that they were unwittingly undermining their own long-term agenda
with regard to the Palestinians), they would have likely been able to better
implement their programme.
The Rabin government should have been more mindful of the
comprehensive security value of Arafat’s attempts to integrate the Islamic
4Yitzhak Rabin, ‘Reaction to Terrorist Attack, 21 August 1995’, at Yitzhak Rabin 
Center for Israel Studies, Tel Aviv University, internet site, 
http://www.rabincenter.org.il:81 /english/fs_speech.html.
5Idem Shimon Peres and Robert Littell, For the Future o f Israel (Baltimore: The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998): 95-6.
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opposition, instead of just evaluating the performance of the PA by direct 
policing standards. Similarly, a unilateral assassinations policy and an 
inflicting of collective punishment through the closure of the Palestinian 
territories served to undermine those efforts of Arafat that could have been 
used to Israel’s favour. Praise and consideration should have been offered 
instead, especially since Arafat had gained increasing influence over the 
Islamic opposition by September 1995. In general, Israel could have 
implemented greater gestures of recognition and done more to promote the 
Palestinian perception of empowerment. For as Buchanan notes, ‘[pjeace is 
not an indivisible commodity: there are minimum requirements that must be 
fulfilled in order that both sides may live with the settlement’.6 If Rabin and 
Peres had been more circumspect about taking such alternative measures, 
especially in tandem with continued diminishing concessions (i.e. the Oslo II 
agreement), then their desired end goal would have been given a better avenue 
for success.
The overall utility of complex co-optation is in the eye of the beholder. 
A sustained vigilance for sensitivity on the part of leaders and policy makers 
might be all that is required for the phenomenon to prosper in different 
international settings, but the nature of the ensuing tranquillity will fall short 
of justice. A normatively oriented perspective would therefore argue that the 
Rabin government’s imperfect ‘control society’ endeavour merely caused an 
inequity to become glaringly obvious, and that it is unenlightened to try to lure 
the leadership of an injured and oppressed people into accepting less than what 
the consensus of the international community holds are due to them. This
Buchanan, 345.
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point of view would further maintain that a more equitable alternative would 
be of benefit to the Israeli people, who have become the victims of their own 
occupation as well. Even if the Rabin government had fully succeeded with its 
aims, it would argue that the Israelis could only attain moral liberation by 
agreeing to divide the land with the Palestinians as equals.
Neither Rabin nor Peres ever had to confront his own boundaries. Both 
men did believe in making peace with the Palestinians, but as has already been 
relayed, simply took for granted that the asymmetrical relationship being 
implemented with them was ‘natural’. They never seem to have pondered that 
their vision of peace was less prudent than building a genuinely equal 
partnership with the Palestinians. (Instead, they were repeatedly praised by 
elements of the international community that supported the notion of an 
Israeli-Palestinian negotiated settlement, further perpetuating a belief in the 
rightness of their ideas.) It is also not clear what traditions or internal 
resources Rabin and Peres could have turned to in order to make such a 
conceptual leap in their relationship with the Palestinians. Indeed, the guiding 
perspective of the thesis, which builds on Raz-Krakotzkin’s view of the Israeli 
national consciousness, seems to suggest that this kind of change would have 
been extremely difficult, if not impossible, to implement. Neither the analysis 
of ‘empty land’ that was relayed in chapter one nor any of the subsequent 
references to this theme made any mention, for example, of an alternative 
vision of peace that could serve as the basis of a genuine Israeli perceptual 
transformation toward the Palestinians. Nonetheless, a normative remedy 
would have at least tried to locate, or recreate, such a tradition. Rather than 
allowing Rabin and Peres to grapple with constraints that had not been
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considered so that they could maximise their authority, this alternative vision 
might have been used to confront the two leaders over their shared belief of 
the need to reformulate Israeli nationalism at the continued expense of the 
Palestinians, in order for them to engage in a kind of self-critique and be fully 
aware of the dubious value of this form of ‘peace*.
Strategic Cosmopolitanism
The issue of intervention as a normative counter to complex co­
optation must now be addressed. It is for this reason that is necessary to re­
examine the proposals of Deiniol Jones that were discussed in chapter one. It 
will be recalled that Jones sought to ensure basic human justice for the 
‘systemically excluded’ parties to international conflict, such as the 
Palestinians. In order to so, he proposed a new form of mediation that could 
supersede the inviolable rights traditionally extended to sovereign states (pp. 
39-40). There is thus the possibility that ‘cosmopolitan mediation’ could be 
used to neutralise and redirect complex co-optation endeavours toward a more 
equitable final outcome. However, the following section cautions against 
implementing Jones’s programme, unless there is absolutely no alternative. It 
argues that if the impact of ‘control society’ forms of governance are still 
bome in mind, the structural changes proposed by Jones could in fact come to 
serve an invidious purpose, and it is doubtful that the ensuing environment 
would truly result in a ‘higher level of universality and difference’.
There is a connection between the criticism, relayed in chapter one, 
that Jones’s analysis of the motives of the Rabin government was not 
exhaustive and a new concern, to be explored below, that ‘cosmopolitan 
mediation’ could have highly aberrant results. It will be recollected that Jones
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focused on the flawed Norwegian mediation at the expense of other 
phenomena, and so was prevented from grasping the entirety of Israeli end 
goals with regard to the PLO (pp. 50-1). Jones might retort that his primary 
interest was to critique the conceptual foundation of the Oslo mediation, to 
demonstrate a negative exemplar and offer an alternative, normative vision, 
and since he was successful in this regard, the crux of his conflict resolution 
programme remains valid and it is thus not necessary to dwell on the empirical 
paucities of his study. But this is an investigation guided by Deleuze’s notion 
of the ‘control society*. Its critical backdrop prompts scrutiny of changing 
relationships and forms of interaction, areas where ‘ governmental!sed’ power 
can become newly consolidated. Jones was not guided by such an approach 
and incorrectly argued that the Norwegian mediation was the root cause of a 
‘negative peace’. Indeed, it was shown otherwise, that the Oslo Accords 
merely served as the outlet for a changing economy of power that had already 
begun to coalesce and was searching for a final form. A similar kind of 
inattentiveness appears to mark Jones’s conflict resolution proposals. After all, 
he suggests modifying international legal boundaries to make them more 
permeable. Jones’s proposed good intentions could be ‘appropriated’ in a way 
similar to those of the Norwegian mediators. If implemented, ‘cosmopolitan 
mediation’ risks providing newly emerging, supra-national, ‘control society’ 
forms of governance with more systematic means of actualisation. 
Supplementary Applications
Thus far, this investigation has only been interested in the general 
principles of the ‘control society’, which were applied to the Oslo Accords. 
But others studies have begun to apply the same principles of ‘control’ in
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disparate fashions. While these other empirical applications were not relevant 
for the analysis found in previous chapters, it is now necessary to incorporate 
them in order to evaluate ‘cosmopolitan mediation’ as a possible means to 
offset complex co-optation. It should be noted beforehand that a discouraging 
prognosis is given. The impact of these supplementary applications of 
Deleuze’s ideas suggest that Jones’s conflict resolution programme is 
effectively a variation of the overarching phenomena seen in the ‘control 
society’. This understanding is primarily shaped by the work of Michael Hardt 
and Antonio Negri (2000), who apply the concept of the ‘control society’ to 
emerging practices of global governance. But insights from a complementary 
analysis by Michael Dillon and Julian Reid (2000) will also be relayed.8 
A New Form o f Sovereignty
For Hardt and Negri, the onset of the ‘control society’ translates into a 
fundamental reconfiguration of the nature of sovereignty. Moving beyond 
Deleuze’s general principles and Hardt’s earlier theoretical expansion of these 
ideas, they proceed to empirically outline what they see as the current 
paradigm of rule and its forms of govemmentality or population management:
7Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2000). It should be noted that Hardt and Negri translate ‘control society’ as ‘society of 
control’. See especially pp. 23-27, 198, 318-319, 329-332.
8See Michael Dillon and Julian Reid, ‘Global Governance, Liberal Peace, and 
Complex Emergency’ Alternatives Jan-March 2000, Volume 25, No. 1, 117-143. Dillon and 
Reid do not explicitly frame their discussion around the concept of the ‘control society’, but 
the notion can nonetheless be said to be implicit in their work. Mirroring Deleuze, for 
example, they attempt to update the Foucauldian notion of governmental power, identifying 
cybernetic technology and non-predictable autopoiesis as the exemplars of a new logic of rule 
(125, 136, 137-8). (For Deleuze’s analysis, see chapter two, 70) A second point o f 
convergence can be found in Dillon and Reid’s use of Giorgio Agamben’s Homo Sacer: 
Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998) to guide their 
analysis (See Dillon and Reid, 127-7). It will be recalled from chapter two that Michael Hardt 
had utilised Agamben’s earlier work, The Coming Community (Minneapolis University of 
Minnesota Press, 1993), to explain Deleuze’s notion of control (See chapter two, 89-90). It is 
significant to note in this regard that the central theme of Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and 
Bare Life is prefigured in The Coming Community (see Agamben 1993, especially pp. 85-7).
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Our basic hypothesis is that sovereignty has taken a new form, 
composed of a series of national and supranational organisms united 
under a singular logic of rule. This new global form of sovereignty is 
what we call Empire...By “Empire,” however, we understand 
something altogether different from “imperialism”.. .In contrast to 
imperialism, Empire establishes no territorial center of power and does 
not rely on fixed boundaries or barriers. It is a decentered and 
deterritorializing apparatus of rule that progressively incorporates the 
global realm within its open, expanding frontiers.9
Nation-states still exist, but their function and purpose has changed. It was
noted in chapter two that the ‘removal’ of internal border controls within the
European Union (EU) was exemplary of the selective boundaries of the
‘control society’ that ‘phase’ between fixed and open states (p. 77). But Hardt
and Negri suggest that this kind of complex alteration of borders has moved
beyond legal or treaty-based mechanisms toward perfected, unbounded forms
of regulation.
Hardt and Negri’s global understanding of the ‘control society’ may 
initially seem to be at variance with the application of the concept that was 
seen in previous chapters. Whereas chapters four and five identified ‘control 
society’ forms of governance as taking hold at the level of the state, Hardt and 
Negri appear to be positing that ‘control’ has shaped a rather different system 
of political order. But these differing readings need not be conflicting. It is 
simply necessary to understand that that they emanate from differing empirical 
sources of ‘modulatory’ logic and the related techniques of rule. This study 
identified the application of ‘modulation’ in the writings of Shimon Peres, 
who favoured having a higher, sovereign force that could constantly redirect 
the subaltern political forces that fell under its hegemonic sway. But Peres was 
operating from a premise that the traditional nation-state would remain the
9Hardt and Negri 2000, xii.
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highest form of sovereignty, with subaltern political forces assuming a 
permanently sub-sovereign role. In contrast, Hardt and Negri extrapolated an 
application of ‘modulation* from the legacy of US constitutionalism and the 
related concept of the open-ended American frontier.10 Their focus produced a 
similar, two-fold understanding of ‘modulation’ as the ability to forever 
amend or modify the base of rule and a complex alteration of the boundaries 
of political authority. Gauging the American constitutional and historical 
experience via Deleuze seems to have allowed Hardt and Negri to move 
beyond an assumption of the relative fixity and the ultimate primacy of the 
nation-state -  even with the conventionally acknowledged caveat of ‘complex 
interdependence’ -  toward a different, supersessive notion of sovereignty. But 
Hardt and Negri’s understanding still remains compatible with the application 
informed by the writings of Shimon Peres. It is perfectly feasible that while 
principles of ‘control’ were manifesting under the aegis of the Israeli state 
from 1993-1995, the ‘new forms of sovereignty’ that Hardt and Negri believe 
to be the primary dynamic of control could also have been gradually 
emerging, simultaneously on a supra-national level.
The Impact on Jones ’s Proposals
An acceptance of Hardt and Negri’s basic contentions immediately 
begins to affect the viability of Deiniol Jones’s proposals. Jones had concluded 
that conflict resolution could neither be left to the power-political role of the 
United States, whose subjective, strategic interests -  and not normative 
commitments -  prefigured its involvement in international mediation efforts, 
nor to small states like Norway that were unable to democratically re-craft the
10Ibid., 160-182.
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dynamics of a conflict. He believed instead that mediation should be
undertaken by a coalition of states (or an international organisation
representing a coalition of states) that was guided by a normative ideological
commitment (p. 49). This programme is essentially invalidated by Hardt and
Negri, who posit that 1) global structural transformations have superseded the
kinds of subjective differences that Jones notes as existing between the US and
a possibly more enlightened coalition of states; and 2) the clarion call of
cosmopolitan-inspired intervention is part and parcel of this change:
The United States does indeed occupy a privileged position in Empire, 
but this privilege derives not from its similarities to the old European 
imperialist powers, but from its differences...We use “Empire” not as 
a metaphor. . .but rather as a concept...The concept of Empire is 
characterized fundamentally by a lack of boundaries: Empire’s rule has 
no limits. It...seeks to directly rule over human nature...[and]..is 
always dedicated to peace-a perpetual and universal peace outside of 
history.11
Jones’s rejection of American geostrategic mediation and small-state 
facilitation is moot because these measures involve a kind of relationship 
among states that has becoming increasingly defunct within a changing 
economy of power. In a sense, the changes that Jones desires to be made to the 
international system (including the pacifying effects of Kantian cosmopolitan 
law) already exist: ‘sovereignty, as the traditional principle of political 
formation whose science is law, is being supplemented by a network based 
account of social organisation whose principle of formation is ‘emergence’ 
and whose science is increasingly that of complex adaptive systems’.12
The principles of govemmentality have become restructured in the 
emerging forms of sovereignty: ‘The difference today lies in the fact that,
uIbid., xiv-xv.
12Dillon and Reid, 119.
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whereas in modem regimes of national sovereignty, administration worked
toward a linear integration of conflicts and toward a coherent apparatus that
could repress them, that is, toward the rational normalization of social life with
respect to both the administrative goal of equilibrium and the development of
administrative reforms, in the imperial framework administration becomes
fractal and aims to integrate conflicts not by imposing a coherent social
apparatus but by controlling differences’.13 Conceptually paralleling the
understanding in chapter two that on a national level this logic manifests as
complex co-optation, Hardt and Negri identify its supra-national expression as
a network of relatively autonomous, but manipulable authorities. In this
system of ‘instrumental multifunctionality’, governance operates via
heterogeneous and indirect means:
[I]t is created by conforming to the structural logics that are active in 
the construction of Empire, such as the police and military logics (or 
really the repression of potential subversive forces in the context of 
peace), the economic logics (the imposition of the market, which in 
turn is ruled by the monetary regime), and the ideological and 
communicative logics. The only way that administrative action gains 
its autonomy and legitimate authority in the imperial regime is by 
following along the differentiating lines of these logics. This 
authorization, however, is not direct. Administration is not strategically 
oriented toward the realization of the imperial logics. It submits to 
them, insofar as they animate the great military, monetary, and 
communicative means that authorize administration itself.14
Dillon and Reid phrase this understanding in terms of its practical
consequences:
[Classical] [sovereignty remains an important aspect of the 
organisation and operation of international power, including that of 
contemporary liberal peace, because liberal states especially, but others 
to the extent that they effect structural adjustments economically and 
sign-up to good governance criteria politically, are deeply implicated 
as key nodes in the networks of global governance. Hence the state
l3Hardt and Negri 2000, 339-340.
14Ibid., 340.
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form -  whose strategic principle formation is sovereignty -  becomes 
just one form of subjectification upon which global liberal governance 
relies. It may not enjoy the exclusivity that traditional accounts of 
international relations once said that it enjoyed, but it nonetheless 
remains a key mode of subjectification. However, it is now 
supplemented by many others.15
In a manner analogous to the relationship between feudal lords and the
sovereign in Medieval Europe, as well as the link between mafia organisations
and state structures during the modem period, an environment of relative
autonomy is frequently punctuated by active collaboration with, and deference
to, a higher authority with which a common interest is shared.16
The overall functioning of the new system of sovereignty is
occasionally dismpted by micro-level breakdowns and/or gross
nonconformities. Such circumstances necessitate a curtailment of local
autonomy, which takes the form of outside intervention. In this regard, Hardt
and Negri note:
For lack of a better term we continue to call these “interventions”. This 
is merely a terminological and not a conceptual deficiency, for these 
are not really interventions into independent juridical territories but 
rather actions within a unified world by the mling structure of 
production and communication. In effect, intervention has been 
internalised and universalised...The arsenal of legitimate force for 
imperial intervention is indeed already vast, and should include not 
only military intervention but also other forms such as moral and 
juridical intervention.17
15Dillon and Reid, 127.
16Hardt and Negri 2000, 342. The analogy to Medieval Europe can be said to 
resonate with Hedley Bull’s concept of neo-medievalism. See Hedley Bull, The Anarchical 
Society: A Study o f Order in World Politics (London: Macmillan, 1977): 254-266. Bull had 
speculated on the structure of potentially new forms of sovereign organisation that might 
eventually replace or supplant the Westphalian state system. He saw prima facie evidence of 
neo-medievalism within five global trends: 1) the regional integration o f states; 2) the 
disintegration of states; 3) the restoration of private international violence; 4) the rise o f trans­
national organisations; 5) and the technological unification of the world. But it must be noted 
that the structural logics of Hardt and Negri’s supersessive form of sovereignty are not at all 
synonymous with the diplomatic traditions and historical practices identified by Bull as 
constituting informal forms of international order or an ‘anarchical society’ in the modem 
period: 1) the balance of power; 2) international law; 3) diplomacy; 4) war; and 5) the 
existence of the great powers. See Bull pp. 95-222.
,7Hardt and Negri 2000, 35.
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It is in the specification of the ‘arsenal of legitimate force’ that the ‘control 
society’ is especially manifested. The criteria for intervention in this decentred 
and deterritorialised environment can be understood as being ‘modulatory’ in 
nature. Intervening authorities continually redefine the demands and 
exceptions that constitute intervention. This exclusive ability to define 
political conditionality, to assess what are the aberrations that compel
1 ftintervention, can be understood as a kind of right to police. In other words, 
the capacity of the police to establish and uphold order provides the basic 
approximation of this new paradigm of rule. Indeed, there is a mutually 
dependent relationship between the legal power to determine exceptionality 
and the ability to exercise police force. ‘The legitimacy of the imperial 
ordering supports the exercise of police power, while at the same time the 
activity of global police force demonstrates the real effectiveness of police 
ordering’.19
The right to police can be viewed as a kind of monopoly over 
normativity. For example, the conventional political lexicon tends to refer to 
events warranting intervention, usually protracted intra-state conflicts that 
threaten to spill over into the international arena, as ‘complex emergencies’. 
The notion of an emergency, a state of things unexpectedly arising and 
urgently demanding immediate attention, conveys that the conflicts requiring 
outside intervention were generated by the failings of internal actors; they 
were the end-result of developmental deficiencies, irrepressible historical 
hatreds, etc. But it can be argued alternatively that such reasoning
18Ibid., 17.
l9Ibid.
233
disassociates macro-level causes from micro-level effects. In other words,
changing forms of authority and economic practice brought about by
globalisation can also be said to have played a role in generating ‘complex
emergencies’.20 Although the term ‘complex emergency’ does help to justify
intervention, it is conceptually inaccurate because it ascribes fault exclusively
to one tier of actors instead of positing ‘a terrain of disorder in which some
states are powerful, some states are in radical dissolution, traditional societies
are collapsing and civil conflict is endemic, where international corporations
and criminal cartels are deeply involved and where international organisations
21and non-governmental organisations are inextricably committed as well’. 
(Dillon and Reid prefer the term ‘emerging political complexes’ because it 
more accurately reflects the understanding that military, political, and 
economic practices of global governance are shaping such phenomena in 
tandem with local factors.22) Continual intervention would hardly be 
justifiable if there ever was an admission that espoused global governance 
practices actually help to ferment destabilising micro-level turbulence.
Interventions are not indiscriminate stabilisation mechanisms. They 
intimately reflect and undergird a new type of authority. Hardt and Negri note 
in this regard that ‘we are dealing here with a special kind of sovereignty-a 
discontinuous form of sovereignty that should be considered liminal or 
marginal insofar as it acts “in the final instance,” a sovereignty that locates its 
only point of reference in the definitive absoluteness of the power it can
20See Mark Duffield, Aid Policy and Post-Modern Conflict: A Critical Review 
(Birmingham: University of Birmingham, School of Public Policy, 1998). See also David 
Keen, The Economic Functions o f Violence in Civil Wars (London: International Institute for 
Strategic Studies, 1998).
2'Dillon and Reid, 117.
22Ibid.
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exercise’.23 Interventions demonstrate the irrevocability of the new form of
sovereignty, ensuring that that the economic and political criteria of global
liberal governance are imposed in toto. ‘[Preventive action constructs...new
territorial and political formations that are functional (or rather more
functional, better adaptable) to the constitution of Empire’.24 While global
liberal governance does function through tactical differentiation, it will not
sanction what might be deemed ‘independently generated expressions of
political difference’ (i.e. ‘rogue states’, feuding warlords, terrorist networks).
In this sense interventions are emblematic of the ‘extra-dialectical’ condition
that is characteristic of the ‘control society’:
...the contending life-forms of emerging political complexes are 
‘persuaded’ into assuming that political adaptivity that global liberal 
governance requires of them in the process of pacifying them so that it 
is not continually disturbed by them. That way it too does not have to 
examine how its very own practices ferment the turbulence that is so 
much deplores.25
Interventions thus guarantee that all forms of identity and political expression
remain essentially ‘a product of the system itself.
Issues relating to the promotion of cosmopolitan values and democratic
international law are tremendously affected by even the slightest acceptance of
Hardt and Negri’s understanding of the new form of sovereignty. First of all,
they note that the theme of cosmopolitanism has become distorted and is
increasingly used to serve a strategic function.
[Supranational subjects that are legitimated not by right but by 
consensus intervene in the name of any type of emergency and 
superior ethical principles. What stands behind this intervention is not 
just state a permanent state of emergency and exception, but a 
permanent state of emergency and exception justified by the appeal to
23Hardt and Negri 2000, 39.
24Ibid., 37.
25Dillon and Reid, 139.
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essential values o f justice. In other words, the right to police is 
legitimated by universal values.26
But there is an additional factor within this occurrence that directly relates to
the conflict resolution programme offered forth by Jones. Hardt and Negri
observe that the interplay of the continual prefiguring of the criteria of
intervention with the exercise of policing powers has not only transformed
classical international law but also has begun to permeate, as a diffuse process,
into the administrative law o f individual societies and nation-states. The
juridical power of the state is no longer absolute and increasingly can be
overridden by supposedly higher principles. ‘Through its contemporary
transformation of supranational law, the imperial process of constitution tends
either directly or indirectly to penetrate and reconfigure the domestic law of
the nation-states, and thus supra-national law powerfully overdetermines
domestic law’.27 Jones’s basic programme thus already exists in a distorted,
proto-institutional form. The very cosmopolitanism and active public
international law that Jones sees as the base of future emancipatory
instruments have begun to emerge, but because of their association with, or
appropriation by, the new form of sovereignty, these devices have become
tokenistic or largely emptied of normative content.
‘Govemmentalised’ intervention is evolving juridical components.
Hardt and Negri take pains to stress that the legal underpinning of the new
networks of rule will be highly original in nature:
[T]his juridical model cannot be constituted by the existing structures 
of international law, even when understood in terms of the most 
advanced developments of the United Nations and the other great 
international organizations. Their elaborations of an international order
26Hardt and Negri 2000,18.
27Ibid., 17.
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could at most be recognized as a process of transition toward the new 
imperial power.28
It is also important to note that Hardt and Negri are uninterested in speculating
the precise shape that this new, facilitative juridical formation might take, and
prefer to emphasise how whatever does emerge will be logically
contextualised in the new paradigm of rule. But they do hint that
international/supranational courts, which have increasingly become
reconstituted as moral agents to justify the logic of intervention, will move
beyond offering mere retroactive justification to some kind of future
administrative role:
The active parties supporting the imperial constitution are confident 
that when the construction of Empire is sufficiently advanced, the 
courts will be able to assume their leading role in the definition of 
justice. For now, however, although international courts do not have 
much power, public displays of their activities are still very important. 
Eventually a new juridical formation must be formed that is adequate 
to the constitution o f Empire. Courts will have to be transformed 
gradually from an organ that simply decrees sentences against the 
vanquished to a judicial body or system of bodies that dictate or 
sanction the interrelation among the moral order, its exercise of police 
action, and the mechanism legitimating imperial sovereignty’.30
The current system of intervention that is tantamount to a non-formal
precursor of Jones’s programme is moving toward a more proper, but just as
normatively denuded, legal equivalent.
It is increasingly possible that ‘cosmopolitan mediation’ could serve as
the crux of a formal legal framework used to justify the state of permanent
exception and police action legitimating the new techniques of rule. In other
words, Jones’s proposal to officially modify international boundaries in order
to allow intervention and democratic mediation of ethnic conflicts faces
28Ibid., 40.
29Ibid., 41.
30Emphasis added, Ibid., 38.
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‘appropriation’ by the new form of sovereignty. In this scenario,
‘cosmopolitan mediation’ would become the overriding principle justifying
intervention, a kind of peremptory norm or jus cogens. But in a move not
anticipated by Jones, two corollary forms would likely emerge as well. It
would be explained that military and juridical intervention are in fact the
facilitating arms of ‘cosmopolitan mediation’. In order for mediators to ensure
the genuine well being and justice for all parties involved in a protracted or
other kind of destabilising conflict, it would be necessary to actively supervise
the implementation of the decreed settlement. This situation is admittedly only
a change of the status quo on intervention from a de facto to a de jure status. It
is also true that Jones would likely oppose the use of his recommendations in
such a crude manner. But it must be bome in mind that Jones was unaware of
the new ‘liminal’ form of sovereignty discerned by Hardt and Negri. He would
not necessarily see such an implementation as a betrayal of his ideas, but
rather as a positive development that preserved the essential aim of fulfilling
cosmopolitan ideals. After all, the gist of his proposals would remain:
‘independent minded’ actors use new powers to promote relations that
conformed to a ‘democratically constituted’ international law. But Jones
would fail to understand that the coalition of non-American states conducting
the mediation would be just as much implicated within a new economy of
power. To recap Hardt and Negri’s note in this regard:
[T]he coming Empire is not American and the United States is not its 
center. ...The fundamental principle of Empire... is that its power has 
no actual or localizable terrain of center. Imperial power is distributed 
in networks, through mobile and articulated networks of control. This 
is not is to say that the US government and US territory are no 
different from any other: the United States certainly occupies a 
privileged position in the global segmentations and hierarchies of 
Empire. As the powers of boundaries of nation-states decline, however,
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differences between national territories become increasingly relative. 
They are now not differences in nature (as were, for example the 
differences between the territory of the metropole and that of the 
colony) but differences of degree.31
Jones would not see his mediators as comprising just another network of
power, nor would he assume that their universal commitments in fact
constituted a strategic function.
Any future system of ‘cosmopolitan mediation* will embody the
relative empowerment of the ‘control society*. It would provide the
Palestinians, for example, with an outcome that in many ways would resonate
with the character of the Oslo Accords. The cruel irony of this situation is that
the instrument of the Palestinians’ disempowerment would be the awarding of
the very sovereignty they have so long coveted. They would attain
independence (not merely the ‘virtual’ equivalents of Rabin and Peres’s
political imagination), but their new status would still be a kind of qualified
emancipation. This independent Palestine would be subject to what Hardt and
Negri refer to as ‘differential racism’, an overarching order that ‘integrates
others.. .and then orchestrates those differences in a system of control’.32
The general apparatus of imperial command actually consists of three 
distinct moments: one inclusive, another differential, and third 
managerial. The first moment is the magnanimous, liberal face of 
Empire. All are welcome in its boundaries, regardless of race, creed, 
color, gender, sexual orientation, and so forth. In its inclusionary 
moment Empire is blind to differences; it is absolutely indifferent in its 
acceptance. It achieves universal inclusion by setting aside differences 
that are inflexible or unmanageable and thus might give rise to social 
conflict....Setting aside differences means, in effect, taking away the 
potential of the various constituent subjectivities. The resulting public 
space of power neutrality makes possible the establishment and 
legitimation of a universal notion of right that forms the core of 
Empire.33
3lIbid., 384.
32Ibid., 195.
33Ibid., 198.
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The cosmopolitan ‘award’ of Palestinian statehood would thus function in a
manner tantamount to the Israeli government’s recognition of the PLO in
1993, as the prelude to what can be viewed as a supranational form of
complex co-optation:
The second moment of imperial control, its differential moment, 
involves the affirmation of differences accepted within the imperial 
realm. While from the juridical perspective differences must be set 
aside, from the cultural perspective differences are celebrated....These 
differences are imagined to be “cultural” rather than “political,” under 
the assumption that they will not lead to uncontrollable conflicts but 
will function, rather, as a force of peaceful regional identification.34
The state identity conferred upon the Palestinians would be very different
from, say, the self-determined, independent identity created by the PLO that,
as was noted in the Introduction, was so admired by Gilles Deleuze (p. 12).
Through recognition and incorporation, the affective potential of this identity
will be utilised for reactive ends:
The differential moment of imperial control must be followed by the 
management and hierarchization of these differences in a general 
economy of command....The reemergence of ethnic and national 
differences at the end of the twentieth century, not only in Europe but 
also in Africa, Asia, and the Americas, has presented Empire with an 
even more complex equation containing a myriad of variables that are 
in a constant state of flux. That this equation does not have a unique 
solution is not really a problem-on the contrary. Contingency, 
mobility, and flexibility are Empire’s real power. The imperial solution 
will not be to negate or attenuate these differences, but rather to affirm
1 c
them and arrange them in an effective apparatus of command. 
‘Cosmopolitan mediation’ will allow repressed or marginalized subaltern 
identities to be given expression, but only under the inescapable tutelage of the 
new form of sovereignty.
It is tempting to minimize the diffuse detrimental effects of the new 
form of sovereignty and stress its advantages instead. Under its aegis, for
34Ibid., 199.
35Ibid., 199-200.
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example, ‘cosmopolitan mediation’ would indeed prevent complex co-optation
from taking hold in the Israeli-Palestinian context. Jones had called for
mediators with contextually specific understanding of conflicts to be given the
authority to implement restructuring, normatively oriented peace settlements.
If implemented, such a framework would bring about the ultimate expression
of Palestinian cultural and nationalist ideals: 1) a state in part of geographic
Palestine; 2) the right of refugees to resettle in this state; 3) a seat of
government in East Jerusalem and 4) jurisdiction over the Muslim and
Christian holy sites therein. Jones’s programme would thus tangibly deliver to
the Palestinians, not just secure substitute arrangements couched in
ambiguities. So even though the newly emerged Palestinian state would be
bound by developmental standards set by others, it can be argued that ‘no state
is an island in an interdependent world’, and after attaining its long awaited
sovereignty, it would be simply prudent for Palestine to be in sync with the
global consensus on good governance and economic development.
The Palestinian state that would emerge from the ‘cosmopolitan
mediation’ process would be able to adapt to the developmental and
governance criteria of the new form of sovereignty within the parameters of its
new national identity, but it would not have the option to either fundamentally
alter or outright reject them. Dillon and Reid comment on the evolution of this
phenomenon of the ‘democratic’ application of hegemonic principles:
The Chief Economist of the World Bank (Joseph Stiglitz) attacks the 
Washington Consensus on liberalisation, stabilisation, and privatisation 
in the world economy, for example, as too technical and too narrowly 
framed a development strategy. He espouses a new intensive as well as 
extensive policy committed to the unqualified and comprehensive 
modernisation and “transformation of traditional societies.” “Honesty, 
however, requires me to add one more word. In calling for a 
transformation of societies, I have elided a central issue,” Stiglitz had
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the candour to conclude, “transformation of what kind of society and 
for what ends?” The impact on modernisation on modem as well as 
traditional societies is, of course, as violent as the impact on global 
resources and global ecology. The values, practices and investments 
that propel such development nonetheless, however, are precisely what 
protect it from pursuing the key question, locally as well as globally, 
that Stiglitz posed in terms other than those that underwrite his very 
problematisation of it.36
World Bank development strategies should not be seen as a ‘master plan* but
rather as emblematic devices of global governance that implicitly reflect the
structural logics of the new forms of mle. It is important to understand that
‘cosmopolitan mediation’ would operate as a similar kind of supranational
ordering device. It would bestow transformation and material deliverance
upon its recipients in an immediate sense, but at a deeper level, exclude them
from any type of consultation or debate. This strategy would not have a
genuinely pluralistic outlook. If after attaining independent statehood,
formerly ‘systemically excluded’ peoples such as the Palestinians are limited
in how they function within the world by prefigured mles of interaction over
which they have no input, can such a situation really be said to resonate with
Jones’s explicit normative priorities or have created a ‘higher level of
universality and difference’?
Dilemmas
The notion of creating just alternatives to Oslo must be understood in 
relative terms. Normative considerations invalidated the conflict resolution 
option that was discerned from Andrew Buchanan’s analysis, an improved or 
more refined form of complex co-optation. Yet Deiniol Jones’s explicitly 
normative programme poses additional dilemmas. Jones’s proposals would 
engender a Palestinian state, thereby countering the complex co-optation
36Dillon and Reid, 118-9.
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endeavour that was at the heart of the Oslo Accords, but would also help 
(albeit unwillingly) to further a new type of power relations that is equally 
inimical to notions of universal human freedom. However it is also necessary 
to ponder the outcome if circumstances had come about in which an 
international coalition of states had intervened to create a Palestinian state just 
before, or in the midst of, the Oslo process. Had this occurred, many would 
argue that Jones’s proposals were essentially sound; they produced a situation 
far more preferable to Oslo and especially the status quo ante. Even if Jones 
did not grasp the enormity of the international environment to which his 
changes were proposed, ‘cosmopolitan mediation’ would have at least 
interceded to create a Palestinian state, finally remedying the suffering borne 
of continued Israeli occupation. Since the Palestinians would have had no 
other alternatives to ‘cosmopolitan mediation’ except continued armed 
struggle -  which provides no guarantee of emancipation, this intervention and 
its end result would have to be understood as an necessary evil. Such a view 
may seem somewhat unpalatable, but it also one that prioritises the immediate 
safety needs of the Palestinians over what are ultimately abstract ideals.
Sobering Insights 
This chapter has uncovered two very daunting implications for conflict 
resolution in the Israeli-Palestinian context. The first insight reflected earlier 
themes about the nature of complex co-optation. It was shown that the 
principal Israeli decision-makers in the Rabin government had not fully 
grappled with their intentions toward the Palestinians. One consequence of 
this phenomenon was that a kind of overriding, deep reflection could have 
hypothetically been used as the basis of a much needed self-critique, a genuine
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reconciliation with the Palestinians. Yet the sources of such a programme, one 
rooted in an alternative Israeli vision of peace that eschewed the notion of 
‘empty land’, were as of then unknown. The second insight of this chapter was 
that even if the international community had felt compelled to intervene in 
order to create a Palestinian state, the Palestinians would not truly have had a 
say over the conditions in which their state emerged. The notion of creating a 
more equitable alternative to Oslo could only be understood in a relative 
sense.
The conclusion will address the key issues of external intervention and 
the need for perceptual transformation. It will move beyond the 1993-1995 
period of investigation and contextualise these concepts within the current 
Israeli-Palestinian environment, in which the peace process has completely 
deteriorated.
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Conclusion 
Circuit Breakers
The status of the Oslo Accords is unresolved to date. The source of this 
condition cannot simply be traced to the excessive hawkishness of Likud-led 
governments in Israel, such as Andrew Buchanan wished to suggest. It should 
be noted that Ehud Barak, who was elected Israeli Prime Minister in 1999, 
vowed to continue the ‘peaceful legacy’ of Yitzhak Rabin. In July 2000, under 
the mediation of US President Bill Clinton, Barak’s Labour government 
agreed to the creation of a Palestinian state as the crux of a final status 
arrangement with the Palestinians. To the surprise of many, Yasser Arafat 
rejected Barak’s offer. Israeli government spokesmen subsequently bemoaned 
the Palestinian leader’s ‘recalcitrance’: a refusal to forego the right of return of 
Palestinian refugees to lands inside Israel and claim that the proposed 
concessions on Jerusalem (the first ever offered by an Israeli government) 
were still inadequate. Arafat is certainly not without faults, but it is likely that 
these particular objections were for domestic consumption, a smokescreen to 
cover more substantive concerns. Members of the Palestinian negotiating team 
later noted that the precise reason for Arafat’s position was that the West Bank 
portion of the proposed Palestinian state would have been divided into three, 
un-contiguous cantons that were completely surrounded by Israel.1 Rather than 
admit humiliatingly that the post-Oslo entity being offered was a state in name 
only, Arafat tried to salvage his domestic credibility by claiming that he would 
not compromise over Jerusalem or the refugees’ right of return. But Barak can
'Geoffrey Aronson, ‘Examining Camp David’ Report on Israeli Settlement in the 
Occupied Territories, Vol. 10, No. 5: September-October, 2000,
http://www.fmep.org/reports/2000/vl0n5.html. See also Hussein Agha and Robert Malley, 
‘Camp David: The Tragedy of Errors’ The New York Review o f  Books, 9 August 2001, 
http:// www. nybooks. com/articles/14380.
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still rightfully claim to be Rabin’s protege and successor. In a sense, this is 
why the Palestinians rebuffed him. Barak was continuing with a legacy that is 
simply inadequate to bring about a viable resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict.
The only way to foster a lasting Israel-Palestinian peace is to truly 
‘override’ the extra-dialectical condition that came to define the relationship 
between Israel and the PLO at Oslo. It will be recalled from chapter five that 
the Rabin government’s recognition of the PLO as the official representative 
of the Palestinian people and as its partner in the interim self-government 
arrangements did not in any way countermand long-standing Israeli wishes 
that the Palestinians would accept a permanently sub-sovereign political 
status. The Rabin government still aimed to consolidate Israeli predominance 
over the land and so a synthesis of the two opposing national claims, or a 
recognition that Israeli and Palestinian ties to the land were truly comparable, 
did not come about (pp. 188-214). This new situation did not engender a peace 
between equals, but rather one in which the PLO-run PA came to be viewed as 
‘a product of the system itself, a mere subcontractor of security that was 
simply expected to accept Israeli dictates. It must be noted that all of Rabin’s 
successors, Shimon Peres (1995-6), Benjamin Netanyahu (1996-9), Ehud 
Barak (1999-2001), and Ariel Sharon (2001-present), accepted this guiding 
principle produced by the Oslo Accords. It is thus the enduring extra- 
dialectical relationship between Israel and the Palestinians, and not the 
inhospitable attitudes of Likud-led governments or the supposed recalcitrance 
of the Arafat regime, which is the primary obstacle to a final-status peace 
agreement.
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Multilateral Intervention
In order to begin to fix the untenable situation produced by Oslo, it is
necessary to endorse calls for multilateral intervention in the latest Israeli-
Palestinian violence. At the time of writing, suggestions are being floated
within policy-making circles for a coalition of external powers to intercede in
the fighting and to firmly guide a final status agreement on the two parties. For
example, the Brussels-based International Crisis Group (ICG) recommends:
The first step is for a fair and comprehensive final political settlement to 
be laid on the table by the international community. The vicious cycle in 
which Palestinians will not lay down their arms until they are persuaded 
that their political aspirations will be addressed, and Israelis will not 
contemplate political concessions until the violence has died down, can 
only be broken by the collective presentation of such a plan by key 
regional and international actors.2
Intervention of this sort would halt the present violence between the two 
peoples, and more importantly, bring about a viable Palestinian state in the 
West Bank and Gaza strip. It should be recalled from chapter six, however, 
that such an action would not be a selfless, benign act based on cosmopolitan 
ideals. Nor can it simply be explained as a pragmatic attempt to prevent a 
spillover of the latest Israeli-Palestinian violence into the international arena. 
While the advocates of this initiative do in fact make these arguments, it was 
earlier shown that an extensive action of this sort is likely to advance dubious 
practices of global governance. It is relevant to note that the above ICG 
proposal calls for interveners to determine the borders of a future, non­
militarised Palestinian state and to establish a multinational force that will 
manage security therein. From the critical perspective of this study, this sort
international Crisis Group, ‘A Time to Lead: The International Community and the 
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict’, Middle East Report, No. 1,10 April 2002 (Amman/Brussels): ii. 
ibid., 12.
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of formula not only excludes the Palestinians from key decision-making 
processes regarding the conditions in which their state will emerge, but also 
creates a juridical precedent for this kind of normatively questionable 
intervention to occur elsewhere. Mindful of the possible consequences of such 
an endeavour, this study nonetheless endorses intervention. It was noted in 
chapter six that, despite its many flaws, external intervention should have been 
taken, had it been possible in 1993-1995; it still would have been a better 
alternative to Oslo (p. 243). This reasoning is even more pertinent at the 
present time, when an international response has become a very real 
possibility. Intervention is less than an ideal remedy, but it is the best existing 
option to address the immediate safety needs of the Palestinians.
Lingering Effects o f ‘Control'
The two-state framework is not a panacea. It does provide a much 
needed disengagement between Israelis and Palestinians but it is ultimately 
only a temporary stabiliser. Indeed a critical perspective would point out that 
this externally imposed solution is somewhat flawed because it does not guard 
against the residual effects of the form of power that manifested as complex 
co-optation in the first place. In other words, there still might be some 
lingering aspects of ‘control’ within Israeli-Palestinian relations. It was noted 
earlier that ‘control’ is like a modulation; it is an ever-adapting, adjusting, self- 
transmuting phenomena. So even though a Palestinian state will have been 
created and complex co-optation of the Oslo variety would be defunct, there is 
no guarantee that Israel, for example, would not once more try to domineer the 
Palestinians though a changing economy of power (i.e. attempt to institute a 
‘proper’ neo-colonial relationship with its sovereign neighbour).
248
Clues for means to eliminate any lingering effects of ‘control’ within the
Israeli-Palestinian relationship might be drawn from Gilles Deleuze’s
reflections about possible ways out from the ‘control society’:
It definitely makes sense to look at the various ways individuals and 
groups constitute themselves as subjects through processes of 
subjectification: what counts in such processes is the extent to which, as 
they take shape, they elude both established forms of knowledge and the 
dominant forms of power. Even if they in turn engender new forms of 
power or become assimilated into new forms of knowledge. For a while, 
though, they have a real rebellious spontaneity. This is nothing to do 
with going back to “the subject,” that is to something invested with 
duties, power, and knowledge. One might equally well speak of new 
kinds of events, rather than processes of subjectification: events that 
can’t be explained by the processes that give rise to them or into which 
they lead. They appear for the moment, and it’s the moment that matters, 
it’s the chance we must seize.4
Deleuze is neither concerned with the usurpation or the accession of state
power. He is more interested in the forms of social change that take place
alongside or ‘beneath’ the state. He favours the accommodation and influence
of minorities but not in a conventional political sense, such as through
programmes of multicultural inclusion or by the creation of autonomy or
consociational regimes. Deleuze understands a minority as having a
qualitative, rather than a quantitative meaning: ‘The minor is that which
deviates from the majority or standard which is the bearer of the dominant
social code’.5 For Deleuze, this process of ‘becoming minor’, which he also
refers to as ‘deterritorialisation’ and as ‘the lines of flight’, represents the hope
of revolutionary politics.6 These terms are meant to convey that if changing
circumstances bring about a move away from dominant ordering mechanisms
and belief systems, new outlets and forms of human subjectivity can be
4Idem Gilles Deleuze, ‘Control and Becoming’ in Negotiations 1972-1990 (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1995): 176.
5Idem Paul Patton, Deleuze and the Political (London: Routledge, 2000): 7.
6Ibid„ 7.
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generated and so the potential for emancipation may increase. This is the 
paradox of the ‘control society’. The rigid systems of ordering of the past are 
done way with in favour of new, co-opting systems marked by a greater 
perception of autonomy and recognition. But as a slackening of past methods 
of population management occurs, opportunity spaces may come to emerge 
where the new networks of ‘control’ lack their efficacy. These opportunity 
spaces, what Deleuze called ‘circuit breakers’7, are instances where social 
actors are free to explore, and engage in, the process of collective self­
definition.
Deleuze’s notion of ‘circuit breakers’ does not provide a ready or at 
hand programme to redress deep-seated views within Israeli-Palestinian 
relations. His understanding does not suggest a clear outline of action, in 
praxeological terms. The idea can only intimate the first steps needed for this 
enormous task. It has been argued in this study that the guiding impetus of the 
Israeli national consciousness, the notion of ‘empty land’, underwent 
transition to ‘control society’ types of governance in the Oslo Accords. It was 
also suggested that while there was no discernible alternative national ‘voice’ 
that the Israeli leadership and population might have relied upon to help 
normatively shape their new relationship with the Palestinians in 1993, it was 
nonetheless worthwhile to try to invent or recreate such a legacy for the sake 
of future peace (pp. 224-5). In this vein, any future ‘circuit breakers’ must 
relate to the rejection of the idea of ‘empty land’, in both its original and post- 
1993 form. These ‘circuit breakers’ would utilise this alternative vision of
7Deleuze, ‘Control and Becoming’, 175.
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peace to foster a much needed critical introspection about the ultimate causes 
of the collapse of Oslo as well as to serve as the basis of genuine 
reconciliation between Israelis and Palestinians.
In the Israeli-Palestinian context, ‘circuit breakers’ might be conceived 
as a rediscovery or a reinvention of bi-national ideals.8 It will be recalled from 
Raz-Krakotzkin’s critique in chapter one that the Israeli national narrative has 
decontexualized the Israeli-Palestinian conflict from its Middle Eastern 
setting. Its discourse and historiography is grounded in a teleological view of 
‘the return of the nation to the homeland’, one that produced a conception of 
land as being ‘vacant’ or ‘empty’ -  as exclusively associated with Jews -  and 
so prevented identification with the indigenous Palestinian population as 
having a common attachment to the territory. Accordingly, the mainstream 
Israeli conception of identity is not based on recognition of the bi-nationality 
of the land. The Oslo Accords, as was shown, ‘advanced’ this understanding 
to ‘control society’ forms of rule. But even as Israel sought to co-opt the PLO, 
it created a potentially transformative conceptual space in which ‘circuit 
breakers’ can emerge. The Accords have formally introduced the Palestinians 
into Israeli discourse, but in a distorted sense, as a ‘whatever identity’ -  to use 
the parlance of Giorgio Agamben and Michael Hardt. Oslo might be said to 
represent a kind of improper bi-nationalism. There is an official 
acknowledgement of the presence of the Palestinians, but as sub-nationals -  
not as equals to the Israelis. Yet an improper bi-nationalism is better than pure
8Bi-nationalism need not be construed in a strict political sense, whereby two nations 
are equally represented in one entity (such as the Walloons and Flemish in Belgium). It can 
also be understood in an ideational sense, so that even if the partition of a territory into two 
sovereign states occurs, it is maintained that the two separate peoples continue to share an 
equal right and attachment to the same land.
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chauvinism, for it provides a base of sorts to revisit a genuine proponent of bi­
national thinking, an alternative national voice who might be used as a guide 
to normatively redirect Israeli perceptions of, and dealings with, the 
Palestinians.
The Legacy o f Martin Buber
The ideas of the Israeli philosopher and theologian Martin Buber
(1878-1965) provide direction for potential ‘circuit breakers’. It is
recommended that Buber’s variety of bi-national thought should be revisited
as the crux of an alternative vision of peace that Israelis can draw upon to
shape their post-Oslo relationship with the Palestinians. From the earliest years
of the Zionist movement, and in a marked departure from most of his
contemporaries, Buber argued that the new Jewish identity that was being
established in Palestine would be inherently marred without an active empathy
with the collective yearnings of the country’s Arab population:
Jewish settlement in Palestine, which was embarked upon in order to 
enable the Jewish people to survive as a national entity, and which, in 
its social, economic and cultural aspects, constitutes an enterprise of 
universal significance, suffered from one basic error, which 
handicapped the development of its positive features. This basic error 
consisted of the tribute paid by political leadership to the traditional 
colonial policy, which was less suitable for Palestine than any other 
region of the globe and certainly less fitting for the Jewish people than 
any other nation. Hence, political leadership was guided by 
international and not intra-national considerations. Instead of relating 
the aims of the Jewish people to the geographical reality, wherein these 
aims had to be realized, the political leaders saw these aims only 
against the background of international events and in their relation to 
international problems. Thus, Palestine was embedded in international 
entanglements and attempts toward their solution, isolating it from the 
organic context of the Middle East, into the awakening of which it 
should have been integrated in accordance with a broader spiritual and 
social perspective.9
’Martin Buber, ‘The Bi-National Approach to Zionism’ in Paul R. Mendes-Flohr ed., 
A Land o f Two Peoples: Martin Buber on Jews and Arabs (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1983): 208.
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Buber was very much committed to a just reconciliation of contending 
Palestinian Arab and Jewish national claims. Although he made specific 
political proposals in this regard (the most noteworthy being his 1942-7 
commitment to a bi-national state in Palestine10), ‘the substance of Buber’s 
challenge to the Zionist leadership was not that he had a more judicious policy 
to offer, but rather his demand that it introduce into its political thinking a 
moral tension or, as he preferred to call it “direction” (Richtung)-a moral 
direction which he deemed necessary to quicken the insights leading to a more 
judicious policy.11
Before the establishment of the State of Israel, Buber argued that the 
Palestinian Arabs’ competing claim to sovereignty could not be deferred or 
neutralised by tactics of power politics because such actions would undermine 
the moral and spiritual core of Zionism. Unlike the mainstream Zionist 
leadership, he refused to dismiss the Palestinian Arabs’ opposition to Zionism 
as the tragic consequence of a ‘greater good’. He did not see this tension in 
zero-sum terms and felt it was possible to allay Arab concerns without 
yielding those Zionist priorities, grounded in authentic need, that were deemed 
to be morally compelling. This monumental task involved mutual compromise 
and accommodation, a willingness to reduce the aspirations of the respective 
national movements to the minimum necessary to secure the basic and morally 
tenable interests of the Jewish and the Palestinian Arab people. Buber was 
very much aware that such a programme required good will and self-sacrifice
10 See, for example, Martin Buber, Judah L. Magnes, and Moses Smilansky, 
Palestine: a bi-national state (New York: Ihud (Union) Association of Palestine, 1946).
11 Paul Mendes-Flohr, Introduction in A Land o f Two Peoples: Martin Buber on Jews 
and Arabs, 12.
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from both sides. He also conceded that there were not a significant number of
Palestinian Arabs who had responded to his call. ‘But as Buber repeatedly
emphasized, the requisite political altruism assumes mutual trust, and thus as
the “interlopers”-the intruding, invading party-the burden of creating trust is,
nonetheless, on the Zionist movement’.12
It is worthwhile to recount the kinds of compromises that Buber was
willing to make in order to uphold the principle of bi-national claims to
Palestine. He opposed, for example, the official Zionist policy of creating a
Jewish majority in Palestine as the guiding strategy of response to the ‘Arab
question’. For the sake of accommodation with the Palestinian Arabs, Buber
was prepared to limit Jewish immigration into the country:
In terms of the fundamental principles of Zionism, this was an 
extremely radical position, for free immigration of Jews into Palestine 
was from the founding moment of Zionism deemed the conditio sine 
qua non for the realization of the movement’s supreme moral purpose, 
namely, the solution of the Jewish question. Moreover by rendering 
aliyah [Jewish immigration] subject to Arab sensibilities and consent, 
Buber and his comrades contradicted the most passionate vision of 
Zionism to reconstitute the Jewish people as a sovereign nation 
invested with the dignity and freedom to determine its own destiny.13
Buber argued that these mainstream Zionist sentiments, which he appreciated
and even shared to an extent, were nonetheless politically unsound. Because
he genuinely sought a political compromise on the basis of equal national
claims, he believed that the insistence upon a Jewish majority was unrealistic
and reckless, an inflexible ideological demand that only served to exacerbate
Arab fears and intensify tensions in Palestine.
While the establishment of the State of Israel rendered much of his
earlier criticisms of Zionist policy irrelevant, Buber remained true to his bi­
l2Mendes-Flohr, 14.
13Ibid., 15.
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national convictions. He took the stance that the 1948 war could have been 
avoided and that the pursuit of political sovereignty had been a fatuous, 
unwarranted extravagance.14 More importantly, he continued to maintain that 
the ‘Arab question’ posed the central moral challenge to Zionism. He 
demanded that Israel grant its own Arabs citizens ‘truly equal rights’ and 
argued that Arab refugees from the 1948 war had the right, and should thus be 
given the choice, to return to their former homes inside Israel.15 But it is fair to 
speculate that had Buber witnessed future events -  the rise of the PLO, the 
Israeli occupation and the response of the intifada, he would have remained 
unwavering in his convictions, calling for a just solution that was grounded in 
a wholly bi-national vision of peace.
Buber’s voice and legacy must be revisited. This call should not be 
misconstrued as an endorsement of Buber’s once proposed bi-national state or 
his past call to limit Jewish immigration for the sake of compromise. Such 
ideas were only feasible within the political circumstances that prevailed 
before 1948. These past proposals, however, reflect a genuine bi-national 
spirit that must be revisited, even after the recommended intervention and 
imposition of a two-state solution by outside powers. Buber’s perspective can 
foster a much needed critical introspection about the ultimate causes of the 
collapse of Oslo. For example, many Israelis have vilified the Palestinian
14See, for example, Martin Buber, ‘Let Us Make an End to Falsities!’ in Paul R. 
Mendes-Flohr ed., A Land o f Two Peoples: Martin Buber on Jews and Arabs. In October 
1948, Buber declared: ‘And now-we say-“we have been attacked.” Who attacked us? 
Essentially, those who felt that they have been attacked by us, namely by our peaceful 
conquest. They accuse us of being robbers... And what is our answer? “This was our country 
two thousand years ago, and here it was that we created great things.” Do we generally expect 
this reason to be accepted without argument? Would we do so were we in their place?’ (227).
,5See Martin Buber, ‘We Must Give the Arabs Truly Equal Rights’ and ‘Letter to 
Ben-Gurion on the Arab Refugees’ in Paul R. Mendes-Flohr ed., A Land o f Two Peoples: 
Martin Buber on Jews and Arabs.
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leadership for the egregious violation of its DoP commitments, fomenting the 
current tensions in order to pressure Israel to make greater final status 
concessions.16 These accusations are not completely unfounded. At the time of 
writing there is even evidence that the PA, and not just the militant groups
17under its jurisdiction, is fostering violence against Israeli targets. On the 
other hand, this view feeds into the hegemonic domination of the Israeli 
perspective because it continues to refuse a constructive engagement with the 
root causes of Palestinian grievances. Understood in this way, the Palestinian 
position countenancing violence should be seen as a kind of relative 
culpability. Violence is a disgraceful, but understandable last resort. Arafat’s 
basic sincerity and commitment to peaceful negotiations were long before 
rendered null and void by Rabin and Peres’s practices akin to complex co­
optation and by the de facto similar policies of successive Israeli governments. 
Buber would say that the burden of creating trust lies ultimately on the State of 
Israel. Updating and expanding Buber’s message, it can be said that while 
Israel has a right to exist in peace and security, its military and settlement 
policies in the West Bank and Gaza strip were not legitimate actions and, even 
after Oslo, it continued to intrude upon and oppress the Palestinians. If Israelis 
want the Palestinians to acknowledge and accept their rights, they must be 
willing to fully reciprocate. Although a greater share of responsibility lies with 
the Israelis because they exercised disproportionate control, this does not 
excuse the Palestinians of the need to change themselves. If the Israelis reach
16See, for example, David Makovsky, ‘Middle East Peace Through Partition’ Foreign 
Affairs March/April 2001.
l7See, for example, documents captured by Israeli forces during their re-occupation 
of Palestinian towns and cities in April 2002 (‘Operation Defensive Shield’), posted at Israeli 
army internet site, http://www.idf.il/arafat/engUsh/indexl.stm. These papers directly link PA 
Chairman Yasser Arafat to Palestinian militant groups engaged in violent actions against 
Israeli mihtary and civilian targets.
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out as equals, the Palestinians must seize the opportunity and respond in kind. 
Otherwise, the failure to achieve peace will not reside with Israel alone.
‘Circuit breakers’ can help foster a bi-national conception of peace. 
There have long been Israeli advocates of dialogue and negotiation with the 
Palestinians. But too many of these voices were content to accept the distorted 
and unequal conception of peace offered by Oslo. It was not enough for Israel 
to make modified ‘functional compromises’. Such formulae were simply new 
ways to consolidate its hold over the land. A lasting peace must instead reflect 
the fact that the Israelis and Palestinians have truly equal national claims. 
Ironically, there is a chance for such a vision to take hold after the current 
environment of violence and recrimination. In the wake of the collapse of 
Oslo, the Israeli people have become increasingly confused and are looking 
for ultimate explanations. Both the ‘concessionary* approach of Rabin-Peres- 
Barak and the unapologetic hawkishness of the Likud have failed to bring 
deliverance. It is at this time that critical voices in Israel must once again raise 
the banner of bi-nationalism. It must repeatedly be said that the violence borne 
of Oslo was because Israel did not treat the Palestinians as equals. Such 
endeavours would mirror Buber’s efforts to introduce a tension or moral 
direction into political debates, but would possess one decisive advantage that 
the philosopher-theologian did not have. One of the key reasons that Buber’s 
message seemed alien to the Israeli population of his time was that it found no 
practical correlation with the political facts on the ground. Such circumstances 
would not be the case if multilateral intervention were to bring about the 
creation of a Palestinian state alongside Israel. Intervention would produce a 
sort of begrudging legitimating space for the Palestinians within the Israeli
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national consciousness. This relative acceptance of the Palestinians must be 
harnessed, developed into a ‘circuit breaker*. The task ahead is to convince 
Israelis that true peace can only ensue by substantially upgrading their 
relationship with the Palestinians, by recognising the full bi-nationality of the 
land.
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